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Introduction: Studying Policy Networks
Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz
Social scientists who, in a curiously self-referential process, attentively
observe the changing conceptual "fashions" in their own discipline have
lately pointed to the ascendance of a new key term: policy networks.
By definition of what makes a theoretical "fashion", this term is attrib-
uted great analytical promise by its proponents, whereas critical commen-
tators argue that its meaning is still vague and that the perspective it
implies has not yet matured into anything like a coherent (middle range)
theory. What they agree on is their subject of concern, discourse and
dispute, and that is sufficient to establish "policy networks" on the theo-
retical agenda of contemporary social science, without necessarily guaran-
teeing the declared value. On the contrary, a speculative oversupply of
networking terminology may inflate its explanatory power so that some
form of intellectual control over the conceptual currency in circulation,
both its precise designations and its amount of diffusion, become inevita-
bly a clearance process within the profession.
This situation obviously entails a welcome challenge which we have
taken up in organizing, with the help of Patrick Kenis and Volker
Schneider, in December 1989 a conference under the heading "Policy
Networks: Structural Analysis of Public Policy Making". The present
volume grew out of this conference, though it is not simply a collection
of conference papers. For one thing we have included only such confer-
ence contributions as would fit together in terms of topic and approach.
Even so, several of the original papers had to be substantially revised
to meet this goal. On the other hand we decided to include two papers
not presented at the conference, but which appeared to fit well with the
selection of conference contributions as chapters of the book.
In spite of the editorial efforts to put together a coherent volume
rather than simply publishing yet another set of conference proceedings,
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we have not achieved, nor tried to achieve, anything like homogeneity -
and even less so anything like an authoritative conceptual clarification.
On the contrary, the book reflects the rather imperfect state of the art
as to its colorful taxonomic and methodological pluralism, and at the
same time provides the opportunity to learn from a great diversity of
empirical studies.
As can be seen from the overview table, the chapters in this book
cover a broad range of policy networks and govemance foci, a wide
variety of sectors analyzed, and many different, occasionally even multi-
ple types of comparisons.
The table also indicates an axis for structuring the volume, by com-
bining a substantial (policy sector and governance focus) and a method-
ological (type of comparison) dimension. What it does not indicate is
the terminological as well as the methodological variety which may be
found. What Laumann et al., for instance, call a policy domain is a poli-
cy sector in the parlance of most of the other authors. Again, what Cole-
man designates as a policy community is quite distinct from the meaning
this term is given e.g. by Campbell et al. (1989). But there is no confu-
sion resulting from such terminological diversity since in most cases the
key terms are either explicitly or implicitly defined, so that the reader
knows what the authors are talking about; this, of course, holds especial-
ly for empirical case studies such as we have assembled in this volume.
The chapters in the book also differ in their methodological approach.
Some are qualitative analyses in the political science tradition (e.g. the
chapters by Coleman and by Döhler), some use sophisticated quantitative
methods of sociological network analysis (e.g. the chapters by Laumann
et al. and by Pappi & Knoke); finally there is a third group of contribu-
tions which draw on both of these traditions - most clearly the chapter
by Schneider & Werle. This diversity of approaches reflects the current
"state of the art" in policy network research. In itself, "policy network"
is a concept that appears to signal the confluence of two research tradi-
tions, (sociological) network analysis, and studies of policy making. In
fact, however, as Kenis and Schneider note in chapter 2, most policy
network studies to date have remained qualitative and "soft". As it is
hoped that this volume will contribute to an intensified intellectual ex-
change between those working in a more qualitative approach and those
working with quantitative data, we have quite intentionally selected ex-
amples from both research traditions for this book. This should also
afford the opportunity to evaluate their respective potentials as well as
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the chances of actually achieving that integration which the key term
"policy network" only hints at now.
In spite of these differences between them, the chapters of this book
also have a number of things in common. First, with the exception of
the overview chapter by Kenis & Schneider, all contributions report on
results from primary research and empirical studies. Whereas method-
ologies, techniques used and empirical evidence vary widely, all studies
interpret findings based on genuine and primary research work and data
generation.
Secondly, all of these studies arc comparative cross-sectoral, or
cross-national, ot diachronic in design, comparing policy networks in
different policy sectors, in different countries, or at different points in
time; Döhler and Kenis even combine two comparative dimensions by
studying a given policy field (health and industrial restructuring) cross-
nationally and also diachronically, over different periods of time. Cole-
man and Pappi compare countries (Canada/US and Germany/US) in
monetary and labor policy, Jansen and Schneider & Werle compare net-
work developments within one high-tech sector such as superconductivity
and telecommunications in one country (Germany) over time. And Lau-
mann et al. compare networking in one country across a broad range
of sectors - agriculture, energy, labor, and health in the United States.
Thirdly, with the exception of Laumann et al. who study networking
processes without structured and organized policy networks, all other
empirical studies focus on structured sets of corporate or collective actors
(and on individuals only as representatives of formal organizations or
agencies). This is a distinguishing characteristic of most recent policy
network research: Policy networks do not refer any longer to "network-
ing" of individual personalities, to group collusions, to the interlocking
of cliques, elites, party or class factions, as in older traditions, but to
the collective action of organized, corporate actors, and consequently
to interorganizational relations in public policy making.
Fourthly, all studies analyze policy networks in their proper domain
frame and that is on the meso (sectoral) level of specific policy fields.
While the eight policy sectors analyzed in detail refer to three main
contemporary macropolitical challenges one could call governance foci -
governing the economy, promoting science and technology, and refbrm-
ing health - the comparisons between policy fields, countries and over
time always take place at the level where policy networks actually oper-
ate - in more or less well-defined sectors.
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Finally, all chapters address questions about the nature, determinants,
and consequences of policy networks as the social infrastructure of policy
formulation and implementation. Taken together, they highlight the most
salient theoretical issues in this new field of research.
In this introduction, we shall briefly indicate some of the more gener-
al conclusions that can be drawn from the various contributions to this
volume. But before turning to substantive issues we must come back
for a moment to the problems, briefly indicated, of terminology.
This book is not about conceptual issues. They are specifically ad-
dressed only in the overview chapter by Kenis & Schneider, and tan-
gentially in some others (e.g. Jansen), but by and large the authors sim-
ply choose and use a specific terminology. In principle, conceptual
issues can be easily resolved if one adopts a nominalist position. The
properties of phenomena named "policy networks" cannot be derived
from the concept (except in a tautological manner); we must choose what
we want them to designate. This is good nominalist practice. That it
seems so difficult to establish an accepted terminological convention in
this case reflects the inevitable ambiguity which surrounds all concepts
referring to phenomena of a highly abstracted, intangible character. In
such cases there are normally many related and yet distinct ways of
circumscribing the object of cognition, depending on the particular aspect
of a complex reality singled out for closer inspection. Such differences
in conceptual practice are even useful because they call attention to the
various dimensions needed to describe empirical phenomena of the class
one is interested in, to help in the construction bf a multi-dimensional
property space in which different policy making structures can be located.
Kenis's and Schneider's initial definition of policy networks as policy
making affangements characterized by the predominance of informal,
decentralized and horizontal relations reflects what might be called one
emerging mainstream view. Defined in this way, the concept emphasizes
that the policy process is not completely and exclusively structured by
formal institutional :urangements. It also emphasizes that the relationship
among those who de facto participate in the process is not hierarchical.
The actors making up a policy network are interdependent, but - by and
large - formally autonomous. This is not to say that policy is never
developed within hierarchical structures; the policy network concept sim-
ply calls attention to the fact that the participants in a collective decision
process are often linked laterally (or horizontally) rather than vertically.
This particular definitional characteistic of policy networks differs from
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the tradition of network analysis, as Kenis and Schneider point out; there,
the relational structures investigated include hierarchies as one possible
configuration. In this tradition of policy analysis, networks ate contrasted
to hierarchies. Yet power can be more or less concentrated: policy net-
works are characterized by a patterned distribution of decision making
powers.
A somewhat contrasting view with fegard to both traditional network
analysis and the Kenis & Schneider counterposition is held by one of
the editors (Marin 1990a: 19-20, 56-58). While policy networks cre
predominantly informal, decentralized and horizontal, they never operate
iompletely outside power-dependence relations, i.e. outside asymmetric
interdependencies and unequal mutual adjustments between autonomous
actors, imbalanced transactions-chains, and verlically directed flows of
influence. Hierarchies neither are one possible structural configuration
among others nor the ideal typical counterpart to horizontal structures
such as policy networks, but in the sense of Nobel Laureate H. A. Simon
(1962) almost omnipresent asymmetric intefdependencies between system
elements and, therefore, continua or matters of degree: formal organiza-
tions are more or less hierarchically structured, and so are policy net-
works. What distinguishes bureaucracies and complex organizations in
general from policy networks are not so much hierarchical vs. horizontal
ielations, but single organizational vs. interorganizational relations and
the nature of power relations permeating both, but in dffirent ways: the
control over strategic rigidities in tight or loosely coupled systems, the
conditions of entry/exit, inclusion/exclusion/expulsion, membership or
other adherences, etc.
Policy networks are explicitly defined not only by their structure as
interorganizational alrangements, but also by their function - theformula-
tion and implementation of policy. This provides a useful criterion for
boundary specification, the inclusion or exclusion of players of a specific
game: actors who do not in one way or another participate in the collec-
tive decision process generating a policy afe not included in the network.
If policy is simply taken to mean a consistent strategy, policy networks
neöd not refer to public policy (but may, for instance, fefer to a collec-
tive market strategy of business firms, as in the study by Kenis), but
this is how the term is understood by all other contributions to the vol-
ume.
If "policy" usually means public policy in policy network studies,
this does not imply that state agents must be the focal or dominant par-
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ticipants. There are studies of networks composed mainly or even exclu-
sively of public actofs, as in the analysis of intergovernmental relations.
In this book, Coleman presents a case where public actors and their
interrelations predominate. In largely self-regulated sectors, on the othef
hand, public policy may well be fbrmulated by private actors (to be
initiated or subsequently endorsed by the proper political authorities).
Most policy networks studied, however, are characteized by a mixture
of public and private actors; in fact, the joint participation of public and
private (corporative) actors is for many as much the hallmark of policy
networks as is the decentering of the central state, the emergence of what
is sometimes called a "centerless society"' As the relative weight - nu-
merical and in terms of power - of each category becomes a descriptive
dimension of focal importance, and that is a purely empirical question,
there is and can no longer be any a priori assumption of a crucial, cen-
tral, hegemonic actor, which is ultimately determinant or only significant
or even simply present in all kinds of policy networks'
If the actors in a policy network are interdependent and interact in
a collective decision process, this does not necessarily spell harmonious
collaboration - or even only what game-theoretical language describes
as coordination games. Instead, the extent - and exact structure - of
consensus and opposition, symbiotic collusion or competition, cooperation
or antagonism or antagonistic cooperation constitute another important
dimension in the description of a given policy network. Marin (1990a)
argues that the divergent, competitive or even antagonistic interests struc-
turally prevailing in most policy networks make antagonistic cooperation
the prevalent, if not defining, feature of such interorganizational arange-
ments.
There are other descriptive dimensions which could be used in a
minimal definition of policy networks, and also to distinguish different
types of policy networks. The number of actors, for instance, can vary
greatly - but not indefinitely. While the classical "iron triangle" is com-
posed of only three major actors, Laumann et al. identified around 80
participants each in the four policy networks they analyze. But could
we reasonably think of policy networks with several hundreds of partici-
pants, with a sheer co-presence of many actors within the same political
arena? Even the Laumann et al. case may be a kind of outlier due to
their focus on networking rather than on policy networks proper: only
a few or not too rnany actors can actually inter-acl with each other -
instead of either simply re-acting more of less uniformly to the same
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(political or price) market signals or of being organized into more or
less uniform action within the same bureaucratic hierarchy. Policy net-
works are composed of autonomous, but interdependent actors, with
divergent and mutually contingent interests - and the corresponding com-
plexities put an obvious, even if not precisely and once and for all quan-
tifiable limit to the number of collective actors able to operate a policy
network and to interact strategically within it.
So far, we have a number both of defining components as well as
of dimensions along which policy networks may vary, but within a cer-
tain range only in order not to lose their character as policy networks:
being anchored in policy sectors; requiring collective action; composed
of corporate actors; structured as interorganizational relations; predomi-
nantly informal and horizontal, but not without asymmetric interdepen-
dencies which means power relations; functionally defined by the formu-
lation and implementation of policy; without stable central or hegemonic
actors; involving not too many participants; and characterized by strategic
interaction and a predominance of antagonistic cooperation or mixed-
motive games.
There are other aspects with respect to which policy networks can
vary. Policy networks, for instance, can exist on dffirent tenitorial
levels: there are international (e.g. European), nationwide, regional and
even local networks; empirical research has so far concentrated on nation-
al policy networks, a fact that is fully reflected in this book. The
stability of policy networks over time and across decision events, or
issues, is another variable of great interest, to which several of the chap-
ters devote attention. Finally, what one might call the action focus of
policy networks can vary: some are of macro-political importance, as
in corporatist networks dealing with a stream of different economic poli-
cy issues, some have a nanower focus (sectoral or subsectoral networks),
and some are formed around a single issue.
In listing these dimensions along which policy networks may vary,
it is important to keep apart matters of conceptual clarilication which
must be settled by definition (i.e. the choice of properties included in
a minimal definition of policy networks) from empirical issues, i.e. the
question what structures meeting the criteria which define policy net-
works actually look like. Major questions of this kind refer to variations
across nations, sectors, and time - and to their causes and consequences.
It is to such substantive issues that we now turn.
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Empirical research on policy networks seryes generally to test as-
sumptions about policy making, particularly the structures which underlie
- and shape - the process and its outcome. Behind this kind of cognitive
interest stands the general premise that structured social relationships
have more explanatory power than personal attributes of actors (Wellman
1988: 3l). The specific question raised by the notion of policy networks -
do those who are formally responsible for it actually monopolize policy
making - is not new; it stands in a long tradition of comparing political
reality with normative expectations. Thus the discovery of the "subgov-
ernments" active in US policy making, an early version of policy net-
works (Jordan 1990), meant the destruction of an illusion, rather than
indicating a change in reality. In contrast it is a major tenet of the policy
networks approach, forcefully argued by Kenis & Schneider in chapter
2, that policy networks are indeed (relatively) new phenomena that have
emerged in response to a growing dispersion of the resources and the
capacities for action among public and private actors. In this perspective,
structural changes in society and in the polity are ultimately responsible
for the emergence of policy networks - as a new structure in, and mode
of, policy making. This does not exclude that state agents have at times
actively assisted in the process of network construction ("networking"
as a political strategy).
If policy networks emerge in response to the exigencies of policy
making under changing conditions, it should be possible to observe that
policy networks change structurally over time. One such change, the
expansion of small and stable "iron triangles" into large and fluidly
bounded issue networks has been suggested, though not empirically prov-
en, by Heclo (1978). In this volume, Schneider and Werle demonstrate
a significant expansion of the German telecommunications policy network
in the course of roughly 100 years. Jansen, looking at a subsectoral
network in German R&D policy, shows how a breakthrough in supercon-
ductivity research in the 80s altered the opportunity structure for research
laboratories and federal policy makers alike and resulted in significant
changes in the superconductivity policy network.
Where policy networks are empirically identified by observing which
actors participate de facto in the controversy, consultation, and bargaining
which precede a given policy decision, the focus is normally on sectoral
or even issue-specific networks rather than on macro-political constella-
tions such as the literature on neo-corporatism has focused on (Lehm-
bruch 1984). It is an interesting question, not addressed in this volume,
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whether aside from the analytical distinction between comprehensive and
sectoral policy networks there might be a real tendency toward sectoral
disaggregation, Irrespective of such a trend we should, however, expect
that network types differ between policy sectors - if indeed the structure
of the target population (or regulatory field) affects the structure of sec-
toral policy networks. In this volume, it is especially the chapter by
Laurnann et al. which provides empirical evidence for such an expecta-
tion, as the authors compare size, composition, and cleavage structure
of four policy sectors in the US.
Policy processes which crystallize about a single issue, or decision
event, tend not to mobilize the full set of actors composing a sectoral
policy network. It is again the research of Laumann et al. which provides
convincing evidence for this. While roughly 80 different corporate actors
make up each of the four sectoral policy networks studied, individual
decision events activate only between25 and 53 of them. Active partici-
pation is thus discontinuous rather than continuous. Moreover, the com-
position of the pro- and contra-coalitions is not stable over time, i.e.
individual actors do not find themselves in one camp together with the
same coalition partners each time they do participate. In spite of the
existence of a more enduring sectoral pattern of relationships, issue-spe-
cific networks thus differ significantly from each other; the authors con-
clude that "... casual observers greatly exaggerzrte the degree of stability
of participation, consensus and cleavage in policy making" (cf. Laumann
et al. in this volume). The conclusion that issue networks in the same
policy sector can differ substantially is confirmed by the contribution
of Werle & Schneider. Looking more in detail at two policy networks
within the German telecommunications domain which crystallized about
two different issues, i.e. the introduction of a new service, and postal
reform, they show how it is the (more technical and economic, or more
political) nature of the issue which shapes the emerging networks.
Policy networks also differ between nations, if the sector is held
constant. This is one of the results in the contribution by Pappi &
Knoke, who compare labor policy networks in the US and Germany.
While in this case, the reasons for the observed structural differences
are not discussed at length, the causal question is at the core of Cole-
man's chapter. He shows how macropolitical institutions of the Westmin-
ster parliamentary vs. the US congressional type shape both the formal
relationships and informal networks in the field of monetary policy.
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The contributions in this volume do not only serve to show how
policy networks differ in important respects. They also have accumulated
evidence about the factors shaping the structure of policy networks, from
the macropolitical institutional framework to the substantive content of
issues. Evidence of the difference such structural differences make for
policy is less rich and direct. Pappi & Knoke in their chapter do aim
to explain labor policy decisions taken on specific issues, expecting them
to be determined by the distribution of power and preferences, mediated
by an exchange of control over policy sub-domains among the actors
involved in the sectoral policy network; their research, however, is not
yet sufficiently advanced to test this expectation. The chapter by Döhler,
on the other hand, does offer a tentative empirical generalization. Com-
paring health policy networks in the US, Britain and Germany over
time and looking at the extent to which neo-conservative reform policies
have been successful in these countries he suggests that highly frag-
mented as well as highly centralized network structures have facilitated
the formulation and implementation of neo-conservative programs. If.
on the other hand, a sector is characterized by pronounced and legitimate
self-government, it tends to resist a policy that would change its basic
modus operandi. Important as these results are, and even considering the
less explicit suggestions which several ofthe chapters contain by describ-
ing both specific substantive policies and the networks which generate
them, it seems clear that there is much need here for future empirical
testing.
This leads up to the final question to be raised by way of introduc-
tion, i.e. whether the contributions in this volume lend support to the
expectation that a deliberate combination of (quantitative) network analy-
sis and (qualitative) policy analysis offers the chance of cognitive ad-
vances in a difTicult field. The reader will undoubtedly form his or her
own judgment about this on the basis of the text, asking for instance
such questions as: Could the structural differences between two issue
networks which Schneider and Werle analyze quantitatively have been
presented as convincingly and with as much detail if they had been
content with a discursive description? Or: What would a quantitative
analysis along the lines of Laumann et al. have added to Döhler's com-
parative study? The general answer we would give is that a combined
qualitative and quantitative approach is obviously much more demanding
in terms of research time and r€sources, but that it offers the chance of
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greater precision, and of discovering both details and comprehensive
patterns that would otherwise have remained invisible.
Quantification always promises formal accuracy. The transformation
of qualitative structural notions to operational constructs forces us to spell
out cleady the relevant variables, so clearly that measurement becomes
possible. In the course of doing so, and through the application of the
formal procedures developed to establish the values of the variables in
a given empirical case, we come to recognize facets of reality which
otherwise might have gone unnoticed, or at least would have remained
implicit. Examples of this are the surprisingly large size of policy net-
works and the fluidity of their boundaqy; both became visible when for-
mal procedures were employed to identify the actors belonging to, or
making up a given policy network. Another insight favored by formal
measurement concerns the variability of issue networks emerging within
a given policy sector. True, this could have been, and in fact has been
recognized in purely qualitative studies (e.g. Mayntz 1990:298-301); but
compared to a narrative account there is simply more proof in empirical
evidence expressed in figures, i.e. the results acquire a higher reliability
and are more convincing than other forms of reasoning.
On the other hand there is always the danger that the price of higher
reliability has to be paid in terms of a lower validity when only quantita-
tive methods are used. The very procedure of operationalizing concepts
to make them amenable to measurement usually requires simplification
by reduction. An example is the reduction of substantive policy prefer-
ences to a simple pro/contra dichotomy as Laumann et al. are using.
Formal network analysis in general reduces the properties of actors to
a few categories (in the extreme case: public/private) and their relations
to a few types, such as information and resource exchange, or power
differentials (normally: reputational power as aggregate measure). But
these measurable structural properties may not be the most salient ones;
the fine-grained details of the distribution of jurisdictions and of the
procedural rules defining the nature of the interdependencies between
given actors easily escape quantification. To what extent, for instance,
would it have been possible to include in a formal, quantitative analysis
the fine distinctions between the American and the Canadian monetary
authorities and the pattern of relations between central bank, top execu-
tive, and competent ministries which Coleman describes?
If such are the advantages and the drawbacks of the utilization of
formal network analysis in the study of policy networks, much seems
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indeed to speak for the rnaxim already formulated, i.e. for the explicit
attempt to combine both approaches.
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Policy Networks and Policy Analysis:
Scrutinizing a New Analytical Toolbox
Patrick Kenis and Volker Schneider
I The Network Perspective in Social Theory
A new catch word diffuses over the landscape of science and is more
and more frequently encountered in a number of disciplines. The term
"network" seems to match a growing need for the de-mystification of
cornplexity in nature and society. Microbiologists are describing cells
as information networks, ecologists conceptualize the living environment
as network systems, and the newest fashion in computer science is neuro-
nal networks with self-organizing and learning capacities. The term net-
work is on the way to becoming the new paradigm for the "architecture
of complexity" (compared to hierarchy as the old architectural paradigm
of complexity: see Simon 1973).
However, at least in the social sciences, network thinking is not
completely new. An antecedent was certainly provided by the German
sociologist Georg Simmel, who presented an original theoretical stimulus
for the network idea drawing upon formal sociology (for this interpreta-
tion see Rogers 1989: 167-168). Other precedents came from French
structuralism. In his famous Structural Anthropology, Claude Ldvi-Strauss
conceived society "as a network of different types of orders"; and he
suggested that these orders themselves could be classified according to
different organizing principles, "by showing the kind of relationships
which exist among them, how they interact with one another on both
the synchronic and diachronic level" (L6vi-Strauss 1969: 3I2).It would
For comments during the conference and for suggestions and critics to the revised version
of the paper, we thank Helmut Anheier, Gerhard Lehmbruch, Giandomenico Majone, Bernd
Marin,-Rinate Mayntz, Fritz W. Scharpf, Frans Stokman, and Raymund Werle, Adrienne
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not be difficult to find further dispersed roors of the network idea. The
abundance and variety in which network concepts occur in contemporary
social sciences, however, indicates a new quality. Networks as new forms
of social organization are currently studied in the sociology of science
and technology (see, for instance, the concept of actor networks in Callon
1986), in the economics of network industries and network technologies(for the concept of market interdependencies see Katzl Shapiro 1985),
and in different approaches of business administration (cf, Thorelli 1986
and Powell 1990).
Network thinking conveys its own picture of the world, its particular
epistemological background. In contrast to the mechanical view of the
world emerging in the 17th century and the bio-organic view originating
in the l9th century, the network perspective implies a new perception
of causal relations in social processes. The mechanical view of the world
established the idea of linear causality explaining social states and events
as determined by external forces. The bio-organic perspective shaped the
notion of functional causality in which societal subsystems contribute
to prerequisites and needs of a global social organism. Both the mechani-
cal and biological world pictures conceived systemness and societal con-
trol as something beyond individual actors. Essentially, this perspective
is changed in the network view of society. The core of this perspective
is a decentralized concept of social organization and governance: society
is no longer exclusively controlled by a central intelligence (e.g. the
State); rather, controlling devices are dispersed and intelligence is distrib-
uted among a multiplicity of action (or "processing") units. The coordina-
tion of these action units is no longer the result of "central steering" or
some kind of "prestabilized harmony" but emerges through the purposeful
interactions of individual actors, who themselves are enabled for parallel
action by exchanging information and other relevant resources. This
perspective - like the older perspectives, too - is shaped by time and by
the information age, and thus is more or less influenced by information
and communication theory.l
According to Krippendorff (1989: 443), rhe science of control and communication (i.e.,
cybernetics) "is fundamentally concerned with organization, how organization emerges
and becomes constituted by networks of communication processes, and how wholes
behave as a consequence of the interaction among the parts". In such an approach,
purpose and intelligence would be seen as "distributed (not centralized) and imminent
in the way people interact or communicate with one another regardless of whether parti-
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Although network thinking will have considerable impact on future
social theory building in general, this chapter is certainly not the place
for a general "philosophical" discussion. Based on the assumption that
the network perspective will be, indeed, also fruitful for political analysis,
we will focus our discussion on the specific use of network concepts
in policy analysis. We will try to show that an important advantage of
the network concept in this discipline is that it helps us to understand
not only formal institutional arrangements but also highly complex
informal relationships in the policy process. From a network point of
view. modern political decision making cannot adequately be understood
by the exclusive focus on formal politico-institutional anangements. Poli-
cies are formulated to an increasing degree in informal political infra-
structures outside conventional channels such as legislative, executive
and administrative organizations. Contemporary policy processes emerge
from complex actor constellations and resource interdependencies, and
decisions are often made in a highly decentralized and informal manner.
2 The Discovery of Networks in Policy Making
In the literature of public policy making, the observation of network
configurations can be traced back to the late 60s and early 70s, although
the real take-off of network studies occurred only in the decade follow-
ing. Since this time, an increasing number of authors have considered
this term as a reasonable descriptor for a cluster of new facets in modern
policy making. To be fair, some facets like informality and decentraliza-
tion were clearly not new to political scientists. Many aspects were even
core elements in pluralist theories of policy making (for such an interpre-
tation see Jordan 1990). There is no doubt that one of the major criti-
cisms of hierarchical, instrumentalist and formalist conceptions of politics
came from pluralist theory. Bentley (1967) and Truman (1971), two of
the most well-known thinkers of this current of theory, for instance,
place great emphasis on a somewhat "fluid perspective" of the political
process. They frequently pointed to the existence of horizontal relations
between government, administration and organized interests. One should
cipants are fully aware of thern". Cybernetics would shift attention from control qf to
control ruitlrin.
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not forget that it was Bentley (1967: 261) who coined the notion of
government as a "network of activities".
A serious shortcoming of pluralist thinking, however, was its rather
mystified image of world complexity: political life seemed to be fluid,
amorphous and in constant change.2 It was neo-corporatist theory and
neo-institutional approaches which confronted pluralist visions with the
pre-dominance of hierarchy, restricted access, selectivity and compulsory
group structures in the political organization of modern societies.3 The
interest of neo-corporatism, however, focused more on the "general archi-
tecture" of nations and sectors with respect to group structures and rela-
tionships with the state. Networks between policy actors like government,
administrative agencies and organized interests, gained the attention of
neo-corporatist scholars only in the early and mid-1980s.4
One of the first authors who explicitly used the term network from
a "post-pluralist" and neo-institutionalist perspective, was Rokkan (1969).
Rokkan can be credited with emphasizing the importance of policy mak-
ing structures besides conventional electoral-parliamentarian channels.
For Rokkan, bargaining networks between corporate bodies and the gov-
emment were not adverse or antagonistic elements of political decision
making structures but complementary channels to conventional structures
which created stability by integrating potential veto powers into the poli-
cy process.5
Another area where policy networks have been observed are studies
of policy making in some restricted sectors or policy studies at the sub-
governmental level. An influential study in this direction was Heclo and
2 Cf. Bentley's view of social life where "... activities are all knit together in a system
..., they brace each other up, hold each other together, move forward by their inter-
actions, and in general are in a state of continuous pressure upon another" (1961:218).
A similar picture is painted by Latham (1964: 48t.) on "public policy" making which
he sees as an expression of equilibrium reached in group struggles, in a universe ofI'groups which combine, break, federate and form constellations and coalitions of power
in a flux of restless alterations."
3 For the main texts of neo-corporatist theory see Schmitter/ Lehmbruch (1979) and Lehm-
bruch/ Schmitter (1982).
4 Kriesi (1982), Lehmbruch (1985), Atkinsor/ Coleman (1985) and Traxler/ Unger (1990).
5 "At least in matters of internal policy it can rarely if ever force through decisions
solely on the basis ofits electoral power but has to temper its policies in complex consul-
tations and bargains with the major interest organizations. To guard against difficulties
and reversals in these processes of bargaining the government has over the years built
up a large network of consultative boards and councils for the representation of all the
relevant interests" (Rokkan 1969: 107-108).
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Wildavsky's (1974) analysis of the British Treasury Department. In this
book, the notion of the "policy community" was introduced to describe
a phenomenon which was closely related to policy networks. Heclo and
Wildavsky defined the policy community as a cluster of personal rela-
tionships between major political and administrative actors in a policy
area. Among these relations, they especially emphasized the role of mutu-
al trust, and governmental sectors were portrayed as closed village com-
munities knitted together by confidence, common calculations and spe-
cific "climates". Interestingly, in this context the authors used the network
notion for the "criss-crossing" relations within the executive community
together (Heclo/ Wildavsky 1974: 389).
A network study focusing more on local governments was published
by Friend, Power and Yewlett (1974).In contrast to the former use of
the network idea, in this book the network concept was applied in a
rather fonnalized context with sqme explicit references to social network
approaches. One of the basic categories of the theoretical approach ap-
plied in this study was a multiple actor system operating in the formula-
tion and implementation of a public policy. Networks in this context
were seen as sub-elements of the "policy system" which was defined as
a set of organizational and inter-personal arrangements dealing with deci-
sion problems related to a given policy (Friend et al. 1974: 26). Such
relations between policy actors included not only linkages based on hier-
archical authority patterns but also informal relationships such as interper-
sonal communication. The communication structure among people acting
in policy systems was called a "decision network".
A further study on sectoral policy making can be found in Heclo
(1978), a widely cited and influential article. The innovative aspect here
was the focus on issue specdic policy networks. This perspective was
seen in contrast to elitist approaches in American policy making which
explained governmental strategies by the interaction and exchange be-
tween a rather small and exclusive set of actors (i.e., the f'amous "iron
triangle" between congress, administrative agencies and lobbying groups).
To extend this restricted picture, Heclo introduced the concept of "issue
networks" designating large and intricate webs comprising numerous
30 Chapter 2
policy making actors,6In these networks, govemmental and administrative
responsibility was seen to be increasingly dispersed among large numbers
of policy intermediaries - very similar to Bentley and Truman's vision.
It is important to note that Heclo also pointed to an observation similar
to Rokkan's with respect to the parallel emergence of new, informal
political decision and coordination structures beside party systems and
parliamentary channels.T
A version of the policy network concept that focuses more on indi-
vidual actors in concrete policy processes has been introduced by Hanf
and Scharpf (1977) in a reader on horizontal coordination in policy mak-
ing. This book explicitly draws some links between the formal network
concept, interorganizational analysis in organizational sociology, and the
use of these approaches in policy research. In the introduction Hanf
writes:
In its most basic sense, the term 'network' merely denotes, in a suggestive manner, the
fact that policy making involves a large number and wide variety of public and private
actors from the different levels and functional areas of government and society. By
stressing the 'intenelations' and 'interdependence' of these individual actors, the term
also draws attention to the patterns of linkages and interactions among these elements
and the way in which these structure the behavior of the individual organizations. As
far as the individual organizations are concerned,.they are embedded in a particular set
of relationships, the structure of which constrains the action options open to them and
the kinds of behavior they can engage in as they go about their particular business (Hanf/
Scharpf 1917: l2).
A common theme in this book is how specific network configurations
operate more successfully than others in policy making. Different network
structures are seen as supportive or critical for coordinated efforts to
reach a common policy objective within a collectivity of actors. Interest-
ingly, already in this book Scharpf expressed the conviction that networks
of interorganizational dependence could be identified by network analyti-
cal tools more precisely. This would eventually lead to an equally precise
identification of prescriptive patterns of required coordination structures
Heclo (1978: 102): "Issue networks ... comprise a large number of participants with
quite variable degrees of mutual commitment of dependence on others in their environ-
ment; in fact it its almost impossible to say where a network leaves off and its environ-
ment begins."
Heclo (1978: 117) insists that "... the growth of specialized policy networks tends to
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between organizational units in interorganizational poticy formation and
implementation (Scharpf 1977: 363).
A policy network referring not to interrelations between concrete
actors but more to linkages between broad social categories - such as
the state, whole societal sectors and social coalitions - has been advanced
by Katzenstein (1978). His "policy network" is a kind of political meta-
structure integrating different forms of interest intermediation and gover-
nance, forming a symbiotic relationship between state and society in
policy making. In the context of a study of foreign economic policy
Katzenstein writes:
The governing coalitions of social forces in each of the advanced states find their institu-
tional expression in distinct policy networks which link the public and the private
sector in the implementation of foreign economic policy. The notion that coalitions and
policy networks are central to the domestic structures defining and implementing policy
rests on the assumption that social life is structured not exclusively of course, but struc-
tural nonetheless by just those formal institutional mechanism (Katzenstein 1978: l9).8
Within this general idea of policy networks as a kind of broad societal
governance structure, we will locate and develop our definition of the
concept in section four of this chapter.
In the last decade, a few studies also emerged which applied quanti-
tative network methods in policy network studies. Laumann and Pappi's
(1976) community power book clearly was one of the first applications
of advanced structural methods. Their interest, however, primarily focused
on elite structures rather than on policy analysis. Empirical application
of network analysis and structural methods with a focus on policy pro-
cesses and domains emerged only within the 80s. Some of the rare ex-
amples are Laumann and Knoke's (1987) analysis of structural properties
and exchange relations in the US health and energy policy domains,
Schneider's (1988) analysis of the West-German policy process of the
Chemicals Control Law, and Pappi and Knoke's USA-Germany compari-
son of exchange relations in the labor policy domain (Pappi 1990; Pappi
and Knoke in this volume). A further example, finally, is Mandell's
(1984) application of network analytical methods to the interorganiza-
tional implementation of a policy program. Apart from these few studies,
the repercussions of formal structural models and methods on the "quali-
tative stream" of policy analysis have been marginal.
For an empirical application of Katzenstein's policy network concept for cross-national
comparison see Katzenstein (1987).
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Therefore, the quantitative studies certainly do not point to a general
trend of methodological thoroughness in the analysis of policy networks.
The majority of policy network studies, instead, focused more on concep-
tual variation and qualitative descr-iption. Examples of particularly well-
known British applications in local government and government-industry
relations are Rhodes (1981, 1986),e Sharpe (1985), Wilks/ Wright (1987)
and Wright (1988); and for neo-corporatist theoretical reasoning certainly
Lehmbruch (1985) and Atkinson/ Coleman (1985, 1989) have to be men-
tioned.l0 Most of these studies have their own perspective, and the mean-
ings and connotations that were given to the term network, are still am-
biguous. But despite such fuzziness, the idea of the policy network clear-
ly has gravitated to a position of central importance. It became an ac-
cepted descriptor for policy making alrangements characterized by a
predominance of informal, decentralized and horizontal relations in the
policy process.
Moreover, parallel to the development of the policy network idea
a number of other concepts were proposed which sometimes described
very similar or even overlapping phenomena. Such concepts are, for
example, the policy sector (Benson 1982), the policy domain (Laumann/
Knoke 1987), the policy topic's organization set (see for this concept
Olsen 1982), the policy (actor) system (see, for instance, Sabatier 1987),
the policy community (Jordan/ Richardson 1983, Mdny 1989), the policy
game, the policy arena and also the policy regime. The network concept
and all these other policy concepts are variations of a basic theme: the
idea of public policies which are not explained by the intentions of one
or two central actors, but which are generated within multiple actor-sets
in which the individual actors are interrelated in a more or less systemat-
ic way. However, each of the different policy concepts emphasizes a
special aspect: for example, the institutional structures in decision making
processes are highlighted by the arena and regime perspective; the con-
flictual nature of policy processes, again, is emphasized by the game
perspective. The arena concept, in contrast, concentrates on conflict and
institutional integration, and the community, system and sector perspec-
9 For a more detailed overview of British works with the network concept see also the
recent article of Rhodes (1990).
l0 Other examples in the application of the network concept in policy making are Zijlstra
(1918179:359-389); Rainey/ Milward (1983: 133-146); Trasher/ Dunkerley (1982: 349'
382); Trasher (1983: 375-391). For an overview see also Windhoff-Hdritier (1985: 85-
2t2).
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tives emphasize a kind of structural closure within actor configurations,
the presence of boundaries and certain integrating forces which give
identity to the structural whole - even if this is only some fotm of inter-
relatedness or interdependence of network actors.
What we have seen in this part is an entire range of different but,
for the most part, complementary views which use the network concept
for a description of structural and institutional arrangements in policy
making, in which ongoing cooperation of autonomous but interdependent
actors is emphasized. To arrive at a more explicit definition of policy
networks in the next part, we allow ourselves to reculer pour mieux
sauter in order to reveal the underlying trends of this upcoming concept.
Conjunctures and Transformations: The Emergence of
Network Thinking in Policy Analysis
Despite some success in diffusing the policy network notion, it has not
yet gained a clear, analytically distinctive meaning. In the main, it is
used metaphorically to shed light on some specific empirical observa-
tions. This coining of a new metaphor during the 70s did not come
about by coincidence but is related to at least three more general trans-
formations:
1. transformations in the political reality, or in other words, in the reali-
ty of policy making as recognized by competent observers;
2. transformations in conceptual and theoretical developments in the
political sciences in general and in policy analysis in particular;
3. the development of a methodological apparatus for structural analysis
which in turn was the result of a more "structural approach" in the
social sciences in general.
In the following, we will look at each of the three phenomena in more
detail.
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3.1 Transformations in Political Reality
At the end of the 70s, the policy network became an appropriate meta-
phor for responding to a number of empirical observations with respect
to critical changes in the political governance of modern democracies.
This was in some way a reaction to simplified and reductionist versions
of modern political organization which lacked, for instance, concepts for
institutional differentiation and fragmentation as well as the notions for
complex interdependencies between state and society. These changes
could be summarized as follows:
- The emergence of the organized society: the increase in the impor-
tance of organized collectivities in social and political life is paral-
leled by a general rise in the number, importance and interdependen-
cy of collective actors and organizations; more and more resources
are produced by or come under the control of organized collectivities;
more and more social affairs are shaped by decisions and actions
of collective and corporate actors.ll
- A further important change can be observed in the trend towards
sectoralization (Wildavsky 1974; Kenis 1991: chap. 2) which is often
also more generally discussed as increased functional dffirentiation(Mayntz et al. 1988). Policies, programs, and agencies have increas-
ingly to be defined in limited, functionally differentiated terms. In-
creased societal complexity and a growing interdependence between
many actors is closely related to growing sectoralization and function-
al differentiation.
- Sectoralization and the emergence of more and more organized inter-
ests and corporate actors means both increasing intervention and
participation by more and more social and political actors in policy
making. Jordan and Richardson labeled this trend "overcrowded poli-
cy making" (Richardson/ Jordan t983: 247-268).
- Increased scope of state policy making and the proliferation of state
intervention targets (so-called "policy domains") are other important
facets of modern society.l2 In this context, Heclo (1978) speaks of
"policy growth" and emphasizes that despite growing state involve-
I I For this general trend see Presthus (1962); Coleman (1974, 1982); Penow (1989: 3-19).
For an increased dominance of institutions in policy making see Salisbury 0984: 64-76).12 For an empirical long-term perspective ofthe growth of state functions see Taylor (1983).
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ment, the pool of state resources did not expand extensively enough.
Effects and tensions resulting from this gap have been discussed as
political overload or "governance under pressure".13
With policy growth, many political scientists observed the decentral-
ization and the fragmentation of the state.In the last decade, it has
been frequently said that the state is not a monolithic whole but a
set of relatively discrete institutional apparatuses that vary across
industries, sectors, societies, and over time (Evans/ Rueschemeyer/
Skocpol 1985; Kenis 1991). These phenomena may have existed for
a long time but tended to be overlooked because many of these
institutional units (such as committees and boards) work rather
through informal frameworks than through national councils and
legislatures.
Closely related to this decentralization of the state is the observation
of a blurring of boundaries betvveen the public and the private. Key
words for these tendencies are "informal administrative action"
(Hucke 1982: 130-140; Hanf 1982: 159-172), informal influence
processes in policy formation, "quasi-legislation"; "soft-law"; or
"state-sponsored self-regulation".
A similar or closely related trend is pointed to in some recent studies
on private governments (Nadel 1975: 2-34; Ronge 1980; Streeck/
Schmitter 1985) which take as an explicit starting point the fact
that in many policy fields public tasks no longer can be fulfilled
without the cooperation of private collectivities. A cooperative state
evolves which delegates or supports organized self-regulation instead
of a state traditionally viewed as the guiding, planning and regulating
apex taking total responsibility for society.
Transnationalization of domestic politics is another facet of contem-
porary politics. Today, national policy processes are deeply embedded
in international policy environments and policy interdependencies.
The membership of nation-states in supranational organizations and
the international concertation of summits, places not only constraints
but often directly influences national policy choices.la
13 For a discussion of the overload phenomena in policy analysis see Brodkin (1987:
57 t-587).
14 Jacobson (1979). For the relationship of nation-states as corporate actors to supranational
organizations as international actors see Kenis/ Schneider (1987) and Schneider/ Werle
(1990), With regard to regime configurations see Keohane (1984).
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- Increased interdependency and complexity of social and political
affairs leads to the growing importance a/ access to information for
the coordination and control of political and social affairs, a trend
which could be compiled under the label informatization. Closely
rclated to this is obviously the growing need for scientific expertise
in the policy making process, a trend that has sometimes been de-
scribed as the scientification of politics.rs
Societal differentiation, sectoralization and policy growth lead to political
overload and "governance under pressure" (see Jordan/ Richardson
1983). Increasingly unable to mobilize all necessary policy resources
within their own realm, governments consequently become dependent
upon the cooperation and joint resource mobilization of policy actors
outside their hierarchical control. Policy networks should therefore be
understood as those webs of relatively stable and ongoing relationships
which mobilize dispersed resources so that collective (or parallel) action
can be orchestrated toward the solution of a common policy problem.
3.2 Conceptual Adjustments and Innovations
In view of these manifest changes in the political structures of contempo-
rary society, political scientists were challenged to adjust their conceptual
apparatus. Consequently, many of the observations discussed have been
reflected in the development of new research programs or research pro-
blematiques in policy analysis. The major shift at this level can be sum-
marized by a transformation in societal governance ftom hierarchical
control to horizontal coordination (Hanf/ Scharpf 1977): Franz 1986:
479-494; Ostrom 1983: 135-147). Enlightened policy analysts have ob-
served a change from a "state-centrist" or "government-focused" view
of political and social processes to an image which has often been called
the centerless or polycentered society (Mayntz 1987: 89-110; Willke
1983; Schuppert 1989). A shift in focus from formal organizational or
constitutional structures to informal affangements in the policy literature
is related to this conceptual transformation. A detailed description of the
historical transformation in political governance would go beyond the
15 For the trend of increased scientific policy advice see Plowden (1987) and Smith (1987
61-76).
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scope of this chapter. However, a short illustration of the major shifts
within policy literature may provide some hints about the major turning
points of this adjustment.
In the first phase, policy analysis was heavily influenced by the
technological and methodological optimism produced by the dominant
behavioralist paradigml6 in political science during the 50s and 60s: it
was generally believed that the application of newly developed "scientific
methodologies" (e.g. operations research, statistical decision theory, com-
munications theory, computer simulation, cost-benefit-analysis, cybernet-
ics, econometrical models) would increase instrumental, informational
and organizational capacities to control societal processes.lT This pro-
duced long shelves of political planning literature and led, especially in
countries which were governed by social-democratic parties, to a veritable
"planning euphoria".
In the second phase, the planning ideology was hurt by the so-called
"real world". It became increasingly questioned whether societal develop-
ment could be purposefully guided by political instruments. Many experi-
ences showed that good intentions and sophisticated plans during the
reformist years were confronted by difficulties that emerged in the imple-
mentation and realization of policy programs (Mayntz 1979: 55-81).
Such disillusion with the planning approach led to the emphasis on extra-
govemmental conditions of success and failure of governmental programs.
These were specific context structures in implementation target fields,
such as actor or interest constellations which supported or hampered the
successful implementation of given policy programs. In the context of
this literature, it was observed that program implementation often oper-
ates through horizontal and non-hierarchical forms of coordination and
16 For an excellent analysis of this relationship see Somit/ Tanenhaus (1967). One of the
key behavioralist articles of faith was that data or findings should be quantified and,
finally, stated as mathematical models or propositions. In contrast to old-fashioned institu-
tionalism, it was believed that this would enable the modelling and prediction of real
social and political processes. The authors take opinion polls and survey techniques as
an example: "These provided instruments for developing vast new bodies of data. Re-
search in this area was greatly facilitated by advances in rnathematical statistics and
the increased availability of electronic computers to perform what had previously been
impossibly tedious computations" (Somit/ Tanenhaus ,I967: 51).
l7 Symptomatic for this believe is l,asswell/ Lerner's (1951) collection in which new me-
thodologies such as probability methods, mathematical modelling and sociometrics tech-
niques are presented as "research procedures" for "policy sciences". Instructive for the
German case is Scharpf (1973) who presents cluster analysis and MDS as techniques
fbr policy analysis and planning.
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that even within the public sector, implementation stntctures are not
always hierarchically structured (cf. Mayntz 1983).18
Now, we seem to have entered the third phase which responds to
the problems and difficulties that manifested themselves during the imple-
mentation debate. It became apparent that the formal distinction between
policy formulation (planning) and policy implementation is often fairly
artificial. This is especially the case when central target actors cooperate
in the implementation process in exchange for participation in program
formulation. Especially in such cases, it makes no sense to study policy
phases separately. A similar problem here is the exclusive focus on state
intervention and public policy programs in the solution of societal prob-
lems. Problems which in some countries are solved or "processed" by
state policies may be solved in other countries by self-regulation through
para-state organizations or privately organized collectivities. In addition,
there may be societal problems which have not yet been perceived as
being relevant by private and public organized actors and consequently
do not arrive on any policy agenda.
In order to fully understand the conditions under which societal prob-
lems are processed by governmental and non-governmental activities,
policy research thus had to expand its narrow focus from "public poli-
cies" to "societal governance" in general (Anderson 1976: l9L-22L;
Marin 1990). Due to this widened perspective, policy research has to
include not only the analysis of general social structures and societal
institutions that condition and regulate this governance process but also
the specific dynamics and "auto-dynamics" (see Mayntz 1985 and
Mayntzl Nedelmann 1987) of societal development in general as the
object of governance. Policy analysis thus needed to broaden its analyti-
cal focus to include whole societal domains and the dynamic dimension
of policy making (learning, positive and negative feedback, etc.) as well.
In sum, policy analysis could restrict its research object not only to
processes within a given and established institutional order, but they also
had to integrate the problematique of how an institutional order emerges
in a highly decentralized and interdependent world.
18 See also, for instance, Mayntz (1979a: 634): "As for central control, the public sector
is never a fully integrated hierarchy but must rather be seen as a highly differentiated
macro-system of organizations, a network which is mol'e or less hierarchized by virtue
of existing vertical lines of communication, but which is basically made up of relatively
autonomous elements."
Policy Networks and Policy Analysis 39
3.3 The Development of Methodological Tools
The third transformation with some influence on "structural thinking"
in policy analysis is the development of new methodological tools. Today
these concepts, methods and techniques enable empirical studies of com-
plex structures in the policy making processes which would not have
been possible twenty years ago. Such concepts and methods for structural
analysis emerged at the end of the 60s and spread widely during the 70s:
- In the sociology of organizations and in administrative science, this
was the development of the early "organization set" concept, "re-
source and power dependency" approach and the "interorganizational
relations" approach.19 In contrast to previous approaches where cate-
gorical variables played the exclusive role, here relational variables
become more important (Wellman 1983: 155-200; 1988: 19-61).
- Parallel to the development of these concepts and approaches stress-
ing the relational character of social phenomena, a number of social
scientists began to apply mathematics to the formalization and analy-
sis of relational configuratiolls. The most important methods were
graph theory, matrix algebra, multidimensional scaling and structural
classification methods such as cluster analysis and block modelling.20
- In turn, the development of these new mathematical and statistical
procedures for relational analysis has undoubtedly been influenced
by the development of computer technology in the 60s and 70s, in
particular by the speedy diffusion of microcomputing since the end
of the 70s.2r
Currently, network analysis is considered one of the major research tools
for structural analysis. Network researchers study elite structures in local
19 For overviews see Whetten (1981: 1-28); Glaskiewicz (1985: 281-304). Important contri-
butions are Levine/ White (1961: 583-601); Emerson (1962:32-41); Evan (1972: l8l-
200); Benson (1915:229-249); Metcalfe (1976l-327-343). First application of network
analysis in inter-organizational analysis was provided by Aldrich (1979) and Aldrich/
Whetten 1981: 385-408).
20 Hararyl Norman/ Cartwright (1969); Coxon/ Jones (1983); Everit (1983: 226-256):
Arabie/ Boormanl L.evitt (1978: 2l-63).
21 Very instructive in this context is an article by Coleman (1965) which, however, still
reflects the age of mainframe computers. In the meantime, the use of computing technolo-
gies in the social sciences has radically changed - and this transformation is just begin-
ning. Only recently has UCINET package and the SONIS system for personal computers
appeared. Another network package available for PCs is GRADAP.
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communities, actor networks in national policy domains, interrelations
between economic firms, and even structural configurations at the world
system level. In a state-of-the-art review on the innovative trends in
sociology in the 80s, Collins (1986: 1351) considered network analysis
one of the five most important innovations for the sociology of the fu-
ture:
Network research began as an empirical field, and it has only gradually begun to go
beyond description and methodology to acquire some generalizable theory. But although
the application of network analysis to theoretical problems is in its infancy, it holds
considerable potential, perhaps even of a revolutionary sort.
We are convinced that these methodological tools comprise a great poten-
tial for policy research which has not yet been systematically and com-
prehensively explored. The tools are there but the community of crafts-
men is still very small.
Types and Dimensions of Policy Networks: A Tentative
Definition
In this section, we want to propose a "policy netwofk" concept or defini-
tion which, first, accounts for the previously made observations about
the changing patterns of policy making and second, is meaningful for
contemporary policy analysis on the one hand and for network analysis
on the other. We are convinced that the notion or the concept of policy
netvvorks, given that it is not used exclusively formally (i.e., as a set of
rclations of any kind) or metaphorically (e.g. as a synonym for criss-
cross could be a common point of reference and could have an integra-
tive function. We propose to reserve the concept fot a specific class of
policy making structures with specific attributes. In a complex political
world, everything could be represented in graphs or networks - even
hierarchies and markets. In order to produce a theoretical surplus, the
term network should thus be reserved for specific organizational modes
of policy making (cf. Mayntz 19-80: 8)' Analogous to the use of networks
in new institutional economicszZ and in the literature of governance (cf.
Schmitter 1989 and Hollingsworth 1990) these structures could be lo-
22 Cf. Williamson (1985) and North (1990). See also footnote 3l
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cated somewhere beyond or between23 "policy markets" and "policy
hierarchies":
Policy markets may be imagined as completely competitive party
systems in which political parties "formulate policies in order to win
elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies" (Downs
1957:28). Another market version is Landes and Posner's interest group
approach in which legislation is seen as a good supplied by the govern-
ment or parliament to groups that outbid rival seekers of favorable legis-
lation. Payment takes the form of votes, campaign contributions, etc.
Legislation is thus "sold" by the legislature and "bought" by the benefi-
ciaries of the legislation (Landes/ Posner 1975: 877).
The other extreme is policy hierarchies as ideal types of bureaucratic
policy making. This means, on the one hand, the electoral hierarchy as
a chain of principal-agent relationships from the "people" down to parlia-
ment and executive. On the other hand, the parliament-executive-adminis-
trative chain is also a hierarchy. Policies are formulated within the parlia-
ment by majority voting. The executive and administrative branches are
mere implementing agents of those policies.
Policy networks should be conceived as specffic structural arrange-
ments in policy making. Policy networks are new forms of political gov-
ernance which reflect a changed relationship between state and society.
Their emergence is a result of the dominance of organized actors in
policy making, the overcrowded participation, the fragmentation of the
state, the blurring of boundaries between the public and the private, etc.
Policy networks typically deal with policy problems which involve com-
plex political, economic and technical task and resource interdependen-
cies, and therefore presuppose a significant amount ofexpertise and other
specialized and dispersed policy resources. Policy networks are mecha-
nisms of political resource mobilization in situations where the capacity
for decision making, program formulation and implementation is widely
distributed or dispersed among private and public actors.
A policy network is described by its actors, their linkages and by
its boundary. It includes a relatively stable set of mainly püblic and
private corporate actors. The linkages between the actors serve as com-
munication channels and for the exchange of information, expertise,
23 Networks as social configurations beyond markets and hierarchies are discussed by
Powell (1990), whereas Williamson (1985) understands networks as an organizational
form between markets and hierarchies
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trust and other policy resources. The boundary of a given policy network
is not primarily determined by fbrmal institutions but rcsults from a
process of mutual recognition dependent on functional relevance and
structural embeddedness.
Policy networks should be seen as integrated hybrid structures of
political governance. Their integrative logic cannot be reduced to any
single logic such as bureaucracy, market, community or corporatist asso-
ciation, for example, but is characterized by the capacity for mixing
different combinations of them. It is the mixture and not the individual
logic per se which accounts for its functioning. This characteristic of
policy networks reflects and even generalizes Katzenstein's (1987) policy
network idea, which he described in the West German case as a combi-
nation of party competition, cooperative federalism and corporatist con-
certation or interest intermediation. The concrete mixture of different
logics which may be present in a specific policy network is an empirical
question. A policy network thus could combine domains that are largely
self-regulated, but also those where the responsible corporate actors are
closely engaged in ongoing bargaining relationships with the state and
other corporate actors in corporatist and pluralist patterns. It is thus per-
fectly thinkable that a policy network has corporatist, pluralist and self-
regulatory regions or "provinces" - and it integrates these different
modes of political organization. Since the whole complex consists mainly
of relatively autonomous action units, the dominant decision rules and
decision styles are rather "bargaining" (Scharpf 1989) or "sounding-out"
(Olsen 1972) than "confrontation". The logic of confrontation is inherent
in voting which polarizes either/or relationships, forcing all the partici-
pants into one camp or the other. Bargaining, in contrast, is based more
on the logic of "sounding-out", stressing common interests and unanimity.
Since the capacity of collective action is very dispersed in networks, the
decision making and strategy formation in a network context is thus very
time-consuming.
In spite of such limitations, networks have some important virtues.
In situations where policy resources are dispersed and context (or actor)
dependent, a network is the only mechanism to mobilize and pool re-
sources. An example is "tacit knowledge" such as details and primary
experience in a policy program, a form of information that is difficult
to codify and to transmit. It is stored in an inexplicit form in the minds
of the decision makers who have primary experience within their domain
(Starbuck 1970: 318). Such information, in fact, is only accessible
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through cooperation and exchange. Nobody can be forced to provide
intangible information. Implementation processes which depend on the
mobilization of such resources, cannot be governed by hierarchical com-
mand-and-control relations.2a
Comparative advantages and disadvantages of policy networks seem
to be higher costs in policy formulation (coordination costs, decision
costs) but significantly lower costs in policy implementation (monitoring
costs, controlling costs). In situations where a given policy task structure
implies high interdependencies and where the necessary policy resources
are highly dispersed, policy networks seem thus to be more efficient and
effective than hierarchical policy configurations.
Policy networks also may be analytically related to the different
phases of policy development such as issue definition, agenda-building,
policy formulation and implementation. Not every problem or issue will
be transformed into a problem of public policy. In order to be considered
as a problematic state or situation that could be tackled by policy inter-
vention, a problem has to be placed on the government agenda. Agenda-
building may pass over discussions in the public and in mass media, but
very often policy issues are raised and defined within restricted networks
of habitually involved actors. These actors, or parts of them, may also
formulate and implement a given policy. But networks that remain inte-
grated over time, encompassing the entire policy process, cannot be gen-
erally expected. There may be other situations in which formulation and
implementation networks differ sharply from the network of issue initia-
tors. The stability or change of policy networks in terms of access, repo-
sitioning and exit of actors within policy cycles, is an empirical question
and cannot be determined a priori.If there are structural types of policy
networks with clear differences in performance or not, is an interesting
question for further research. To identify and measure such structures,
network analysis could be a valuable structural tool. In the final section,
therefore, we will investigate the question of usefulness of network ana-
lytical approaches for the study of empirical policy networks.
24 Bohnert/ Klitsch (1980) argue, for instance, that nobody can be forced to provide good
information.
44 Chapter 2
5 Network Analysis and the Empirical Study of Policy
Networks
Policy Analysis and Nework Analysis are two relatively coherent families
of social research with an important potential for cross-fertilization. Poli-
cy analysis, as expressed by Dye (1976: 1), "is finding out what govern-
ments do, why they do it, and what differences it makes".25 Network
analysis includes the broad array of methodo-logical tools for the analysis
of rälational configurations and structures.26 Although there has been
almost no communication between the two disciplinary fields until now,
we think that both of these research domains are highly relevant to each
other. On the one hand, for network analysts, policy research could be-
come an interesting and relevant "application domain". Policy analysts,
on the other hand, could find in network analysis a powerful toolbox
to be able to grasp and analyze highly complex structures, relational
configurations and actor systems in modern politics.
Network analysis does not provide an "explicit theory" by itself -
although it may have a strong affinity to some particular social theories.2T
Some describe this approach as a method looking for a theory (see, for
example, Collins 1988). In our opinion, network analysis is no theory
in stricto sensu but rather a toolbox for describing and measuring rela-
tional configurations and their structural characteristics. For a number
of theories, such structural arrangements are irnportant elements.
From this perspective there seem to be at least six different applica-
tions of network analysis in the study of policy networks:
1. One possible research strategy has been described by Scharpf (1973,
1977) and could be labeled the normative or prescriptive use: here,
network analysis would be used to compare prescriptive networks
25 Overviews on policy analysis are given in Dye (1976); Windhoff'-H6ritier (1987) and
Feicl</ Jann (1989).
26 For a nethodological introduction to network analysis see Knoke/ Kuklinski (1982);
Pappi (1987); Burt/ Minor (1982); Marsden/ Lin (1982); Berkowitz (1982). Fol overviews,
trend reports and valuative accounts see Alba (1982:39-74); Barnes (1979: 403-423):
Scou (1988: 109-127).
27 Since measurement and description is always "theory-loaded", network analysis also
contains implicit theories. These are especially theories which emphasize the importance
of structure for the understanding of social phenomena. For the discussion on the theoreti-
cal status see: Laumann/ Knoke (1987: 83-109), Anderson/ Carlos (1976: 27-51), Poucke
(197918O:. l8l-190), Burt (1982), and Mathien (1988: 1-20).
Policy Networks and Policy Analysis 45
which map the "objective need" for coordination and cooperation in
a policy process (prescriptive patterns of coordination, prescriptive
task structure and "objectively required" policy interactions) with
existent patterns of exchange and collaboration in empirical networks.
A further step would be the development of indicators for the "good-
ness of fit" or "misfit" between both networks. The guiding idea is
to detect structural obstacles, failures or stalemates in policy net-
works.
2. In another strategy, the description and measurement capacities of
network analysis would be used for cross-netvvork comparisons in
order to develop (or test) hypotheses explaining the effect of aggre-
gate characteristics of the policy network on specific interactions.
This can be accomplished by cross-national policy network compari-
sons or by comparisons between different national policy domains
or policy processes. This strategy concentrates on building empirical
indicators to measure network characteristics (for example, density,
connectedness, centralization, asyrnmetry, fragmentation, etc.) and
on building models relating these structural characteristics to the per-
formance or, more generally, the outcomes produced by specific
policy networks. Such a hypothesis, for example, could be that the
more asymmetrical the exchange or influence network is structured,
the higher the capacity for collective action.
3. A third application of network analysis is its use in the construction
and testing of formal models on policy rnaking processes. In this
research strategy, network analysis is employed inthe operationaliza-
tion of formal models. An example would be the model developed
by James S. Coleman on exchange processes within systems of ac-
tion.28 The application of such a model demands plenty of informa-
tion about structural dependencies and resource flows within a set
of policy actors. This information can be collected and the required
model indicators can be constructed using network analytic tools.2e
4. A further application is the use of network analysis to test hypotheses
of theories on policy making which include structural propositions.
28 A short outline of the model contains Coleman (1986: 85-136). For a more extended
elaboration see Coleman (1990).
29 For applications of the Coleman model see Marsden/ Laumann (1977:199-25O); Pappi/
Kappelhoff (1984: 87-117); Laumann/ Knoke (1987). For the application of Laumann
and Knoke's data to another nrodel see Stokrnann/ van den Bos/ Wasseur (1989).
46 Chapter 2
Corporatist theory, for example, assumes specific relational configura-
tions between large and monopolistic associations, their members and
the state - in contrast to pluralist theory which supposes different
structural arrangements in the policy process.3o Additionally, gover-
nance theories differentiating between hierarchies and market-like
relations3l contain implicit propositions on structural configurations
which can be identified and described more precisely with the help
of network analysis.32 For instance, it could be used to decide wheth-
er an empirical structure of cooperation and information exchange
represents hierarchical control instead of market coordination - or,
more importantly, it could discover any other empirical forms of
cooperation including hybrid mixtures of diff'erent governance forms.
5. A fifth application would be the use of network analytical methods
for the identification and reconstruction of complex policy games,
i.e., relations or patterns of strategic actions between a set of actors
in the formulation and implementation of a policy. In this approach,
network analysis would be used as a measurement tool for game-
theoretical models. Network sampling methods could be used to
specify boundaries of games,33 to identify aggregate or collective
actors34 and also, to some extent, to identify some of the relation-
ships between players which are constitutive for a given game (e.g.
information structures on mutual payoffs).
6. Network analytic methods could also be used to reconstruct network
dynamics in terms of structural transformation or stability. By repli-
cating policy network studies at different points in time, for example,
the conditions under which the whole set of actors and its status
differentiation stays stable or changes, could be studied. Interesting
30 For an operationalization of corporatist and pluralist structures of interest intermediation
see Schmitter (1974).
31 Hollingsworth/ Lindberg (1985); Campbell/ Lindberg/ Hollingsworth (1991); Schmitter
(1989: 173-208).
32 An example is Marsden's (1983) analysis of power structures within exchange systems.
33 A n-person game or several interconnected games could be delineated by the identification
of clusters of actors which take each others action as mutually relevant (cf. Laumann
et al. 1982).
34 "Aggregate actors" in the sense of Scharpf (1990), which are treated as single players
in game theoretical models, could be identified with clique-identilication methods, cluster
analysis or blockn-rodels. For an application of an empirical identification of collective
actors see Marsden/ Laumann (1977).
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questions in this analysis would be the entry of new actors, their
repositioning and the exit of actors.3s
This list of application possibilities is by far not exhaustive. It only
contains some hints for directions in which a cross-fertilization of policy
studies and network analysis might develop.
6 Conclusion
The motivation behind the development of the ideas in this chapter was
the feeling that a complementarity exists between first, the description
of the contemporary policy making processes, second, the emerging poli-
cy network idea which acquired increasing conceptual cutrency during
the 80s, and, third, innovations in methodological tools for analyzing
structural configurations. However, this complementarity is still in the
state of a potentiality. For the most part, the scholars working in these
fields did not yet combine and integrate their efforts enough. The starting
point of the chapter was that we believe that such an "alliance" or inte-
gration could lead to a better and much more precise description and
understanding of contemporary policy making.
The aim of the chapter was to propose a policy network definition
which could support this conceptual and methodological integration pro-
cess. It was not intended to add one or two new facets to the variety
of existing network metaphors, but to contract and explicate the number
of real phenomena on which these conceptual developments are based,
as well as to uncover the key propositions and the essential links and
nodes within the existing conceptual diversity. Moreover, we tried to
sketch out the methodological toolbox already available for the analysis
of highly decentralized and intermeshed policy making actor configura-
tions and some possible research strategies. Consequently, the policy
network concept proposed here could offer some operdtional steps for
an integration of conceptual and methodological efforts within in the
empirical analysis of policy networks.
35 This could be done, for instance, by a kind of "brokentie analysis" which Palmer
(1983) applied to interlocking directorates.
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Admittedly, a policy network concept which is operational for the
empirical analysis, is not without problems and difficulties. Identifying
actors, links and boundaries in networks structures demands sophisticated
techniques and large efforts in data-gathering. Such large-scale invest-
ments in empirical political analysis is not accepted by everybody within
the scientific community since not all systematic structural inquiries lead
to breathtaking empirical and theoretical results. Often they confirm more
intuitive and "soft" observations of qualitative analysis which also can
be obtained by low-budget research. However, it should not be over-
looked that an intuitive grasp of actor configurations is rapidly exhausted
when the number of actors involved increases. Even a genius researcher
would be unable simultaneously to grasp the structure of an actor system
with more than a handful actors involved. And often the links between
actors are not only multiple but also multiplex. Theorctical concepts
which acknowledge that social and political reality is complex and highly
intermeshed, should not confine their analysis to the repetition that
"everything is connected to everything" but should engage into efforts
to measufe and map such political or social structures with satisfactory
precision. For an approximation of such long-term goals, we also want
to conclude - as it is done so often - that still much research is needed
to exploit the combined potential of policy analysis and network analysis
in the study of public and private policy making.
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Or ganizations in Political Action : Representing Interests
in National Policy Making
Edward O. Laumann and John P Heinz
with Robert Nelson and Robert Salisbury
1 Introduction
State policies are the products of complex interactions among governmen-
tal and nongovernmental organizations, each seeking to influence the
collectively binding decisions arising from policy making events that have
consequences for their interests. In the United States, the incredibly volu-
minous and disparate character of national policy making activities is
only dimly revealed in the tens of thousands of pages officially published
every year in the Federal Register to describe the myriad actions of
hundreds of executive agencies, departments, bureaus, institutes, and
establishments, the thousands of Congressional hearings held to evaluate
the merits of about 10,000 bills being proposed each biennium, and the
thousands of pages devoted to summarizing appellate court actions on
a multitude of cases of the most diverse sorts. We must thus seek some
way of systematically decomposing this complex totality into more man-
ageable units that can be studied with existing techniques. Following the
leads suggested by Laumann, Knoke and their associates (Knoke/ Lau-
mann 1982; Laumann/ Knoke/ Kim 1985; Laumann/ Knoke 1987) in
their study of national policy domains, we propose to regard national
policy making as subdividable into a number of delimited policy do-
mains. Each of these may be identified by specifying a substantively
defined criterion of mutual relevance or common orientation among a
This chapter is a substantially revised and updated version of a paper read at the annual
meetings of the American Sociological Association in New York, New York, August 30 -
September 3, 1986. We wish to acknowledge our appreciation for the generous financial
support provided by the American Bar Foundation and the National Science Foundation (SES
8320275) and for the thoughtful and expeditious research assistance of Tony Tam in perform-
ing the data analysis.
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set of consequential corporate actors concerned with formulating, advocat-
ing, and selecting courses of action (that is, policy options) intended to
resolve a delimited substantive problem (Knokei Laumann 1982: 256).
Obvious examples of national policy domains include education, agricul-
ture, housing, foreign trade, civil rights, defense, energy, and so forth.
Participants in domain policy making actions include all public- and
private-sector actors whose capacities to affect the collective outcomes
of policy decisions must be taken into account by the other participants.
In 
-brief, 
a national policy domain consists of the consequential actors
in a delimited subsystem of the State. Our central assertion is that corpo-
rate (organizational) actors are the principals who dominate the national
policy making process.
- If one can meaningfully distinguish substantively circumscribed
policy arenas for close study, we are then in the position to identify
ihree critical sets of actors that play distinct roles in the representation
of private and public interests. First, there are the clients, found in many
organizational guises, who retain Washington representatives to monitor
policy developments having consequences for their interests and/or to
öommunicate their preferred outcomes in appropriately influential ways.
Then there are the govemment officials who must deal with these repre-
sentations; and finally there are the representatives themselves, both law-
yers and nonlawyers, employees and fee-charging consultants, who do
ihe myriad tasks required to perform these mediating functions effective-
ly.
The research design is thus based on a tripartite conception of
private representation in which client (nongovernmental) organizations
ietain representatives to contact government officials for the purpose
of affecting policy outcomes. The links among the three sets of actors
are diagrammed in Figure 1. The connection between client organizations
and their representatives involves the decision to hire particular represen-
tatives and, thereafter, to monitor and, when necessary, control them' The
linkages between the representatives and the targeted officials consist of
activities of monitoring and intervention regarding official policy actions'
The latter, in turn, produce outcomes that pfesumably affect the client
organizations in some way and may lead, in turn, to some alteration in
their relationship with their representatives'
We had two fundamental bbjectives in devising our study design'
First, we wanted to identify a set of policy domains sufficiently diverse
on important analytic dimensions that they could be expected to give
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us at least a first approximation of the diversity and range of representa-
tional tasks and modes of organization that characteize national policy
making deliberations more generally. That is, by judicious selection of
the parts, we hoped to get some glimpse of the whole. Secondly, we
wanted to devise replicable procedures for validly and reliably identifying
the key actors in each domain, who, in turn, would become the objects
of closer examination. (For an extended description and rationale for the
study design, see Heinz et al. 1987,1991).
1.1 The Selection of the Policy Domains
The four domains we selected for study - agriculture, energy, health,
and labor - have distinctive features that provide theoretical grounds for
expecting differences in how policy is formulated and in the roles and
impact of representatives. The particular topics included in a given opera-
tional definition of a policy domain were determined from a broad read-
ing of the documentary sources pertaining to a particular policy subject.
The Congressional Quarterly, for example, regularly publishes volumes
devoted to reviewing legislative and other initiatives that bear on particu-
lar policy topics. The Federal Register is also a good source for learning
about activities of specific executive agencies, and appellate court cases
can be screened for those pertaining to particular policy controversies.
The domains vary in four interesting respects. First, they vary in
the constellation of interest groups. Agriculture and energy politics are
organized around regionally segmented producer groups (milk, grains,
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cotton, tobacco, etc., in agriculture; oil, natural gas, coal, nuclear energy
in energy) (see, e.g., Hadwiger/ Brown 1978; Guither 1980; Heinz
1962; Davis 1982; Chubb 1983; Laumann/ Knoke 1987). Health and
labor are dominated by various nationally oriented brokering institutions,
such as the American Medical Association, the American Hospital Asso-
ciation, and the American Association of Retired Persons in health (see,
e.g., Marmor 1970; Stan 1982; Laumann/ Knoke 1987); and the AFL/
CIO, the US Chamber of Commerce, and the National Association of
Manufacturers in labor (see, e.g., Wilson 1979; Greenstone 1969; BoV
Dunlop 1970).
Second, the level and form of conflict in the domains vary. Labor
policy typically pits two major camps against each other, and indeed,
much of the contention between the parties has become institutionalized
within the National Labor Relations Board and various agencies of the
Department of Labor. Health policy typically has involved disputes over
the means of attaining widely shared goals, but has undergone consider-
able fragmentation in recent yezus, as the interests of doctors, hospital
associations, insurance companies, medical schools, hospital equipment
manufacturers, and so forth have diverged (Heclo 1978:96). Energy and
agriculture manifest more explicit competition among alternative produc-
ers and between consumers and producers.
Third, the institutional composition and general policies of the do-
mains have changed at much different rates in the last two decades.
Agriculture and labor have long maintained a relatively stable set of
agencies and broad policies. Energy and health have only recently given
rise to new cabinet-level departments and wide areas of policy making.
Finally lawyers and legal institutions play different roles across and with-
in domains. Agriculture and health are less "lawyered" domains, both
because direct bureaucratic negotiation and policy development are more
important processes than are formal adjudicatory, licensing, and rulemak-
ing procedures, and because farmers and doctors compete more effective-
ly for positions of policy making authority in government and private
organizations (cf. Nelson et al. 1988).
While both energy and agriculture have policy subdomains concerned
with foreign trade and international policy making, our selection of policy
domains is heavily skewed toward domestic policy issues. To the extent
that domestic policy controversies differ in important ways from those
concerned with defense and foreign policy, we may run the risk of over-
estimating the ease with which interested parties enter into particular
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policy arenas and have impact on policy outcomes. We may even run
a risk of misrepresenting the sorts of actors who come to be influential
in policy deliberations.
L2 Sarnpling Design
Appropriately modifying the procedures developed by Laumann and
Knoke (1987: chap. 3), we adopted a sequential sampling design that
successively revealed the three sets of actors we believe play the crucial
roles in policy deliberations. To identify the claimant actors in a policy
domain, we devised procedures which allowed us to (1) identify the
organizations attempting to influence policy in a specific policy domain,
(2) assess the level of policy making activity by those organizations, and
(3) sample organizations according to their level of activity. Sampling
from this comprehensive listing of interested parties, we then asked well-
placed informants in the organizations we sampled to tell us the names
and positions of representatives they employed or retained in a given
policy domain. The population of named individuals was sampled and
queried, in turn, about their contacts with specific government officials
exercising policy-related responsibilities. This listing of nominated gov-
ernmental officials constituted our third population of interest: targeted
government officials. This chapter restricts attention to the four samples
of organizations and their reported participation in 20 selected events
between 1977 and 1982 as described by their representatives.
The procedures for identifying organizations active in a domain re-
quired a substantial amount of documentary investigation and preliminary
interviewing because no single list adequately defines the population of
interested parties. Each policy area involves numerous policy making
subsystems within the executive, legislative, and judicial branches that
attract quite distinctive populations of participants.l We thus wanted to
use several different methods for locating interested parties. Each method,
by itself, had a systematic bias toward finding certain kinds of organiza-
tions and neglecting others because it concentrated on particular decision
making arenas. By cornbining nominations from several sources with
The total numbers of government targets we ultimately identified as relevant and ac-
tive in the agricultural, energy, health and labor policy domains werc 74, 66, 62 and
56, respectively.
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different known biases, we hoped to "triangulate" on a comprehensive
listing of the population of relevant organizations. We describe below
the results of these methods at some length because they uncovered an
enormous number of organizational actors that are active in the represen-
tation process - a volume of participation of unique corporate actors that
has been underappreciated in the literature on interest groups.
Our first method for locating interested actors in a policy domain
was attentive to issues attracting mass media attention because of their
controversiality and broad popular interest. Such issues are often to be
resolved in the Congressional arena. Organizations taking partisan public
stands on popular issues are often to be identified by this technique' We
conducted a computerized search of stories in national and regional news-
papers and magazines dealing with federal policy making in each domain
from January 1977 to June 1982, noting the number of stories mention-
ing each organization. The data regarding newspaper coverage of organi-
zationalparticipation were compiled from "The Information Bank," a data
base of the New York Times Information Service (NYTIS). To compen-
sate for regional effects, the data base included the following newspapers:
Chicago Tribune, Houston Chronicle, Los Angeles Times, New York
Times, San Francisco Chronicle, Seattle Times, Washington Post and
Time magazine. The product of the computer search was an extensive
set of news story abstracts from the source news media. These abstracts
were then searched and tagged for the names of organizations, and lists
of organizations in each domain were compiled. The number of mentions
for each organization was recorded, a mention for this source being
defined as an appearance in one newspaper abstract. Duplicate abstracts
of stories reported in two or more news sources were eliminated. The
first row of Table 1 reports the number of mentions and the number of
unique organizations iäentified by this method for each domain.2
See Andrew Shapiro (1985) for a more complete description of this procedure and the











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Second, we searched the abstracts of Congressional hearings held by
committees and subcommittees with jurisdiction in each of the four do-
mains during the 95th through the 97th Congress, noting the number
of hearings in which organizations testified. Less publicly partisan and
more specialized organizations are revealed by this procedure. In light
of the enornous number of hearings covered in the Congressional Infor-
mation Service (CIS) database, we restricted the search to the first ses-
sions of the 95th, 96th, and 97th Congresses and to a selection of only
the major committees active in each domain. The second row of Table 1
gives the aggregate counts of mentions and unique organizations identi-
fied by tfris procedure.
Third, during winter and spring, 1982, we interviewed twenty to
twenty-three government officials in each of the four policy domains,
and asked the officials to name the organizations that contacted them
frequently and organizations representative of those that contacted them
episodically. This method is especially likely to identify organizations
having direct dealings with particular executive agencies and their regula-
tory initiatives. Two criteria were used in selecting individuals to be
interviewed: (1) the position of the individual in the unit and (2) his or
her tenure in the unit, An attempt was made to avoid relying exclusively
on politically appointed officials as well as on those with fewer than two
years tenure in office. Row three of Table 1 gives the aggregated results
of this inquiry.
Finally, for each domain we compiled a list of organizations appear-
ing under the industry heading related to the domain in Washington
Representatives (1981), an annual publication that canvasses various
public sources and surveys organizations in an effort to list organizations
represented before the Federal government. Organizations that are self-
professed lobbyists before Congress and the Executive agencies are espe-
cially likely to be identified. The fourth row gives the count of organiza-
tions identified in this way.
Several features of Table 1 are worth noting. First, we can readily
see that each source method of nominating organizations for inclusion
in the population of claimant organizations has distinctive features that
set it apart from the others. If we had relied only on the listing produced
by the Washington Representatives, we would have underestimated the
population of interested organizations by a factor of 2.8 (744512638).
Secondly, we learn that domains differ substantially among themselves
with respect to the amount of newspaper attention given them, the raw
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numbers of organizations identified as active, and the numbers of organi-
zations engaged in repeated efforts to influence policy outcomes in their
respective domains. From various points of view, the energy domain
seems to be the largest in terms of the number of organizations attracted
to its concerns, with agriculture and health roughly tied in scale of par-
ticipation with almost a third fewer organizational participants, and
labor placing a rather distant third. Thirdly, while the CIS ratios of men-
tions to counts of unique organizations identified are remarkably stable
across the four domains, the NYTIS ratios suggest considerable differenti-
ation across the domains with respect to the presence of repeat players.
For each domain we drew a random sample of 100 organizations,
with each of the four sources contributing equally, but with each organi-
zation in the first three sources weighted by the number of mentions in
that source. Because, for all but the listing from Washington Representa-
tives, the probability of selection increased with the number of mentions,
our sampling procedure reflected each organization's level of activity in
the domain. But we had an even stronger reason to adopt this weighting
procedure. Laumann and Knoke (1987: chap. 5) had demonstrated that
there was a high correlation between the number of times an organization
was named by other organizations as being among the most influential
actors in the domain and the number of mentions of the organization
in newspaper stories, appearances in congressional hearings, amici biefs
and interviews with government officials. Hence, there is solid reason
to believe that the number of mentions in the various sources is a good
measure of perceived organizational influence - an essential feature to
know for the analysis more generally. The sampling procedure thus gen-
erates a list of organizations that disproportionately includes the most
influential organizations in the domain and relatively underselects the
least influential organizations. simple inspection of the samples reveals
that we were quite successful in including many of the most prominent
and influential organizations, with an admixture of less visible, more
peripheral organizations, that will permit us to investigate what, if any,
systematic differences are to be observed in their modes of participation
in policy deliberations.3
In fact, at least 14 percent of the organizations actually interviewed in the four domains
had received ten or more mentions through a combination of our four procedures for
identifying participating organizations; and slightly more than 32 percent had received
at least 5 mentions. Thus the organizations selected were heavity skewed toward the most
J
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Having sampled the client organizations participating in each domain,
we identified the representatives they employed or retained in the domain
by conducting telephone interviews with informants in a minimum of
75 organizatiöns in each domain, 316 organizations in all.a These infor-
mantJwere identified by using published listings of organization officers,
supplemented with direct inquiries of the organizations, to determine who
hadoperating responsibility for the organization's involvement in federal
policy in the appiopriate domain. The informant so identified was asked
io name up to four individuals inside the organization (employees, offi-
cers, member-volunteers) and up to four individuals external to the orga-
nization (employed in outside firms, trade associations, and so forth, but
not falling within the definition of an internal representative) who acted
as key representatives for the organization in the policy area. It is this
listing of nominated individuals who constituted the population of repre-
sentatives to be sampled next.
The client interviews generated between 400 and 450 names in each
domain, for a total of I,716 individuals. (Representatives could appear
on the lists as many times as they were mentioned; about 5 percent
appeared in more than one domain.) Random selection from these lists
piöduced realized, samples ranging between 184 and 206 representatives
per domain. About two-thirds of the total sample were based in Washing-
ion and interviewed there;s while another 15 percent were based in other
major cities and interviewed there. The remainder of the sample was
intärviewed by telephone using an adapted format. The overall response
4
active organizations in each policy domain. For comparison, only l'5 percent of the
organizatlons in the sampling universe had l0 or more mentions, and only 5.3 percent
had received 5 or more mentions.
The response rate was 75 percent, with 8 percent of the organizations refusing inter-
views. Änother 12 percent of the organizätions could not be located, were located
overseas, or had ceased to exist. The iet'usals did not follow a pattern, and therefore,
did not constitute a maior source of bias. See Shapiro (1985: 12-14)'
The fact that almost one+hird of the persons meeting our definition of a Washington
representative are located outside the Washington metropolitan area deserves stressing'
Cäntrary to much received opinion, which has taken particular notice of the rapid growth
of the irade association and lawyer populations in Washington over the past decade'
Washington does not currently exercise a monopoly over the performance ofthe represen-
tational function. Unfortunaiely, we lack any historical evidence that would permit us
to estimate the extent to whiih this function has shifted to washington. certainly we
might expect that different aspects of representation might be done by insiders and
ouirid.t.. Out data permit us tö evaluate the kinds of rclles various representatives per-
form, but they are not directly pertinent to the concerns of this chapter (see Heinz et
al. 1987),
5
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rate of representatives successfully interviewed is 78 percent. About 10
percent of the representatives contacted declined interviews.
It is this sample of representatives that we used to determine the
extent and nature of organizational participation in specific decision mak-
ing events in each policy domain. Each respondent was treated as an
informant about the organization that nominated him/her; in many cases,
two to four representatives were interviewed from an organization. We
pooled the information from multiple representatives regarding the organi-
zation's participation in the 20 decision making events. Over two-thirds
of the representatives were, in fact, employees of the nominating organi-
zations.
Table 2 provides an overview of the distribution of the types of
organizations active in the four policy domains and, by inference, in
Washington domestic policy arenas more generally. It also documents
the systematic variation in this respect between policy domains.
Table 2: Tlpes of Organizations Active in Four Policy Domains: Percent Distributions
Policy Domain
Type of


















The sort of organization that is most often represented is the trade associ-
ation, which accounts for more than a quarter of all clients. But there
is substantial variation among the domains in this regard. In the agricul-

















































while only about one-sixth of the health clients are such associations.
The agricultural trade associations include not only the organizations of
farmers or producers, but also the industry associations of processors and
distributors, such as the Grocery Manufacturers Association. Individual
corporations are included in the "business" category, which is the next
most numerous class of clients, and where a similar variation among the
domains is displayed. Overall, nearly a quarter of the clients are busi-
nesses, but the range extends from a high of 54Vo in the energy domain
to a low of only 8Vo in the labor policy area. We have no solid explana-
tion for the finding that clients in agriculture are more often represented
as umbrella groups or associations while those in the energy policy do-
main tend to retain their identity as individual businesses, but this ten-
dency may be explained by the ielative "maturity" of the two domains.6
It may also be due to the relative size of the business entities in the
domains (i.e., energy businesses are larger and therefore more capable
of acting independently than those in agriculture and health).
As one might expect, the next most numerous category of clients,
labor unions, is much more often active in labor policy than in the
other domains. Even in the labor domain, however, two-thirds of the
clients are not unions, and unions make up only a small proportion of
the clients in the other three domains. One might also anticipate the
findings that minority group organizations are much more active in
labor and health policy than they are in agriculture and energy, and
that nonprofit and professional organizations are far more prominent in
health policy than in the other domains. State and local governments
and "citizen issue" groupsT are relatively evenly represented across the
domains, although they have a smaller presence in labor issues than they
do in the other policy arenas.
Most client organizations identified three or four key employees
who acted, often exclusively, as their representatives on matters in the
four domains. Only 3l7o of all the organizations surveyed (N = 311)
reported that they regularly retained law firms for advice and representa-
With a few exceptions, agriculture has been the subject of federal regulation for a
longer time than has "energy policy" as such. There has thus been a greater opportu-
nity for those organizations with common agricultural interests to coalesce into groups.
The term "citizen issue groups'r refers to organizations claiming to advance or defend
the well-being of the public as a whole regardless of, or in opposition to, what are
alleged to be narrower "special interests". These organizations include those concerned
with environmental protection, abortion, political campaign reform, and so on.
6
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tion in a policy domain, and more than one-half (5l.4%o) reponed that
they never used law firms for such purposes.8 Organizations were much
more likely to use trade associations regularly for advice and representa-
tion, but almost one-half (49.8Vo) of the organizations never used such
associations - nearly the same proportion as that which never used law
firms. Almost two-thirds (63.7Va) reported that, apart from their use of
law firms, they never used outside consultants, lobbyists, or public rela-
tions personnel for representational work, and only a little over one-
fifth (22.2Vo) of the client organizations regularly turned to such outside
representatives for assistance. (See Laumann/ Heinz 1985, and Nelson
et al. 1988, for a more extensive discussion of these findings.)
2 Organizational Participation in Decision Making Events
One of the key methodological innovations of our study design (first
developed by Laumann and Knoke (1987: chap. 1, 9-13)) is the identifi-
cation of a set of significant decision making events over an extended
period of time (in our case, between 1977 and 1982) in which the sam-
pled organizations could choose to participate. By combining a bounded
set of organizations and events, we can construct a data set describing
the interface of organizations and events that permit us to answer a num-
ber of important questions about the organizations' roles in national
policy formation. How do the organizations vary in the extent to which
they participate across the set of events? What organizational and interor-
ganizational features account for these variations in participation? What
features of the events themselves help explain organizational participa-
tion? To what extent does an organization's participation in one event
predict its participation in another? Asked from quite a different point
of view, how are the events linked to one another by common or disjoint
patterns of participation? Can the relative degree of event interdependen-
cy illuminate the degree of loose or tight coupling within, and across,
Economically oriented organizations such as business firms, trade associations, and
unions are considerably more likely to use law firms for representational tasks than
are professional, govemmental, or other nonprofit organizations. One f'act that might
account for this dift'erence in law firrn usage would be the considerable difference in
the financial resources controlled by the two broad types of organizations.
8
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domain policy making? And perhaps most importantly, to what extent
do organizations' preferred outcomes on one event predict their prefer-
ences with respect to another? How this last question is answered will
lay the foundation for understanding the structure of consensus and cleav-
age in the policy domain. And finally, how stable are these patterns of
consensus and cleavage over time? In this brief report, we can only
address several of these questions in a preliminary way, but we believe
the results are sufficiently promising and provocative that more thorough-
going investigation is amply justified.
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Space limitations preclude our listing the 22 events in each policy do-
main that we investigated. For illustrative purposes, we have selected
one event from each domain, with its time of occurrence, brief descrip-
tion of its substantive content, and the number of organizations activated,
with the split between those for and against the initiative also indicated.
We have also reported the average number of organizations activated
per event in each of the four policy domains.e
Not only do the 20 events in each domain vary considerably in the
number of organizations they attract to deliberate their outcomes, but the
individual organizations also vary in the number of events in which
they become active. Due to certain design features of the study that
focused attention on individual representatives rather than on organiza-
tions as the units of analysis, the data collected are not always optimal
for measuring features of organizational participation. In the case of
estimating organizational activation, these limitations are especially likely
to lead to underestimating activation in specific events. Despite this cave-
at, we note that only a few organizations fail to participate in at least
one of our targeted events (and these were excluded from the subsequent
analysis). The means and ranges of individual organization participation














9 To facilitate cross-domain comparisons, we included two events common to all four
policy domains, the passage of the Econornic Recovery Act of l98l that provided
across-the-board reductions in individual income taxes and the rejection of the Regu-
latory Refbtm Act of 1982 that would have provided tbr a legislative veto of proposed
agency regulation. For pu4)oses of this chapter, we have excluded these events from
the lbllowing analysis.
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3 Event Linkage or Dependency
The twenty events we identified in each domain obviously possess quite
distinct substantive and institutional content, and they occurred over a
span of six years. These events might be regarded as free-standing, inde-
pendent occasions for the sample of organization to attempt to exert
their influence, given an interest in the outcome. At least some pairings
of events, however, may well have a common core of participants and/or
nonparticipants. Such patterned linkages among events might be used
to shed light on the degree to which the policy domains, or at least parts
of them, were loosely or tightly linked - presumably with implications
for the overall coordination of policy outcomes. Our analytic premise
here is that pairs of events vary along a continuum of actor participation.
(See Laumann/ Knoke 1987: chap. 11, for an extended treatment of this
approach.) At one pole, the events may be treated as entirely independent
of one another (i.e., participation of actors in one event is random with
respect to their participation in the other). At the other, the two events
are completely dependent on one another, either in the causal sense that
Figure 2: Event Linkages Defined on the Basis of Pailicipation Patterns
Event B








N = total number of possible organizational participants
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the first event is a necessary and sufficient condition for the second or
in the strategic or purposive sense that an actor's preference for the
outcome of the second event constrains its behavior concerning the first
event.
There are four possible ways in which an organization can respond
to a pair of events. An organization may (a) participate in the first event
and continue to participate in the second event, (b) participate in the
first event but drop out in the second event, (c) not participate in the
first event but become active in the second event, or (d) remain inactive
throughout. To measure the degree of dependency between a pair of
events (Yu), we shall use Yule's Y Y = (s-1) / (o+1), where o = (a
* 
.q / b * c), and a, b, c, and d refer to the cell frequencies in Figure
2.t0
Table 4 presents selected comparisons of Yule's y as our measure
of paired event dependency or linkage for the four policy domains. Not
surprisingly, all four domains manifest average absolute y's significantly
larger than 0, but that is only because we disregard signs in calculating
such an average. Each domain, in fact, has a very distinctive pattern of
event linkage when we examine the means and percentages of positive
and negatives Y's. The labor domain is the only one with a positive bias(i.e.,75.37o of the Y's are positive) in event linkage, suggesting that its
system of actors and events are, at least, loosely coupled. It is 8.7 per-
cent more probable, on the average, that an observation of joint participa-
10 we have chosen Yule's Y as a measure of association between a pair of events be-
cause it is invariant with respect to the relative number of cases that appear in each
column or row, i.e., it is insensitive to the number of participants ln eäötr event. To
control-the marginal distribution is of concern because of the great variability in the
rates of participation across events.
Yule's Y has a straightforward interpretation as the difference in the probability of
being in the diagonal cell and the probability of being in the off.diagonal cell för a
standardized 2 x 2 table. The standardized table for a given c is one that has marginal
probabilities (.5, .5) for both rows and columns. Thai is, all marginal effects on the
expected probabilities have been "removed." In short, the size of yule's y tells us how
much more probable it is that an observation will fall into a diagonal cell rather than
an off-diagonal cell (cf. Bishop et al., 1975). Since it is a ratio sCde measure, with an
absolute value bounded between (0, l), it can be averaged and compared across domains.
Since Y is not commonly employed in the sociological literature, it may be helpful
to süggest yet another way ofinterpreting it. Each Y corresponds to a specific probability
of falling into the diagonal cells of the standardized 2 x 2 iable. To obtain thii probabili-
ty' simply calculate P - (Y + l) / 2. For instance, if y is 0.4, then the probability of
observations falling on the diagonal (the co-present and co-absent cells) is (0.4 ;D /
2 = 0.7. By subtraction, the probability of being in the off-diagonal cell is 0.3.
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Thble 4: Selected Comparisons of Yule's Y as Measure of Pailed Event Linkage
for the Four Policy Domains
Policy Domain







7o of Positive Y's
7o of Negative Y's



















n In the labor domain, the eighth event had only two participants. As a result, there were
many Yule Y's of +1 or -1, which greatly affected the averages. To avoid this' we
dropped the pairings which included Event 8 from the analysis reported here. For the
sakö-of strict comparability, the unadjusted averages for labor ate .235,.218, -.285' and
.094 for the first four row entries in the labor column, respectively.
tion (or joint absence) will occur on labor events than an observation
of mixed (present/absent) participation. The agriculture domain has a
considerably less strong tendency toward a positive bias of event linkage
within its set of events, while both energy and health have roughly equal
numbers of positively and negatively linked pairings of events. In the
case of energy these balance out so that there is no net bias of linkage
(-.016) among the pairings of events - in other words, random linkage
among events is the norm. Consistent with this finding of independence
among energy events, Laumann and Knoke (1987) present a diverse array
of empirical indicators that the energy domain lacked institutionalization
of the rules of the game so far as access and participation were con-
cerned. The health domain, on the other hand, has a net negative bias
(-.064) in event linkages. Remember that a negative Y represents a sys-
tematic dependency between two events in the sense that inactivity in
one event is nonrandomly associated with activity in the other. This
negative bias in health was observed in the earlier study (Laumann/
Knoke 1987: chap. 4 and 11) as well and can be shown to be related
49.5
50.5
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to the fact that biomedical research controversies tend to attract a very
different set of actors from those active in the other health-related events
- that is, those organizations interested in biomedical research issues
participate exclusively in those and avoid all other events, and the con-
verse is also true.
Some degree of patterned participation across sets of events was
anticipated, of course, since the events were drawn from domains of
presumably interrelated concerns. A similar analysis of participation in
events drawn from wholly unrelated policy areas (so that there is no
coherent or systematic patterning of actor participation from one event
to another) would produce an average Yule's Y approximating zero. A
negatively signed Y is likely to occur when the paired events are drawn
from disjunctive policy domains where participation in one event pre-
cludes participation in the other. Overall, one must be struck by the
relative lack of interdependencies among our events, even though they
are all drawn from a presumptively common universe of concern.
Much can be learned from a careful examination of the patterning
of the Yule's Y across the set of events in a domain (e.g., the existence
of relatively sharply demarcated subdomains). We must defer such an
examination to another occasion. For present purposes, we need only
point out that while the co-presence of actors in pairs of events is some-
times substantially greater than chance, common participation in pairs
of events nevertheless involves relatively few actors. This fact gains in
significance when we examine the extent to which actors' preferences
for particular outcomes co-vary across the events because it tells us that
we can expect only small numbers of common actors in randomly drawn
pairs of events. To put it another way, if the average rate of participation
in events is about 20 percent of the total sample, then we can expect
by chance that only 4 percent (.20 x.20) of the actors will jointly appear
in any two events having these rates of participation. Since the participa-
tion patterns are only modestly tied across events (i.e., the average Y's
are somewhat larger than chance), we can expect only a few more com-
mon participants across pairs of scenarios than would be predicted by
chance.
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4 The Structure of Conflict and Consensus
Those concerned with analyzing conflict and consensus in the resolution
of policy issues may well ask how our approach deals with such matters.
In light of the multitude of parties, both public and private, who are
actively engaged in controversies over diverse policy issues, is it possible
to specify principles that organize interested parties in a stable structure
of cleavage and cooperation? Should we expect, on the contrary, a fluid
structure of almost random coalitions and oppositions for each contested
event? Given a system of fluid coalitions, agreement or opposition be-
tween any pair of interested parties in a given event would depend
solely on calculations of the marginal advantages and disadvantages of
each policy option. Such calculations are unlikely to provide very consis-
tent bases for ordering preferences across corporate actors, save, perhaps,
for those whose organizational mandate is to be ideologically consistent
even with respect to the most arcane "technical" questions'
To what extent, then, do actors' preferences in one event covary with
their preferences in another? Strictly speaking, this refers to behavioral
or revealed preferences and not to attitudes or "true" preferences. An
actor reveals its preference in a given event only if it participates in its
resolution on a particular side (including an explicit fence-straddling
position). The actor may harbor strong views about most of the events
we asked about, but only those in which it acted will count in the analy-
sis. Each organizational actor was attributed its preferred outcome in an
event on the basis of the consensual report of one or more informant
representatives acting in its behalf.lr Of the 190 Spearman rank-order
correlations in each domain (20 x 19 / 2), we found only 7.9Vo, lO.SVo,
8.9Vo, and 4I.6Vo in the agriculture, energy, health, and labor domains,
respectively, that were significant at the p < .05 level or less (two-tailed
test). Only the labor domain, by all accounts the most polarized and
ideologically motivated, shows a high proportion of significant correla-
tions between organizations' preferred outcomes across pairs of events.
If active in an event, an organization was assigned to one of three positions: "1" for
"pro," "2" for "no position" or "ambivalent," and "3" for "con." lnactive organizations
were treated as missing cases, Spearman's rho's were then computed for every pairing
of events to measure the degree to which the jointly active organizations' position in
one event were associated with its position in the second.
11
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In sum, we observe only modest evidence of linkage among events
with respect to participation and preferred outcomes in all four domains.
To be sure, a small subset of events are closely interconnected and mani-
fest consistent cleavages - but persistent cleavages appear very much to
be the exception to the rule. One interpretation of these results would
suggest that technocratic and strategic, rather than systematically ideologi-
cal, considerations drive actors' participation in most policy controversies
in the four domains.
In general, individual organizational actors maintain portfolios of
issue concerns in which they have an interest. Each actor's portfolio
of expressed interests effectively links these issues to one another in
distinctive ways. Actors sharing issue portfolios constitute issue publics
that are, in turn, linked in greater or lesser proximity to one another as
a result of their variable overlapping interests. Thus linkage of events
is in part a function of the concatenation of individual actors' interests.
Moreover, the events themselves are linked to other events in the past
on various grounds, they overlap in the present with other events that
compete for attention or frame political debate, and they are linked to
future, anticipated events. In acting strategically with respect to given
events, therefore, every actor constructs a unique web of linked events
and interests that influences the decision to participate and with what
effect.
An alternative explanation for the observed low level of connected-
ness of participation and preference points to the important distinction
between intra-organizationally preferred and publicly revealed preferences.
Our data refer primarily to the final stages of long processes in which
options proposed by various interested parties are progressively win-
nowed, leaving only a handful of "viable" alternatives to be placed on
the fbrmal governmental agenda. Although actors have well articulated
preferences for particular outcomes, participants in the endgame must
engage in a form of strategic action in which selecting a course of action
entails an evaluation of the implications (linkages) of each option for
the actor's other current or future objectives, subject to the constraints
imposed by their past actions. Such considerations oftentimes support
the strategic endorsement of the winning option despite strong initial and
continuing preferences for some other alternative. The actor settles for
the least "bad" outcome when it faces the prospect of losing anyway
- especially if, by going along, one may win even minor concessions.
One may also hope that one can redress the balance of costs and benefits
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in future interactions on other issues. Calculations that lead to joining
the winning side are especially likely in recunent events under generally
nonadversarial conditions. Only events that are episodic (nonrecurrent)
and/or have clear winners and losers tend to lead the opposing sides to
fight to the bitter end.
To this point, our argument would seem to imply that there is very
little coherence or pattern in the multifaceted controversies and selective
choruses of agreement arising in the four domains. To the contrary,
however, we do expect to observe highly patterned structures of consen-
sus and cleavage in each domain. To appreciate this surprising contention
in the face of the relatively low association across events in participation
and preferences, we call attention to the linkages among the actors with
respect to their policy interests, information exchanges, and involvement
in institutionalized decision making arenas. Laumann/ Knoke (1987: chap.
4, 7 and 8) demonstrated that the flow of candid and confidential infor-
mation follows well worn channels among actors sharing common inter-
ests and broadly similar postures toward issues of importance to them.
That is, actors regularly turn to trusted others for interpretive and strate-
gic information concerning "what is going on" and "what is to be done."
Timely information gained from these confidential exchanges helps to
orchestrate the individual actors' strategic policy interventions. The pat-
tern of confidential exchanges in a given policy domain constitutes the
enduring structure that binds the actors. Analogously, we might speak
of such a structure as a crystal that is left intact or subjected to breakage
along different fault lines, depending on the blows it receives from vari-
ous policy-relevant events.
Figures 3 through 6 depict the first two dimensions of the three-
dimensional smallest space solutions (Schiffman et al. 1981) for the four
policy domains, derived from the input proximity matrices described in
the footnote below.t'
12 To calculate the input matrices for multidimensional scaling, we first assigned organiza-
tions to their preferred outcomes on each event, as described in footnote I l. The affinity -
antagonism based proximities were then estimated in three stages. First, for each of the
20 events in a domain, we constructed two social dissimilarity matrices: one correspond-
ing to the affinity in positions (shared preferences in outcomes) between pairs of organiza-
tions and the second corresponding to their opposed positions to one another, For the
affinity matrix, the element (i, j) will be "0" if the position of organization i and j are
not missing for the event and if their positions match, otherwise the element will be "1."
For the antagonism matrix, the element (i, j) will be "1" if either i or j is "for" while
the other is "against" the option; otherwise the element will be "0." In both matrices,







Figure 3: Organizations in the Agriculture Domain
Note: The first two-dimensional olol of a three.dimensional smallest sDace
solution depicting the proximitieö of 1 1 7 organizalions with respect tolheir
pro and con posftionsbn 20 selected evenis. (Kruskal stress =.17, R2= 85.3%)
First Dimension
Each three-dimensional solution achieved quite acceptable Kruskal stress
and R2 coefficients, despite the large number of points being plotted,
indicating good fits between the monotonic transformation of the original
proximities and the derived distances.
"0" means similar whereas "1" means dissimilar. Second, we stacked the 40 binary
matrices, 20 for affinity and 20 for opposition - i.e., two for each column-wise Pearson
correlations to generate the N by N proximity of the 20 events, to form a comprehensive
matrix of N by 40 N in size, where N = the number of organizations in the domain.
We then computed column-wise Pearson correlations to generate the N by N proximity
matrix. This procedure is akin to the analysis of multiple networks with procedures such
as CONCOR (Arabie et al. 1978) for blockmodeling. There is one critical difference:
The dummy natrices used in our method refer to dissimilarity matrices whereas those
of multiple network analysis ref'er to the presence/absence of ties regardless whether the
ties signify social similarity or dissirnilarity. Thirdly, the proximity matrix estimated in
stage 2 is submitted to ALSCAL (Schiffman et al. l98l) in SAS for nonmetric multidi-
mensional scaling. In general, the fitted distance between two organizations in the result-
ing spatial solution is invelsely related to the degree of structural equivalence of the two
organizations in terms of their affinity and oppositional linkages to other organizations
in the space.
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Figure 4: Organizations in the Energy Domain
pro and con on 20
First Dimsnsion
In all four solutions, one finds a tight cluster of organizations in the
central region that includes the law firms, consulting firms, and certain
trade associations that participate relatively infrequently.13 These organiza-
tions are retained or consulted by clients that vary from matter to matter
and they are not consistently partisan on the major issues of the domains'
By contrast, the peripheral locations ringing the spaces are occupied by
major advocacy or claimant organizations that speak, with frequency, for
a fairly narrow and consistent range of interests. Since over one-hundred
organizations are plotted in each solution, it is difficult to discern the
basic pattern in the welter of detail. To facilitate perception of the under-
lying pattern, we have plotted the locations of all the organizations but
have provided the names for only a select few that typify the organiza-
tions to be found in a localized region of the space. To imagine the
general shape of each solution, one might think of a sphere on whose
13 The Pearson correlations between the number of events in which an organization partici-
pated and the distance the organization was located from the centroid of the three-dimen-
sional solution were .85, .79, ,85 and .89 for agriculture, energy, hqalth, and labor respec-
tively (p < .001).
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surface is distributed the peripherally located actors, with a tight cluster
of organizations-usually law and public relations firmslocated roughly
at the core or central region of the sphere. Throughout the body of the
sphere are scattered organizations located at different radial distances
from the center of the sphere as a function of their level of event partici-
pation - the less active being closer to the center and the more active
being farther to the periphery (surface) of the sphere.
For example, in Figure 3, we find the American Agricultural Move-
ment at the extreme lower lefthand side of the space diametrically oppo-
site the National Cattlemen's Association at the upper righthand corner
(shades of the range wars!), and the Environmental Defense Fund in the
lower righthand corner, thus forming an equilateral triangle of opposing
interests in agricultural politics. The Farm Bureau, like its more political-
ly radical neighbor in the space, the American Agricultural Movement,
represents grain producers. The Cattlemen's interests are generally aligned
with those groups that process and consume grain, including the Milk
Producers, General Mills, the Grocery Manufacturers Association, and
so forth. The Environmental Defense Fund is the most active of the
Note: The lirst two-dimensional olot ol a three-dimensional smallest soace
solution depicling the proximitioö of 120 organizations with respect tolheir
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labor, environmental, and consumer groups that challenge, among other
things, the farmers' use of pesticides and water.
Figure 6: Organizations in the Labor Domain
Firsl Dimension
pro and on 20 92.4o/ol
With respect to the energy domain (Figure 4), four sectoral quadrants
can be roughly delineated, beginning in the upper lefthand corner with
the public utilities (and their principal trade association, the Edison Elec-
tric Institute), and going clockwise to the upper righthand corner with
the big oil interests (and the American Petroleum Institute as their key
spokesman), to the lower righthand corner with the natural gas interests
(and the American Gas Institute), and, finally, to the lower lefthand side
with its environmentalist organizations (including the National Resources
Defense Council at the bottom of the space).
The health domain (Figure 5) is also roughly organized into four
sectors ringing the center. In the northwest quadrant, we find miscella-
neous consumers of health care and labor unions. Moving to the north-
east quadrant, we observe the third-party payers of health care costs. The
southäast corner is populated by hospitals and hospital trade associations
such as the American Hospital Association (an extreme outlier, being
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one of the most active participants in the policy domain). Finally, in the
southwest corner, we find the major professional associations of health-
care providers, with the American Medical Association being the extreme
outlier.
Figure 6 depicting the labor domain is organized rather neatly, as
one might have expected, into a bipolar opposition structure with the
unions anayed on the righthand side and the major employers and their
trade associations on the left. The AFL/CIO is the extreme outlier on
the right, and the National Association of Manufacturers and the US
Chamber of Commerce are diametrically opposite at the extreme leftside
of the space. Worth noting is the internal ordering of the two sides. The
pairings of sparring partners (e.g., General Motors versus the United
Automobile Workers (U.A.W.), General Mills and the Food Service and
Lodging Institute versus the United Food Workers) are located diametri-
cally opposite one another, on a rotating axis around the center. Put
another way, the employer side arrays its constituent elements from the
heavy and intermediate manufacturing companies in the north to the light
industry and service businesses, such as construction and food processing,
in the south. The converse ordering of the counterpart unions from north
to south is to be observed on the union side of the space.
If one treats these solutions as depicting the overall structure of
coalition and cleavage among organizations across the diverse array of
policy controversies in a domain, one can then examine each policy
event separately to see how a particular event split that structure into
opposing parts. A detailed examination of the 80 events in hand, in
which we identified the regions of support and opposition in each contro-
versy, is highly suggestive about the distinctive politics that characterize
each domain. Presentation of such an examination would exhaust the
reader's patience, so we must summarize our principal conclusions based
on a detailed inspection of these plots. First, we observe that the support-
er and opponent sectors are usually delineated in distinctive regions; in
only a few controversies are supporters and opponents mixed together
in common regions. Yet the patterns of cleavage shift dramatically from
event to event as the substantive content changes. More starkly put, with
the possible exception of the labor domain where there is evidence of
a recurrent polarized axis of cleavage between labor and management,
the domains reveal no single axis of cleavage that might coincide with
an ideological dimension of liberalism/conservatism, defined economically
or socially. On the contrary, it appears that an axis of cleavage following
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the diameter of the spherical spatial solution can be almost indefinitely
rotated in any direction as the distinctive features of given contrpversies
differentially captule the attention of organizational interests.
To illustrate this point, let us consider the case of controversies in
agricultural policy. One observes a clear split over a proposal to raise
acreage limitations on federally irrigated land. Environmental groups
are on one side and the United Farm Workers and California farm orga-
nizations, beet sugar, cotton, and cattle producers, are on the other. But
there is an even more lopsided contest over increased price supports
for grain between various grain producers, including the Farm Bureau
and regional and local grain producer organizations, and a small number
of grain buyers, including CARE, an organization in favor of high pro-
duction and low prices that was opposed to the higher price supports
because it would increase the price of grain on international markets.
None of the participants in the controversy over federally irrigated land
were active in the fight over grain price supports. On the other hand,
proposals to make the Delaney Clause's ban on carcinogens in food
additives less stringent were supported by virtually all the food proces-
sing interests and opposed by most environmental groups and some labor
unions. Two other agricultural events presented yet other interest constel-
lations. Legislation rolling back dairy price supports drew support and
opposition from scattered positions throughout the space. The milk pro-
ducers, dairy state farm bureaus, and national farm organizations were
opposed, while retail food and food processor interests were in favor.
Cuts in food welfare were passed even though they were opposed by
a wide array of producers, environmental, labor, and humanitarian
groups and supported by only two or three organizations. Notably absent
from this contest were the national farmer groups.
One of the most divisive controversies of the period took place in
the health domain regarding hospital cost containment. The issue split
the space in half. In the lower half, hospitals, hospital trade associations,
and their allies opposed the imposition of mandatory caps on hospital
charges. In the top half of the space, third-party payer and consumer
groups supported the caps. In the case of cost reporting for Medicare
and Medicaid programs, the cleavage line rotated 90 degrees so that
opponents of uniform cost reporting - notably the hospital associations
and third party payer groups - were arrayed against various consumer
groups who wanted to avoid the creation of a two-tiered system of medi-
cal reimbursement that discriminated between the poor and the elderly
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and everyone else. A somewhat different split arose between opponents
of the proposed phaseout of health planning schemes, mostly the state
and local governmental bodies that derived some influence and control
over health care delivery systems in their jurisdictions, and the hospital
and medical interest groups that found these planning schemes to be
sources of interference. The proposed Delaney Clause revision shows yet
another pattern of cleavage that arrayed a tight cluster of food processing
interests against a handful of consumer advocates. Finally, the issue
concerning prospective medical payments based on categories of illness
rotates the axis of cleavage to a vertical plane, where hospital and third-
party payers were allied as proponents. The scheme was seen as likely
to result in "loose" and highly favorable government-guaranteed payments
for services rendered. These interests were opposed by a cross-section
of professional medical groups who were concerned about the rigidities
likely to arise from categorizing patients on the basis of diagnoses that
are subject to change. The energy events display a similar multidimen-
sional combination of structure and fluidity, as was observed for the
agriculture and health domains.
While the labor events reproduce the polar antagonism between busi-
ness and labor, they also reveal differences in the activation of various
segments of the oppositional structure depending on the issue involved.
Proposals for labor law reform stimulate the entire northem hemisphere
of unions and trade associations, plus the AFL/CIO. The question of
OSHA enforcement was primarily a concern of industrial employers and
unions, but also prompted involvement by women's groups, firefighters,
and transportation workers, who typically are not labor militants. The
ambivalence of organized labor about civil rights is portrayed in the issue
over affirmative action where the unions stood on the sidelines while
business groups and civil rights groups did battle.
Returning to the analogy of breaking a crystal, we know that how
the crystal splits depends on the strength and precise incidence of the
chisel blow, given the structure of the crystal. Similarly, much of the
strategic action of event participants, including even the matter of who
decides to participate and on what side, depends upon how the issue is
framed. The manner of framing may selectively energize the interests
and actions of certain domain members and discourage others from enter-
ing the deliberations. A consensual chorus results when the accepted
frame neutralizes the mobilization of potential opponents by stresiing
the facilitative, nonadversarial character of the policy question.
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5 Structural Stability Across Presidential Administrations
How stable are these configurations of actors? One could easily imagine
that new decision making events, arising in different Congresses or Presi-
dential administrations, would result in substantial reorganization of the
organizational proximities. Alternatively, stable proximities among organi-
,ulionr might iesist change in the face of changing administrations and
related hislorical circumstances. As a first cut at this intriguing question,
we propose to use the proximities of organizations estimated from their
participation in events during the Carter administration to predict the
proximities of these same organizations during the first two years of the
it"ugun administration. Table 5 presents the correlations of the pairwise
proiimities for the carter period (1977-80), using the procedure described
äs stage 2 in footnote 12, with those estimated on the basis of the events
arising during 1981-82.
Table 5: product-moment Correlations between Organizatiohal Proximities during the Carter
Administration and those of the Reagan Administration
Pearson


















a Sample size is the number of Pairwise proximities in a domain, which is calculated as
n(n-l)12 where n = number of organizations in the policy domain. It is difficult to calculate
the degrees of freedom to evaluate the statistical significance of the Pearson correlation
because there are, when all is said and done, only n organizations and only n-l possible
partners. In this case we used the original proximity, as calculated in footnote 12, and not
the fitted
D onetailed
Euclidean distance, which would restrict the degree of freedom to n-2
Rather sufprisingly, three of the four domains show comparable, but
very modest, intertempofal correlations between the two Presidential
administrations, with the energy domain displaying essentially no stabili-
ty. (We are interpreting the strength of the correlation as a rough mea-
sure of intertemporal stability. Negative cofrelations would suggest
Organizations in Political Action 93
radical re-organization of the policy domain's structure of consensus and
cleavage.) In both the Laumann-Knoke study and this work, the energy
domain displays a very low level of institutionalization when compared
to the other domains on a number of different indicators. It is worth
noting that labor has the highest conelation across time, but even it fails
to be especially strong despite its reputation for long-term polarization
of the participants into well-defined warring camps.
Since we lack comparable figures for other time periods, it is diffi-
cult to draw firm conclusions about the relative volatility of policy mak-
ing structures over time. The changes alleged to have been wrought
by the Reagan Presidency in the conception and implementation of wel-
fare state policies are entirely consistent with the low intertemporal corre-
lations we observe. One suspects, however, that casual observers greatly
exaggerate the degree ofstability ofparticipation, consensus and cleavage
in policy making. Even full+ime ideologists would be hard pressed to
specify the "correct" position on the myriad "technical" issues demanding
resolution. Absent such consistency-producing principles, one should
expect to find, as we do, that organizations' preferences are very loosely
coupled from event to event because each event is seen as presenting
unique or distinct features that must be taken into account and that ren-
der them distinguishably different from other events possessing broadly
similar content (cf. Laumann/ Knoke 1987: chap. 12, l4).
6 Concluding Remarks
The principal observation of this analysis is the remarkable orderliness
in the patterning of consensus and cleavage in the four policy domains.
Except perhaps for the labor domain, however, it is not an orderliness
that is easily comprehended by one or two broad analytic distinctions.
The positions of organizations are not based simply on pervasive ideolog-
ical disagreements or master corporate identities that are closely associ-
ated with known and unchanging interests. The structure is best thought
of as a multidimensional set of distinctions that arc selectively activated
by the particular framing of issue events presented in a certain sequence.
Each actor possesses an array of corporate interests, resources, and link-
ages with others - i.e., strategic considerations - that motivate and con-
strain the positions it takes. To study such structures more effectively,
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we must devise more sophisticated methods for capturing the global
character of this multidimensionally organized interface of events and
actors.
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Policy Networks in the German Telecommunications
Domain
Volker Schneider and Raymund Werle
1 Telecommunications as a Domain of Public Policy
State control of technology is a topic receiving increasing academic atten-
tion. The interest of social science in the role of the state in technology
development is rather new, although public policy related to technology
can be traced back to the industrial take-off. Especially in all European
countries the provision of a telecommunications infrastructure with tech-
nologies such as the telegraph, the telephone and also new communica-
tionJ systems such as cänrputer netwörks, facsimile transmission and
interactive videotex has been an undisputed state function and a govern-
mental prerogative that only recently was challenged by a new technolog-
ical revolution.
The telecommunications domain that has emerged since can be relat-
ed to a network of technological components enabling communication
over distance. However, such a purely technical perspective would over-
look the network of actors and ihe configuration of iocial forces which
are linked by vested interests and various concerns to the purely technical
configuration. The telecommunications sector is therefore also a system
of actors - an action domain - where specific economic, technical and
political interests arc at stake, where resources are mobilized and ex-
changed and where individual and collective strategies are pursued. In
addition, telecommunications also provides political and economic arenas
For helpful comments we thank Philipp Genschel, Renate Mayntz, Fritz W. Scharpf, Uwe
Schimank and Susanne Schmidt, and for technical assistance we are grateful to Günter Schrö-
der. We also appreciate the assistance of Doris Gau who carried out the interviews concerning
the telecommunications reform and Jürgen Bienzeisler who prepared the data set for the
analysis and produced a data documentation and a codebook. Thanks to Susan Wylegala-
Häusler for linguistic assistance.
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structufed by established institutions which define "the rules of the game"
that shape ihe actors' interaction, confrontation and cooperation.l
The aim of this chapter is primarily to contribute to the analysis of
public policy and not to the study of a given technology. Therefore we
are not interested in everyday activities in telecommunications such as
the use of the telephone or the manufacturing of switching facilities. Our
interest, instead, is focused on actor configurations and institutional ar-
rangements shaping public policies in this technology domain. Telecom-
munications in this sense is not only seen as a general system of action
but more specifically as a domain of public policy in which relevant
actors engage in processes of decision making and resource mobilization
which are oriented towards solving economic or social problems gaining
political relevance. This may be the provision of a new infrastructure
iervice by the state, but also the structural or institutional redefinition
of public functions in this sector.
The entities making up a public policy domain's system of actors
are those acting units which are "concerned with formulating, advocating
and selecting courses of action that are intended to resolve the substan:-
tive problem in question".2 In contemporary societies these are typically
corporate actors - public and private organizations or associations. Since
their "capacities to affect the collective outcomes of policy decisions
must be taken into account by the other participants", the telecommunica-
tions domain must be conceived as a social action systemr in which the
units do not act in isolation but take their respective resources, interests
and strategies into account. Such relations of mutual taking-into-acount
and resource dependency lead to networks ofroutinized interaction. Poli-
cy domains are constituted therefore by one or more policy networks.
2
3
Such rules may emerge out of social interactions, stabilizing and roinforcing the patterns
of behaviour, or they may be enacted more or less intentionally and formally. For a
discussion of these institutionalist concepts see Langlois (1986) and Scharpf (1989).
Cf. Knoke/ Laumann (1982: 256). This policy perspective assum.es not only a common
orientation among a set of actors but also their mutual relevance for each other (see also
Wright 1988: 609-610). It contrasts the wider, less specific concppt of "relevant social
g.oups" which is employed by some scholars in order to explain the evolution and
äevdlopment of technological atrtifacts. These groups comprise institutions, organizations
and alfkinds of unorganized groups including consumers or users as lOng as they "share
the same set of meanings attached to a specific artifact" (Pinch/ Bijker 1984 414).
Laumanr/ Knoke/ Kim (1985: 2). For a broad and detailed elaboration of the concept
of corporate action see Coleman (1990, esp. chapters 16, 19 and 20). See also Mayntz
(1986).
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The topology and specific configuration of such networks has to be seen
as an important structural property of the policy domain.
In the following sections, we will identify different policy networks
making up the telecommunications domain. It will be shown that this
is not a fluid or amorphous field of actors and events but is shaped by
a long history of interaction. An introductory description of the historical
emergence and transformation of institutional arrangements and gover-
nance structures in German telecommunications will help to understand
the current topology of policy networks. We will show that due to tech-
nical, economic and political factors, highly differentiated, comparatively
large and rather pluralistic policy networks evolved in this sector. This
finding will be evidenced in the third and fourth section by two case
studies illuminating the actual decision making and interaction structures
in two recent "issue areas": Firstly, a policy network which was involved
in the introduction of a new service, and secondly, a network which was
generated by the recent institutional reform of the German telecom sector.
By comparing both networks in the concluding section we will try to
conceptionalize the telecommunications policy domain as a sector with
differentiated but relatively stable and partly overlapping policy networks
which are routinely involved in the processing of policy problems. These
networks, however, are not sharply delineated sub-systems but often
transcend the classical boundaries of the telecommunications policy do-
main and overlap with other domains of public policy - without impair-
ing this domain's identity.
2 The History of German Telecommunications: Establishment
and Transformation of an "Iron Triangle"
The history of German telecommunications begins with the introduction
of telegraphy in the mid-1840s. The telephone emerged about 30 years
later. The following major telecom inventions were radio and television
in the 1920s and 1930s respectively. computer-related transmission net-
works emerged in the 70s and 80s. All these technologies have a com-
mon specificity: they are based on network industries relying on the
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highly coordinated cooperation of different technical and economic actors
in-thä development and operation of the system.a
In the early years of telephony, the local systems in some countries
were established by private firms, at times with several competing local
networks. In most cases, however, early competition quickly turned into
oligopolistic or monopolistic market structures.s The general trend was
thus a horizontal integration of telecommunications networks and the
emergence of territorial monopolies. In some countries associational or
cooperative management structures were established (Scandinavia and
the rural US) but typically telephony developed very early into a hierar-
chical model of governance, either by private firms or public administra-
tion.6 The tendency toward monopoly pricing by private monopolists as
well as the growing infrastructural significance of telecommunication
services were the driving forces pushing telephony under governmental
control in most countries. Even in a liberal state such as Britain, the
state gained total control over this sector in 1911. Although different
modes of political governance were employed, basically two dominant
forms have emerged. States have either directly engaged in telecommuni-
cations creating a public monopoly or they have established specialized
agencies and enacted regulations in order to control the behavior of the
döminant firms in the sector.T
The state monopoly in Germany can be traced back to the postal
monopolies (royal postal prerogatives: "Postregal") of the late Middle
Ages. Although the first telegraph line in Germany was introduced by
the military in 1846, telegraphy was soon opened for commercial use
and its administration moved from the War Office to the Post Office.
This shaped the first steps of German telephone development decisively,
because immediately after its invention, the German Post Office (GPO)
4 For a general discussion of the concept of "network industries" see Carlton/ Klamer
(1983).
5 The most important examples for competitive market arrangements are the US in the
period from l89S to tgOZ and Sweden from 1883 to 1918. Economists explain pressures
ioward monopolization of network industries mainly by the positive externalities of
telecommuniiations networks (along with the number of subscribers, the utility of a
network increases for each subscriber) and the related economies of scale; see Rohlfs
(19'74); Katzl ShaPiro (1985).
6 For the concept of governance that öannot be elaborated in this chapter see Williamson
(1985) and Hollingsworth (1990).
7 For a comparative overview on different organizational forms in telecommunications
see Pierce (1978) and Schneider (1991).
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decided to use telephony as an extension of the telegraph network to
rural areas. A few early applications by private businessmen for conces-
sions to run telephone networks were rejected and telephony was
declared a part of the official state monopoly. Hence from the very be-
ginning, telecommunications in Germany was under "political control"
and administrated by the PTT (post, telegraph and telephone administra-
tion).8
The status quo of the telephone system as a state monopoly was
explicitly legalized in the Telegraph Act of 1892 and confirmed in the
Telecommunications Installations Act of 1928. The PTT had the exclu-
sive right to install, operate and maintain the telephone system which
included transmission and exchange technology as well as the telephone
handsets which were perceived as a constituent part of the technical net-
work.
The PTT as a public administration only reluctantly expanded the
system, although after a short time this business turned out to be rather
profitable. Among the driving forces were the local and regional cham-
bers of industry and commerce which soon discovered the usefulness
of the telephone for business communication. They formed coalitions
with the local public administrations to mobilize a minimum number of
subscribers which the PTT had declared to be the necessary condition
for the provision, construction and installation of a network. Organized
business interests thus fulfilled an important function in the identification
of demand and the minimization of allocational risks.e
The technical components of the telephone system were developed
by the manufacturing industry in Germany. The PTT had only minimal
technical competence and practically no R&D laboratories to engage in
the process of the technical design and production of the system. The
equipment was developed and produced by a small group of manufactur-
ing firms in the field of electrical engineering ("the court suppliers").
8 The head of the PTT was the Post Office and later the Post Ministry, a branch of the
central government. For the early history of the telephone in Germany see Thomas
( I 988).
9 For tlris observation see Holcombe (1911: 37 -64) who concludes, "... the German system
of a special representation of economic interests, and their cooperation with the public
authorities in the management of business undertakings, has worked well. ... Thus the
organizations of economic interests have an educational as well as administrative value.
To this agency the German public trusts not only to get what it wants, but also to learn
what it ought to want" (Ilolcombe l9l l: 64).
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Their tendency toward cartelization was accepted if not supported by the
PTT. The problems of compatibility and network management required
the PTT to opt for strict uniformity of all technical components (Einheits-
technik).lO Consequently, the procurement policy was directed toward
purchasing a specific item from a dominant manufacturer holding patent
or other proprietary rights for the blueprint of this product. In order to
prevent dependency on a single manufacturer, the PTT obliged the re-
spective producer to grant patent rights to at least one national "competi-
tor". As compensation, the firm was guaranteed a relatively high propor-
tion of orders by the PTT.
The emerging network of actors may be represented by a simple
triangle. The PTT as an integrated part of the central government cooper-
ated and bargained on the one side with the local Chambers of Industry
and Commerce, but especially with their peak association, the German
Chamber of Industry and Commerce (Deutscher Industrie- und Handels-
tag, DIHT). Dominant issues were the quality of the telephone service,
tariffs and other problems typically related to the use of the system. On
the other side, there were close contacts to the equipment producers,
especially to the large companies like Siemens. Here, problems of invest-
ment policy and technical research and development were important
topics. In this triangle, the PTT was the dominant actor. After the 1920s,
the triad became slightly more differentiated but in principle remained
stable during the decades that followed.
With the Reichspost Budget Law of 1924, the legal status of the PTT
was transformed from a government department, fully integrated into the
central treasury, to a corporatelike public administration with its own
property and budget separate from the central budget. The PTT was
allowed to retain its revenues and to borrow money from the general
capital market. This led to greater organizational autonomy and a reorga-
nization and formalization of political control. An Administrative Council
with up to 41 members, conceived as a quasi-parliament, consisted of
political representatives from the central parliament (Reichstag), the
chamber of the kinder (Reichsrat) and one from the Finance Minister
of the central government. But also the employees of the PTT and the
associations of industry, trade, commerce and agriculture were invited
to send delegates to this council, so functional as well as territorial politi-
10 Also financial constraints and a continuing lack of adequately qualified technical staff
brought the PTT to favor this option.
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cal interests were represented in this corporatist body. The main function
of the administrative council was controlling financial affairs and eco-
nomic activities of the PTT.
The minister of the PTT was the political head and the executive
manager of the telecommunications administration. He was charged with
regulatory and operational competence in telecommunications. Political
control of the PTT by actors other than the minister in charge was not
formalized with the exception that the Minister of Finance had the right
to approve all relevant financial affairs.
The Administrative Council did not replace the more clientelist net-
works of direct interaction between the PTT and the private manufactur-
ing firms. It rather allowed for an institutionalized mix of political and
economic elements of control in telecommunications. The overall policy
network in this sector became slightly more dffirentiated and intricate,
although the central position of the PTT remained unchanged or was
even strengthened. A number of political actors, the manufacturers and
the commercial users of the telephone system, were interested in a great-
er formalization of the intermediation of interests in telecommunications
policy making.
The situation rapidly changed in the period of Nazi rule when matters
of economic performance of the telephone system were clearly subordi-
nated to political and military priorities (Thomas 1,988: 197-202). The
general strategy of the dominating party, the NSDAP, pushing the "unity
of party and state" resulted in cutting down informal political networks
and liquidating intermediary organizations. Concerning telecommunica-
tions, the Administrative Council was abolished. This measure was in-
tended to reduce the organizational autonomy of the PTT by producing
a hierarchical command structure and decision making process, and set-
ting the organization free from economic considerations. Paradoxically,
however, this partly increased the autonomy. Conelating this develop-
ment, the PTT drifted into a situation of isolation - deteriorating techni-
cal innovation and sophistication (except for military purposes) - and also
economic inefficiency.
After the Second World War, with the foundation of the Federal
Republic of Germany, a federal PTT Ministry was re-established and in
the early 1950s a very mpderafe political discussion started about the
institutional reconstruction of the telecommunications domain. The state
monopoly was not challenged at all but was perpetuated on the basis
of the Telecommunications Installations Act of 1928. The question of
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reorganizing the PTT was answered rather quickly. In 1953, the model
of the Reichspost Budget Law was transformed into a slightly modified
new version called the PTT Administration Act. The separation of the
PTT budget from the federal finances was confirmed as was the Admin-
istrative Council and its central competence. Though the number of mem-
bers was reduced to 24, the composition of the re-established corporatist
body changed only slightly.rr
It should be noted that the PTT Administration Act ensured more
elaborated rights of intervention for other ministers in the PTT affairs
than the old Budget Law had done. The Minister of Economics had to
approve the charges and utilization conditions for the telecommunications
services and the Minister of Finance had to approve the PTT's budget
(including debts, plans for investments etc.). On the other hand, the more
informal interdependence of the PTT and the manufacturing industry
remained unchanged by the Act, although the formal model of the PTT
Adininistration Act was based on a conception of rather tightly coupled
political and economic activities in telecommunications' Figure 1 shows
the structure of the political-economic network in telecommunications
as it had evolved in the 1950s and 1960s before major technological
and economic changes triggered a network expansion and an increased
separation of the political and economic sphere (cf' Werle 1990: 143).
As a public monopoly, the management and operation of the telecom-
munications system was not only oriented towards economic goals but
was clearly a product of political processes, too. The policy nenvork
engaged in the major political decisions shaping telecommunications
policy during the more than 2O-yeat post-war period wQS rather small.
Besides the formally involved political actors like the federal cabinet,
several ministries (first of all the PTT Ministry), the Federal Parliament
(members of Parliament and certain committees) and the Federal Council,
only the political parties (especially through their activities in parliamen-
tary committees), the postal workers' unions and the DIHT continuously
participated. The equipment manufacturing firms did not play a signifi-
cant political role but restricted their direct participation to economic
The Federal Parliament (Bundestag) and the Federal Council (Bundesrat) could send
5 representatives each into that assembly. Another 5 delegates were recruited from indus-
try, irade, commerce and agriculture. The council was completed by 7 members represent-
ing the staff of the PTT and two experts in telecommunications technology and finance
respectively.
ll
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Figure 1: The Political-Economic Actor Network in the Early 1970s
BDI: National Association of German lndustries
DGB: Associalion ol German Trade Unions
OIHT: German Chamber ol lndustry and Commorce
DPG: PTT Workers' Union
FTZ: Central Oltico for Telecommunications Technology
SEL: Standard Elektrik Lorenz
ZVEI: Csntral Association ot lhe Electrical
Engine€rino lndustry
activities. Here, they could rely on informal links among themselves and
with the PTT Ministry and its engineering center, the Central Office
for Telecommunications Technology (Fernmeldetechnisches Zentralamt,
FIZ), which had been revitalized and stabilized after the war during the
years of close cooperation when the future telecommunications system
had to be designed.
In a first step the policy network grew moderately in the 1960s when
telephony gradually expanded in residential areas, too. The PTT's prob-
lems in meeting the growing demand for telephones on the one hand,
and the increasing political significance of the industrial activities in
telecommunications on the other, triggered the engagement of additional
actors. Especially the equipment-manufacturers in the electrical industry
and its Central Association (Zentralverband der Elektrotechnischen Indu-
strie, ZVEI) but also the peak association of industrial firms, the Federa-
tion of German Industry (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, BDI)
appeared on the stage although the DIHT remained the most visible

















During the expansion process of the telephone system, it became
more obvious that political and economic decision making processes
intermeshed and overlapped but only few actors participated in all pro-
cesses. Many actions had to be legitimized politically and economically
and their effects were difficult to project. Raising telephone charges, for
example, could either provoke political protest and a loss of votes or
a decrease of usage and dissatisfaction with the service, or both.
An effort to reduce these problems by an institutional separation of
regulatory and operational functions in telecommunications failed at the
beginning of the 1970s. But it became obvious that with the increasing
number of actors in telecommunications not every actor was able and
willing to engage in all kinds of activities. At the beginning of the
1950s, only a handful of actors participated in the discussion of the PTT
Administration Act; about 15 years later, the debate on the reform of
this act activated approximately 10 associations (including two workers'
unions) outside the official circle of political actors (government officials,
political parties etc.) and almost a dozen experts. The equipment manu-
facturers and other economic actors remained in the background.
This suggests that - as a consequence or at least as a correlate of
the process of expansion and differentiation in the area of telecommuni-
cations services and equipment - differently composed actor networks
have evolved to deal with either more political or more economic prob-
lems in this sector. This differentiation does not necessarily imply total
separation of networks and actors. But it clearly led to the emergence
of relatively autonomous clusters of interaction based on the division of
labor in complex societies.
As long as purely economic decisions affect public policies, govern-
mental agencies will also try to influence, and participate in these deci-
sion making processes and not restrict themselves to politics. One there-
fore should expect that the PTT Ministry holds central positions in al-
most all of the co-existing networks. In the following sections we will
look at two of these actor networks which evolved in the process of
growth and differentiation in telecommunications.
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3 Policy Networks in the Introduction of a New
Telecommunications Service: The Case of Videotex
(Bildschirmtext)
Bildschirmtext (Btx) is a new telecommunications service which combines
the telephone, video and computer technology.l2 Its purpose is to make
the exchange of visually displayed information between videotex termi-
nals possible. The core of the system is an information data base and
a number of text communication facilities (electronic mail). This idea
of an easy-to-use electronic data service for the mass public emerged
in the mid-70s and inspired politicians and businessmen to see this tech-
nology as the communications infrastructure of the future, giving every-
body access to the world of computer information. However, in most
countries, with the exception of France, these hopes did not come true
and the use of videotex is still restricted to specialists.
The German Bildschirmtext system was introduced between 1975
and 1984 and this introduction was heavily promoted by the German
PTT and a number of industrial actors.r3 The primary interest of the PTT
was, firstly, to get a new, future market which could complement the
almost saturated telephone business in the long run, and secondly, to
increase the utilization of the existing telephone network especially out-
side peak hours. After the first official demonstration of the system (initi-
ated by the PTT in 1977) restricted trials began in 1978 involving the
PTT, certain equipment producers and about one hundred information
providers. In these pilot experiments, field trials were conducted from
1981 to 1983 which aimed at anticipating possible social and economic
consequences of the new service. Finally, the service was to be officially
started in the autumn of 1983, but due to technical snags, implementation
was delayed for almost one year.
In 1984, there still were great expectations: It was believed that at
the end of the decade, several millions of subscribers would be connected
to this service. Up to the end of 1990, however, Btx gained only about
250,000 users. Compared to the initial expectations and to the about 5
12 In other countries it is known by the names viewdata, videotext, Prestel, Teletel, and
Telidon.
13 Fol a more detailed and comprehensive analysis ofthe introduction ofvideotex in Germa-
ny see Schneider (1989),.
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million participants in the French videotex system, this service introduc-
tion was certainly not a success.
Although there is clearly no single explanation of the fatal German
situation, an important determinant of the different development in the
two countries is undoubtedly related to the institutional structures by
which these service introductions were governed. In both countries, the
preexisting public telecommunications monopoly turned videotex introduc-
tion - despite its commercial character - into a matter of public policy,
involving the general political decision making machineries. Due to the
German federalist decision making structure and also to the fact that the
participating industry in Germany was much more autonomous and frag-
mented than its French counterparl, Btx could not be implemented with
the same decisiveness that the French have demonstrated with their Mini-
tels.
An important factor in the politicisation of the introduction of Btx
was the relation of this new communication service to media policy.
Since Btx allows not only the transmission of messages, but essentially
provides an electronic infrastructure for the distribution and communica-
tion of information, it was thought to affect a number of actors in the
traditional media sector. In Germany, this was the press, the broadcasters,
and especially the kinder (federal states) as the authorities responsible
for the German radio and television system. Other actors appeared from
outside the media policy domain advocating data protection and consumer
protection with respect to concerns of social groups which were anxious
about negative impacts of the videotex technology on their life style and
social situation.
During the Btx introduction in Germany, the PTT played a dominant
role as coordinator and "system leader": It initiated the undertaking,
shaped the core decisions of systems architecture, coordinated the estab-
lishment of the central computer network, controlled the installation of
specialized telecommunications connections and led and coordinated to
a large extent the public relations activities.
Despite this central position, the German PTT was far from achieving
hierarchical control over the overall actor set. Btx not only interfered
with other public policy domains but also in its indigenous field the PTT
had to rely more and more on the cooperation of private firms competing
under market conditions. The procurement of Btx terminal equipment
was completely liberalized. In the first years of Btx development, the
PTT was not even allowed to provide any terminals. This was not only
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due to its technical concept of Bildschinntext relying on the nonnal
TV setf a but also to the growing demand for deregulation and liberaliza-
tion (see next section). During the early 1980s, it became very difficult
for the PTT to continue its traditional terminal procurement for new
services. Since the "French strategy" of a completely state-led terminal
diffusionls was "politically not feasible" in Germany,l6 the Bundespost
had to use an indirect approach which was not entirely unsuccessful.
Despite a lack of traditional ties to private TV set manufacturers or to
the press, the German PTT was able to motivate a larger number of
actors for cooperation by a series of financial incentives, organizational
and informational support (e.g. research funding, coordination of trials
and presentationq, support by extensive marketing activities, etc.).
Similar problems arose in the information business since the PTT
as a "common carrier" could not offer information services itself. The
growth of an information market within the videotex system thus de-
pended on the successful motivation and stimulation of private firms,
primarily from the print media sector, to engage in this new market.
Seen from the perspective of governance, the German Btx was intro-
duced within a mixture of market ar:rangements, hierarchical coordina-
tion by the PTT and associational coordination through business associa-
tions in consumer electronics and the new information provider domain.
In this situation, the traditional, only slightly extended triangle in German
telecommunications began to expand into a complex network of heteroge-
nous actors.
t4 When the German Bundespost initiated videotex introduction in the mid-1970s, it was
believed that the use of the home TV set with an adapter would be the most economic
solution and the Bundespost had therefore to cooperate with the German TV industry.
Since this sector is organized as a private and highly competitive market, a liberal termi-
nal policy was the logical consequence.
In France, the PTT bought several million videotex terminals from its telecom industry
and distributed the terminals for free (Mayntzl Schneider 1988).
This is indicated by a statement of officials of the PTT Ministry in an interview: "We
could do it, for instance, like the French: We commission one million terminals and give
them away for free. Then we would have I million subscribers in a short time. This
would be nice - but this is not feasible in the Federal Republic. We expect that the
terminals will be provided by industry and bought by the users. ... We also discussed
these problems with our French colleagues. They think that one has to give the industry
a fixed order - otherwise this will not work. If we would have taken up their proposal
and have ordered, say, 500,000 decoders, we woukl have been swamped with reproaches.
We would not have survived the subsequent political discussion" (Diebold Management




The structure of the Btx network was shaped by the existing institu-
tions, some key decisions in the technical area, and the actors' percep-
tions. The legally relevant definitions of the new medium played an
important role for the inclusion in or exclusion from the policy network.
At the end of the 1970s, it was not clear whether Btx should be consid-
ered as a form of broadcast communication or as an individual telecom-
munication like the telephone or data transmission. Such a distinction
had important consequences in Germany because quite different regulato-
ry structures in telecommunications, broadcasting and the press exist.
Whereas telecommunications is a state monopoly run at the federal ad-
ministrative level, the broadcasting system is controlled by the German
kinder.tT ln the press sector, finally, governmental regulation (by k)nder
legislation and by a "regulatory framework" at the federal level) is very
limited.
In this context, the kinder saw Bildschirmtext mainly as an electron-
ic mass medium and feared that it could introduce market forces in their
traditional domain. The press, in contrast, perceived the intervention of
the broadcasting authorities as intended to extend their regulatory powers
into the area of hew electronic media.
The fact that the provision of terminals was liberalized, that media
policy became involved and that Btx created other social issues (rational-
ization, data and consumer protection) triggered the engagement of a
rather inclusive set of actors. The technical and organizational built-in
requirements for system development (resource mobilization, systems
operation, administration, standardization, guarantee of access, content
regulation, information provision) thus activated many more actors than
traditional telecommunications policies. In addition, a number of actors
got involved by anticipating certain "external" effects or social impactsls
of the Btx technology. Thus, the perceived technical and organizational
functions and anticipated externalities " generated" a network of actors
who considered each other directly or indirectly relevant for the system.
Although this structure was not the result of a common and homogenous
perception of the technological system (competing purposes, competing
l'7 In the 1980s the German Broadcasting System was partially opened to private radio and
TV stations which are also generally regulated by the states' governments'
l8 Examples are: privacy and security, consumer protection and effects on employment
and industry structure.
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usage perceptions), the different visions, nevertheless, converged into a
single structure of mutual relevance on the actors' level.lg
Besides an intuitive and qualitative account of this interaction system,
the network of mutually relevant Btx actors can be identified and ana-
lyzed more systematically by network analytical methods.2o For this
purpose we applied a research strategy similar to that of Laumann/
Knoke (1987). In the first step we identified about 140 organizations
which had been considered relevant for the introduction of Btx by a
group of experts. Then, from this large set we selected the subset of the
40 most influential organizations and this subset was interviewed with
a standardized questionnaire.zl
From the pre-selected subset each respondent was asked to mark
organizations listed in the questionnaire which had particular influence
in the technical and institutional "shaping process" of Bildschirmtext. The
respondents also reported, using a standardized form, whether they coop-
erated and exchanged information with the other actors on the list.
Influence reputation, cooperation and information exchange can be
interpreted as the major facets of a structure of mutual relevance. An
impression of this structure is given in Table 1. For the sake of simplici-
ty of presentation, we only display the average value each actor received
concerning influence, exchange of information and cooperation. In order
to make comparisons easier, the indices have been rescaled to give the
actor with the highest score the maximum value 1.00.22
19 "Mutual relevance" implies that actors take each other into account in their actions. They
have to have a certain degree of power to influence the policy making process. Mere
inaction does not necessarily indicate inelevance or marginality, since others may take
the interest of one "passive" actor into account (Knoke/ Laumann 1982:257).
20 For an overview of network analytical methods see Knoke/ Kuklinsky (1982) and Pappi
(re87).
21 The list of these 40 actors was presented to the interviewees. They could add relevant
actors not included in the list and eliminate those they considered irrelevant. The resulting
population to be analyzed in this section comprises 42 actors.
22 The influence reputation scores are slightly different from those reported in an earlier
version ofthis chapter and in Schneider (1989: 205). This is a result ofdifferent recoding
procedures, which were employed in the two analyses. This fact should prevent us from
overinterpreting the influence positions. The formal precision of the computation clearly
suggests a greater validity of the measurement than one can really achieve by means
of a questionnaire.
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Table 1: Influence Reputation, Cooperation and Information Exchange in the Videotex (Btx)
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Note: The table contains only actors with an influence reputation score of at least 0.25' All
indices were rescaled to the maximum 1.00. IP = Information or service provider,
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As it is shown in Table 1, the actors with the greatest influence reputa-
tion were the German PTT Ministry and its technical agency (FlZ).
Among the producers, IBM was considered most influential since it
designed and established the network of computer databases. Also the
small and innovative TV set producer Loewe Opta was considered to
be very influential. This firm strongly stimulated the development of
the terminal market by its innovative capabilities. That Siemens - the
largest telecommunications producer in Germany - also held a strong
"reputational position" was expected. On the user and application side,
the information providers' association Btx-AV (Btx-Anbieter Vereini-
gung), ranking as high as IBM, the press and the DIHT have been con-
sidered to have the highest influence reputation.
It is interesting that purely "political actors" such as the party with
the highest influence scores (the SPD), the Federal Ministry of Research
and Technology (Bundesministerium für Forschung und Technologie,
BMFT), the Bundestag, those responsible for data protection at the feder-
al and the Ländef3 level etc. received relatively low rankings, whereas
producers and the major information providers were positioned more at
the upper end of the influence reputation scale.
The PTT Ministry was not only the most influential actor but also
the most frequently nominated partner of cooperation in Btx' All in all,
Table I shows that the rank order of cooperation is very similar to that
of influence.
Considerable similarity between the actor's positions also exists with
regard to information exchange. The PTT Ministry ranked highest and
the FIZ and the Btx-AV were very frequently mentioned partners in
information exchange processes, too. All the other actors have significant-
ly lower scores. But this does not mean that there was no clearly struc-
tured network of information exchange. This can be demonstrated by a
block model procedure,2a a network analytical tool in the narrower sense.
Using this procedure, the whole network of information exchange can
23 Their relatively highest (twelfth) position is due to the fact that for a longer period, Btx
was also perceived as an electronic mass medium.
24 The blockmodel was produced by the coBloc-procedure (canington/ Heil 1981) with
the program system SONIS (Pappi/ Stelck 1987).
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be reduced to the essential "strings" and "nodes"25 where the actors with
highly similar communication profiles are condensed into single actor
blocks.
Figure 2: The Policy Network in Videotex (Btx)
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Figure 2 represents such a compressed communication structure with
eight actor blocks. Here, the three most frequently mentioned partners
of information exchange, together with the association of the telecommu-
nications equipment manufacturers (ZVEI), occupy the most central posi-
tion in the network. The role of this group can therefore be labeled as
the "coordinator and system leader". This central group has direct ties
to four blocks of producers and main information providers. The group
of "political actors" which were mainly responsible for the media, con-
25 Because every actor was asked to specify the actors with whom he had an especially
extensive information exchange during the Btx introduction, we received an asymmetrical
matrix representing the communication linkages in our population. This matrix is the
basis (input) of the block model procedure.
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sumer and privacy regulations occupies a rather peripheral position in
the network. This structure suggests that technical and economic problem
perceptions clearly dominated political considerations.
The "infrastructure" of this information and coordination network
consisted, on the one hand, of direct informational and cooperative rela-
tions in the field trials and of promotional alliances for public relations
activities and, on the other hand, also of the membership and participa-
tion in a series of formal committees within the PTT and the information
providers association (Btx-AV). The latter was very influential because
it accomplished an organizational framework for the cooperation between
the PTT and the most important information providers. Beyond this eco-
nomic organization of Btx development, a number of formal political
institutions organized and channelled the influence of the kinder, the
intervention of data protection authorities, and the voice of the consumers
and other affected groups in the regulation of this new electronic medi-
um.
To summarize and visualize the structure of mutual relevance in the
introduction of Btx each actor position with respect to influence reputa-
tion, information exchange and cooperation is displayed in a three dimen-
sional scattergram (Figure 3). It shows the outstanding positions of the
PTT, its technical agency (FTZ) and the Btx-AV. Between these three
actors and all the others there is a relatively large gap - especially with
regard to information exchange and cooperation.
At the beginning of this section, we pointed to the failure of the Btx
diffusion and indicated that these development problems have to be relat-
ed to the structure of the Btx policy network during its introduction. A
comparative examination of the introduction of videotex in France and
the UK26 indicates that such a relationship clearly exists. In the three
countries, governance structures of videotex introduction differ in three
respects:
1. the weight of political actors representing "regulatory policy issues"
in the media policy domain and in consumer protection;
2. the degree of vertical control the PTT had in each system (from
equipment and terminal production to systems operation and informa-
tion provision);
26 For a comparison of different videotex introduction strategies see Mayntz/ Schneider(1988) and Vedel (1989).
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3. the degree to which the systems provider had a monopoly in the
service provision or was submitted to market competition (horizontal
control).
In Britain, the "political actors" had the lowest weight because political
regulation never became an issue there. An important reason was that
the old British Post Office had been able to "buy off" potential opposi-
tion from the press by giving up its claims on information provision and
by incorporating press organizations into the videotex project. This
meant, on the other hand, that the Post Office's direct "veltical" control
of Prestel, the British videotex system, was rather low because it was
not only dependent on the cooperation of terminal producers but also
on the information providers. In addition, when British telecommunica-
tions became completely liberalized in the early 1980s, the new British
Telecom also lost the "horizontal" control and Prestel had to fight with
new competing services.
The French videotex introduction, in contrast, was under almost com-
plete horizontal and vertical control of the French PTT. The French
0.8
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telephone authority Direction G6n6rale des Tdldcommunications (DGT)
provided the service, distributed the terminals (for free!) and controlled
the most important information service, the electronic directory.
Similar to the British, the German terminal domain and the informa-
tion sector were market controlled but Btx never had to compete with
other videotex services. On the other hand, it was shaped and partly
restricted by the regulation of potentially negative externalities. Although
the different actors demanding this kind of regulatory intervention had
a rather low influence reputation, they managed to impose the (from their
perspectives) necessary minimal regulations confining Btx, for example,
to "interactive" usage between either terminals or terminals and a data
base. However, the most important facet of Btx introduction was un-
doubtedly the low degree of vertical control, despite the PTT Ministry's
central position in the Btx network. Aside from the PTT Ministry, there
were other rather influential actors with different interests in the "coordi-
nator and system leader" block. The same holds true for the blocks of
dominantly economically oriented producers. The group of political ac-
tors, although not very influential after a restrictive political definition
of Btx had been reached, "remained" in the network - ready to keep
watch that the definition was not violated by the PTT Ministry.
The German videotex development became locked into a kind of
chicken-egg dilemma. Potential users waited for cheap terminals and
attractive services but terminal prices and the utility of information ser-
vices depended to a large degree on the investments of private business
firms. These actors, however, were only willing to invest when there was
already a critical mass of users. The PTT, which might have financially
been able to cut the vicious circle by subsidizing terminals, telecommuni-
cations tariffs and perhaps even the provision of information services
during the early years of Btx introduction, could not manage it.
Obviously, the direct approach used by the French to establish a
system from scratch over night was not feasible in the German context.
But institutional constraints and the concrete structure of the actor net-
work were not deterministic causes of the relative failure. The strategy
of the PTT to introduce Btx in a cooperative mode together with autono-
mous actors, respecting the given institutional boundaries and the delim-
ited economic domains, was not bound to fail automatically. If the accu-
mulation of technical coordination and timing problems had not created
serious technical snags, the strong expectations which almost everybody
had during 1982 and 1984 could have pushed the growth of the user
4118 Chapter 4
community beyond the necessary critical mass within a short period.
Complications produced by international standardization processes and
the tendency to over-engineering in German telecommunications made
the whole undertaking very time-consuming and resulted, among other
things, in too expensive Btx terminals. When the expected "take-offl' of
the system did not take place, Btx's reputation was further damaged. All
in all, this finally led to the failure of the PTT's introduction strategy,
recovery from which will be very difficult.2T
The Policy Network of the Institutional Reform in
Telecommunications
In contrast to the case of videotex policy making which demonstrated
the impact of the institutional setting on the economic prospects of the
service, the policy process of institutional reform was driven by the goal
to change and restructure this setting. Success or failure of such a pro-
cess can be assessed on a long-tenn or a short-term basis.28 A short-
term indicator could be the mere capacity for collective action, i.e.
whether the initiators and proponents of the reform succeeded in mobiliz-
ing support to transform the proposals for institutional change into an
enacted law. "Objective problem pressure" alone does not trigger reform
initiatives, nor is there only one way out of the problematic situation.
"Change agqnts" with convincing arguments and sufficient formal politi-
cal power as well as informational and reputational resources to form
coalitions to overcome institutional inertia are always needed.
After the failure of a first reform initiative in the early 1970s, it took
about 8 years until the dissatisfaction with the status quo led a few ac-
tors to call for a liberalization of the telecommunications market. Com-
puter manufacturers like IBM and Nixdorf, a dynamic German company
which later was sold to Siemens, demanded free entry into the terminal
equipment market which through the PTT's restrictive approval practice
27 After this failure was acknowledged in 1987, the PTT was allowed to enter the terminal
market.
28 Medium- or longterm success of the structural changes in telecommunications woüld
be indicated by better performance, higher efficiency and innovativeness which was
explicitly intended by the reform.
was a well protected domain of the traditional suppliers of the German
PTT. But also liberal cDU ministers of economics in the ränder, espe-
cially Lower Saxony, began to criticize the growing monopoly po*rt
of the PTT which, as a consequence of the confluencä of computeis and
telecommunications, at least indirectly interfered in the traditi-onally un-
regulated market for computer equipment.
In a first spectacular step in 1980, the German Monopolkommission(antitrust commission) analyzed the procurement policy ör tne prr and
the structure of the telecommunications equipment marliet which in many
segments was dominated by the purchasing power of the prr. In its
report, the commission questioned the prTs double role as player and
umpire in the market (Monopolkommission 1981: 9l-110). Th; commis-
sion demanded far-reaching liberalization measures in the terminal
market and a certain degree of service competition within the public
telecommunications network. The PTT successfully rejected the proposals,
but its position had already become weakened because of some stiategic
errors made in previous years (Dang Nguyen 1985: l l2-rl4). Especially
the fact that the PTT still supported the development of an obsoletä
analogue electronic switching system while the world was going digital
had provoked severe criticism. This case was seen as evidence ofburäau-
cratic and monopolistic inertia.2e
As these problems did not directly or visibly affect the quality or
availability of telephone service, the general public did not challenge the
PTT's monopolistic position which seemed to guarantee universal särvice
at reasonable costs. In addition, radical reforms like privatization of the
telecommunications branch of the PTT were practicaiy excluded by the
Basic Law postulating the PTT to be state-owned. The new federal gov-
emment - a coalition of the christian Democrats (cDu/csu) and the
Liberals - coming into office in 1982, had to take this into consideration.
The new PTT minister, who had formerly cnticized the prr monopoly
frequently, was willing to initiate a reform at all costs. In this respect,
he could count on the liberals, who demanded far-reaching changes in
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The decision was not cancelled until 1979 when it had become obvious that fully digi-
tized systems were technically and economically superior to analogue technology iweile1990:249-263).
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telecommunications, whereas his own party, especially the Bavarian wing
(CSU), was not so enthusiastic.3o
' 
Rittrough technical changes - digitization, satellite and mobile com-
munication-- and an international trend toward liberalization and deregu-
lation exerted pressures for reforms,3l a series of legal and political com-
plications in Glermany favoring veto coalitions against any kind of trans-
iormation of the status quo demanded a well pfepafed concept. The
government therefore established an independent commission which was
äomposed of almost all relevant social groups, i.e. trade and industry,
science and Politics.
In 1987, ihe Commission of the European Communities (CEC) issued
a "Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Tele-
communicati,ons Services and Equipment" demanding a "restructuring
of national markets" to permit competition in the market for terminal
equipment and for value added services.32 Only a few months later, the
Gärman government commission published its report on the possibilities
oil i*ptäuing the fulfillment of iasks in telecommunications".33 A 9:2
majority of the commission proposed a "Restructuration of the Telecom-
-uäi"uiionr System" strikingly iimilar to the EC proposals. Major points
were organizational separations of
- the telecommunications branch from the other branches of the PTT,
- the regulatory (sovereign) functions from the operational (entrepfe-
neurial) tasks.
The PTT TELEKOM was to keep its network monopoly and also the
monopoly of the telephone servicä, but all other services would be of-
fered in öompetition with other providers. The market for terminal equip-
ment would be completely liberalized.
The reform act, drafted by the government a short time later, was
based on the commission's report. But the government not only intended
30 For a comparative study of institutional reform in telecommunications, emphasizing
political aspects see Grande (1989).
3l brp""tAty ih" US udtninistration - after the divestiture of AT&T - attacked the German
"piotectionist" policy in telecommunications'
32 F'or the strategic rolö of the CEC in the European process of telecommunications liberal-
ization see Schneider/ Werle (1990).
33 That is: "The most effective pton1ätion of technical innovation, the development.and
oUr..uun." of international communication standards and the safeguarding of competition
on the telecommunications market" (Witte 1988: 9)'
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to organizationally separate TELEKOM, it explicitly wanted to split the
PTT into three public corporations (TELEKOM, Banking, Postal Ser-
vices) under the roof of a directorate (Direktorium) with mainly coordi-
nating competence. The reform was declared a necessary adaptation to
international and technological developments contributing to more effi-
ciency and variety within the telecommunications infrastructure and to
a strengthening of the German industry in the world market.
The parliament's committee on post and telecommunications orga-
nized two hearings, the first dealing with the EC's Green Paper and
the second with the reform act. A wide range of political and economic
actors and many experts were invited to give statements and to answer
a series of questions formulated by the committee. More than fifty indi-
viduals or organizations participated. Compared to earlier legislative
and administrative processes in telecommunications, the mere number
of interested or affected actors had grown considerably.
After the reform law had passed the legislative bodies in summer
1989, we carried out a survey among all these actors but excluded scien-
tists and other experts not directly affected by the reform.34 Once again,
standardized questionnaires were used, and the general data collection
procedure was similar to that of the videotex network.
The first step of the data analysis concentrates on the structure of
mutual relevance as it was perceived by the actors in the process of
institutional reform. We saw, in the previous section, that the PTT Minis-
try held a central position in the process of introducing Btx. One might
argue that this was typical for a technical innovation process in which
economic considerations predominated. Service providers and producers
of terminal equipment and network technology were more relevant than,
for example, political actors, and the PTT Ministry as the central finan-
cier of the technical infrastructure of the new service had to carry a high
risk. Compared to Btx, the telecommunications reform was much more
political in the sense that parts of the institutional basis of this sector
were to be redesigned and restructured. This was f'ar more dangerous
for the PTT because the organization was directly and fundamentally
34 Because of the higher degree of formalization of this reform process compared to the
introduction of Btx, the identification of the relevant actors was less complicated. In
addition to the actors who participated in the hearings, the relevant political parties and
ministries were included in the survey. The number of actors analyzed in the following
amounts to 38.
r22 Chapter 4
affected by every detail of the reform. Obtaining control over this pro-
cess was a vital question for the PTT. Table 2 shows that the PTT Min-
istry indeed succeeded in getting such a central position in the reform
network.
As in the case of Btx, all respondents were asked to give an estima-
tion of the inJluence of every organization included in a list we pres-
ented. All but one respondent rated the influence of the PTT Ministry
as "very strong" or "strong". After rescaling the influ_ence reputation, the
PTT Ministry displays the maximum value of 1.00.rr The PTT Ministry
also was most frequently mentioned as a partner in information exchange
and cooperation by the other actors. Its relative dominance becomes
evident when we, as in the case of Btx, display the position of each
actor in the "three dimensional" space of influence reputation, informa-
tion exchange and cooperation in Figure 4.
Table 2 and Figure 4 also show, as could be expected, that the most
influential actors in the reform process were political organizations such
as parties, other ministries, workers' unions and manufacturers' (produc-
ers') associations. The largest and most important German equipment
manufacturer, Siemens, only ranked fifteenth in the influence-reputation
scale.
Although in the beginning a general consensus seemed to exist that
the German telecommunications sector had to be restructured, neither
the government commission nor the PTT Ministry managed to reach an
agreement among all relevant actors when the concrete details of the
reform had to be designed. The liberal party (FDP), the BDI (Federation
of German Industry) and the computer manufacturers represented by the
Association of German Machinery Manufacturers (Verband Deutscher
Maschinen- und Anlagenbau, VDMA), but partly also the Ministry of
Economics and the DIHT demanded further liberalization, in particular
the elimination of the PTT's network monopoly.
The postal workers' unions (especially the Deutsche Postgewerkschaft,
DPG), the SPD and also the majority of the (smaller) telecommunications
equipment manufacturers in the Central Association of the Electrical
Industry (ZVEI) considered the liberalization as too far-reaching or the
speed of the restructuring process to be too fast. The most prominent
35 In an earlier presented version of this chapter, the rescaling procedure was not employed
and a couple ofquestionnaires had not been returned at that time, so.the figures are
slightly different.
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Table 2: Influence Reputation, Cooperation and Information Exchange in the
Telecommunications Retbrm









































































































































































Note: The table contains only actors with an influence reputation score of at least 0.25. All
indices were rescaled to the maximum 1.00.
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opponent was the DPG, a union organizing more than 807o of the PTT
employees. The DPG attacked the reform as a first step towards privat-
izatlon and criticized the organizational division of the PTT as a measure
to impede cross-subsidization. According to the DPG this would result
in increased rationalization pressure and layoffs in the postal branch.
Another important concern was the presumed weakening of its organiza-
tional integration, although the workers' unions were conceded one third
of the seats on the boards of the three corporations.
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nefuork position
The liinder also criticized the reform draft. Those governed by SPD
majorities tended to reject any reform initiative launched by the federal
Ge rman Te le cotnmunicati ons r25
"Wende"36 administration. This brought Bavaria, governed by an absolute
majority of the CSU (the Bavarian "sister" of the CDU), into a strategi-
cally strong position. Its votes in the Bundesrat (Federal Council) were
needed to secure a majority over the SPD Länder. Bavaria, a state with
industrial conglomerates but also large peripheral rural areas, traditionally
stressed the infrastructural significance of the PTT complex and de-
manded more political control of this sector. Most of the other kinder
wanted to keep a position of minimum influence which was in danger
of diminishing because the reform draft contained no substitution for the
eliminated Administrative Council.3T
The short description of the position of several rclevant actors may
create the impression that their attitudes and interests varied considerably.
Their image of the reform process, however, was not very divergent. The
three issues of liberalization (of the markets for terminals, services and
networks) and the issue of organizational division of the three old PTT
branches were perceived to be closely linked. The complex reform prob-
lem has only one underlying issue dimension. This can be demonstrated
by a principal component factor analysis which shows high loadings of
all four items on one single factor (see Table 3). This factor, comprising
75Vo of the total variance of the four input variables,3s represents a latent
variable measuring the actors' attitudes toward the global "liberal reorga-
nization issue" in telecommunications.
To identify similarities and dffirences of interest positions toward
the liberal reorganization of telecommunications in Germany, we also
applied network analytical methods. We asked the actors to give a global
statement relating their own stance to those of the other actors. The
resulting ma-trix was examined by means of a block model procedure
(COBLOC)3e in order to extract sets of actors with relatively similar
interest positions. At least four groups of actors perceiving each other's
positions as similar could be identified. The largest group comprises
"supporters" of a definite but, at least in the first step, rather moderate
36 The change in government from the l3-year SPD/FDP coalition to the CDU-CSU/FDP
coalition in 1982, which was considered a fundamental change in West German politics,
has become known as "Die Wende".
37 According to the old PTT Administration Act, the states delegated five representatives
into the Administrative Council.38 Perception of the liberalization of the markets for (l) terminals, (2) services, (3) networks
and of (4) the organizational division.
39 For a short description of this procedure see previous section.
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Table 3: A Factor Analysis of the Actors' Attitudes toward the Telecommunications
Reform
Factor Loadings









(Scale: I = Reform is much too radical, 2 = is too radical, 3 = ok, 4 = should have
been more radical, 5 = should have been much more radical)
reform. They concentrated their efforts on what appeared to be feasible.
To this group belonged, among others, the PTT Ministry, the Ministry
of Economics, the CDU/CSU and the EC Commission. Another larger
cluster is that of "opponents" who criticized the reform as a whole or
central elements of it. Their dominant perspective was that of the affected
PTT workers and the individual non-commercial users of telecommunica-
tions services. The DPG, the SPD and also the Green Party belonged
to this group which at least wanted to retard the reform. A smaller group
of actors, comprising the BDI and the FDP might be called the "pushing"
coalition. They demanded far-reaching liberalization of the telecommuni-
cations sector. A fourth group, including rather heterogeneous actors,
generally agreed with the reform but demanded a few specific changes
with respect to very special interests. The kinder are, for instance, mem-
bers of this founh group of "stipulators". They tried to get more political
control of the infrastructural component of the telecommunications sector.
In this respect, they succeeded in imposing one of the few changes of
the reform draft providing the establishment of an "infrastructural coun-
cil" (Infrastrukturrat) with representatives of each of the kinder and an
equal number of delegates from the Federal Parliament. This council can
decide (or make proposals) whether the three PTT corporations should
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be obliged to provide certain services with a high infrastructural signifi-
cance regardless of the market situation.
Figure 5: The Policy Network in the Telecommunications Reform
Note: Each malrix entry reports the degre€ (in
percent) of inleresl similarity (resp. informalion
exchange) lrom the perspeclive ol lho row-block
aclors.
The theoretiml maximum is 10oo/..
O D€nsiry>3o%





-> asym. inlerest similarity and inlorm. exch. (>30o/o)
+ sym. inter€et slmilarlty and inform. exch. (>30%)
Size of circles indicat€s aggregals inlluonca reputation
Figure 5 gives an impression of the actor network in the process of
the institutional reform with regard to interest similarity. The matrix on
the left reports the information exchange relations within and between
the groups.aO The four groups differ with regard to the aggregate influ-
ence reputation, their internal homogeneity of interests and their relative
similarity with the other groups. We can see that the "supporters" are
40 This time - in contrast to the last section, where we had no information about the similar-
ity of interest positions - not the information exchange activities, but the perceived
interest similarities were used as input variables for the COBLOC analysis. So the infor-
mation exchange relations only provide an additional information of a structure which
is constituted by interest positions.









































vefy influential and internally rather homogeneous. They perceive the
stance of the "pushers" as colresponding highly with their own position.
The "pushers" do not see any similarity to the "opponents" and vice
versa. This latter group is internally relatively homogeneous but there
is only little affinity to the position of any other group. In addition,
the "opponents" are not very well integrated into the information ex-
change network of the four actor groups.
The network of interest similarity suggests that the group of "oppo-
nents" was in conflict with all other actors and that there was almost
no chance to join a coalition with one of the other groups. This impres-
sion is confiimed by multidimensional scalingal (see Figure 6). This
procedure results in a two-dimensional solution with one dimension clear-
iy dominating. In this "liberal reorganization issue" dimension - the hori-
zontal axis of Figure 6 - the most prominent opposing actors are located
far on the left-hand side whereas the pushers can be found on the other
side, but they are more visibly intermeshed witti the great group of sup-
porting actors.42
- 
While most of the actors in the supporting group perfectly agreed
with the results of the reform process, it is not surprising that the pushers
and more so the opponents articulated discontent when asked for a sum-
maizing statement. However, the deviation of the opponents and the
pushers from the main stream was not radical enough to provide a basis
lor a veto-coalition. The pushers, who - as we could see in Figure 5 -
were with regard to information exchange and interest similarity, not
too strongly separated from the supporters, came to the conclusion that
the reform could be interpreted as a small but not the final step in the
right direction. So, eventually, they preferred this provisional solution
to blocking the whole undertaking. The opponents, on the other hand,
were rather isolated not only with respect to their interest positions but
also to information exchange and their power fesources were too small
to impede the institutional change.
ln tnis section, our interest was not only directed at the specific
reform problem and the way it was handled but also at the type of actors
playing the dominant roles. Although the changes were motivated by
4l The dissimilarity of actors with respect to their interest positions was computed as the
Euclidian distance.
42 Input variables in this analysis are the atomistic interest positions and not the perceived
interest interrelations.
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Figure 6: The Actors' Postitions Toward the "Liberal Reorganization of




economic and industrial policy considerations and designed to improve
the economic performance of this sector, they directly entailed a new
definition of the role of the "state" and the respective political actors in
this field. It turned out that political and not economic issues dominated
and political actors constituted the most relevant actor networks in the
reform. Within these networks, the PTT Ministry held the strongest posi-
tion. It was perceived as the politically most powerful organization and
was effectively integrated into the networks of cooperation and informa-
tion exchange. The Ministry could present a well prepared draft of the
reform act which preserved relevant parts of the old monopoly and, at







L?inder BMWi1 "a IZDH
... . 
'\/Er.sEL,, .P$S*"6r-rJö-.















to be a necessary adaptation to an international trend, not too liberal and
not too restrictive. Although the pushers as well the opponents had con-
siderable power resources, they neutralized each other or became so
isolated that there remained only small chances fbr coalition formation.
The PTT Ministry therefore could maintain a maximum of control and
could mobilize the allies it needed to get the law passed.
Issue Networks and the Inner Circle in the
Telecommunications Domain
The German telecommunications sector was run as a state monopoly for
more than a century. Its governance structure in this period was rather
simple: a stable triangle including the PTT as a public administration,
a small family of equipment manufacturers and the German Chamber
of InduStry and Commerce cooperated in a clientelist and corporatist
mode. Their common interest was to build up the telephone network
respecting each others domains and interests. Economic and political
interests appeared to be rather congruent, and when they conflicted, poli-
tics had primacy. After the war, this triangle remained the backbone of
telecommunications policy but around this core a gradually more differen-
tiated policy network containing more actors and divergent interests
emerged.
Only at the beginning of the 70s with the expansion of telecommuni-
cations, with the proliferation of new services and the rapid technological
change did the number of actors begin to explode. This development led
to an enlargement of the "policy area" and the "policy community" in
telecommunications.a3 At the same time, however, the domain was sub-
jected to significant structural changes. As demonstrated in the two case
studies in the previous sections, clearly differentiated actor networks
emerge depending on the problem situation and problem perception.
Primarily economic problems like the introduction of the new tele-
communications service videotex especially mobilize economic interests
and the network of relevant actors predominantly contains private firms
43 The concept of policy domain implies these two elernents which are distinguished by
some scholars (esp. Wilks/ Wright 1987: 299-3Ol). For a discussion of several concepts
relating to that of policy networks see also Jordan (1990) and Rhodes (1990)'
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as manufacturers of equipment, information providers for the new service,
specialists for technical development etc. Predominantly political problems
like the institutional reform of the German telecommunications system
towards more liberalization especially activate the general core of "high
politics" like political parties, workers' unions, peak associations of busi-
ness etc. Thus, political problems seem to create and activate other policy
networks than economic problems would. The networks may even be
issue-specific and issue-dependent.aa It appears, however, that variation
of networks between "classes or 'functional' types of problems" (i.e.
economic vs. political) is greater than between issues within one class.
Despite such variations and changes, it should be kept in mind that an
important aspect of policy networks is their contribution to continuity
and stability in political interactions.
Our two cases indicate that within a policy domain there is always
a multiplicity of policy networks which partly overlap and partly diverge.
When there is an "inner circle" of actors that are generally influential
in the telecommunications policy domain, those actors would be present
in all of the coexisting policy networks. In our case, they would form
the intersection of both analyzed configurations. A plot of the actors'
influence reputation scores in the two networks indeed shows that there
was a core of actors having considerable influence in both policy net-
works (Figure 7).as
Those actors positioned respectively on one of the two axis were
absent in the other network,a6 whereas the PTT Ministry - placed in the
upper right corner of the diagram - played the most dominant role in
both. But also the other actors in the upper right square, having an influ-
ence reputation of at least .40 in either case, can be considered "mem-
bers" of the "inner circle" of the telecommunications domain. We see
that almost all German manufacturers of telecommunications and comput-
er equipment and also their associations belong to the core, although (or
44 For the concept of "issue networks" see Heclo (1978).
45 We confined this presentation to the indicator of influence because, on the one hand,
not all informations are directly comparable in böth cases (similarity of interests) and
we wanted, on the other hand, to avoid redundancy. This procedure is confirmed by a
computation of the correlation coefficients between influence reputation, information
exchange and cooperation. In the case of videotex the lowest coefficient amounts to .78
(between influence and information), and in the telecommunications reform the lowesl
coefficient even rcaches up to .89 (influence and cooperation).
46 A few of them "stem" from other policy donrains and were only mobilized by the specific
issues to be dealt with.
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because) they have diverging interests. Also the federal states (Uinder)
with - in contrast to other domains - a rather weak formal (legal) compe-
tence in telecommunications have a strong de facto position. The tradi-
tionally highly influential status of the DIHT has survived all economic
and political changes as is reflected in the diagram. Other generally
relevant actors are the Federation of German Industry (BDI), the Central
Association of German Craft and Trade Enterprises (Zentralverband des
Deutschen Handwerks, ZDH)47 and the Ministry of Economics, the latter
not only because it had the right to approve the charges and utilization
conditions for the telecommunications services but also as a protector
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of "free markets" and competition. The banking associations are relatively
influential because the banking sector is not only a very important and
extensive user of telecommunications services but also because banks
compete with some of the financial services offered by the PTT.
The interpretation of Figure 7 should not be overstretched because
it is only based on two case studies. However, it clearly shows that the
"inner circle" of influential actors has become relatively large and rather
"pluralist". We assume that this network also functions as a "translator"
of technical into economic and economic into political problems. It is
only through this ability that the technical, political or economic implica-
tions and consequences of institutional changes or the introduction of
new services or other activities in the telecommunications domain can
be adequately assessed.4s Core actors are not always more influential than
those who only appear on the stage when specific issues are to be han-
dled. Moreover, as they have partly contradicting interests, the core
actors may neutralize each other in conflict situations.
Although formal institutional changes cannot be expected to generate
totally novel networks, the telecommunications reform will affect the
future actor constellation and their influence positions. In this sense,
Figure 7 displays the "old order" of this sector. This order will not be-
come completely obsolete but the intended "depoliticization" of economic
and technical issues and the clearer separation ofthe different "functions"
in telecommunications assumingly will lead to a further specialization
of actor networks and to new problems of coordination and "translation"
between networks.
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Chapter 5
Policy Networks and Change: The Case of
High-T" Superconductors
Dorothea Jansen
1 The Discovery of High-T" Superconductors
In September 1986 two European physicists from the Zurich Lab of IBM
published a paper in the German Zeitschrift für Physik on "Possible
High-T" Superconductivity" in a ceramic material. Superconductivity is
the phenomenon, first discovered in 1911, that certain pure metals and
alloys lose their electrical resistance when they are cooled beneath a
certain temperature, the "critical temperature" T.. Superconductivity is
conditional on very low temperature near absolute zero.lt requires com-
plex cryocooling technologies and expensive liquid helium as a cooling
medium. Despite hard efforts to raise the critical temperature from these
very low temperatures, no progress had been made since 1973, when
niobium germanium with the T" of 23 Kelvin, i.e. 23 degrees above
absolute zero, was discovered. There were even theories predicting that
superconductivity above 30 K was impossible. Again and again different
physicists claimed to have found high-T" superconductivity (HTS), but
all the sensational reports turned out to be false. Now Müller and Bed-
norz claimed to have discovered an oxidic material, LaBaCuO (lantha-
num-barium-copper oxide) with a T" of 30 K. By December 1986 their
experiments were replicated by two groups in Japan and the US. Soon
it became clear that the so-called "Zurich oxides" were no exception -
there were other oxidic superconductors with even higher critical temper-
ature$. In January 1987, the US group succeeded in preparing a material
which soon dominated HTS research: YBaCuO (yttrium-barium-copper
oxide). It allows cooling with simple technologies and cheap liquid nitro-
gen.
With the discovery of YBaCuO, announced in a press conference
(even before publication of the scientific paper) in mid-February 1987,
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a worldwide race in the science and technology of HTS was set off.
Feverish activity dominated not only the scientific frontier, but also poli-
tics. As early as February 1987 governmental agencies in Japan started
funding and organizing the field. Japan declared HTS a basic future
technology and part of the MITI-Program "Technologies for the Next
Generations' Industries".
Parallel to these Japanese activities, American congressmen started
a campaign to commercialize superconductivity. America feared that they
might win again in science while losing in the technological competition
with Japan. The superconductivity campaign finally culminated in July
1987 in President Reagan's "Superconductivity Initiative", one point of
which was to restrict the flow of information from American National
Labs to foreign scientists.
The discovery of HTS triggered huge activities in science, industry,
and science and technology policy. A very small scientific and technical
field (in 1986) suddenly grew by a factor of ten and even more. This
particular event offered researchers of science & technology the unique
chance to study how a developing field gets organized, which actors use
which strategies in policy formation, whether and how this is dependent
on their previous position in the field and on special scientific and tech-
nological trends.
This chapter provides an analysis of the German FITS policy. It is
based on both secondary data on public funding for superconductivity
research before and after HTS, and on structured, open-ended interviews
with HTS researchers from ten research groups at universities, research
institutes and industry, with representatives of the main funding agencies
and with members of an advisory committee established by the Bundes-
ministerium für Forschung und Technologie (BMFI = Federal Ministry
of Research and Technology).t The goal is to explain the formation of
The interview data were collected during summer 1988 (research groups) and winter
1988/89 (funding agencies, committee) in a project at the Max-Planck-Institut für Gesell-
schaftsforschung in Cologne in collaboration with the Institut für Wissenschaftstheorib
und -forschung in Vienna, which will analyze these data along with data on Austria and
Switzerland under a comparative perspective. A research report on the German case is
forthcoming (Jansen 1991). Previous versions of this chapter were presented at the policy
networks conference and at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, held at the Ruhr-
Universität Bochum, 2-7 Aprit 1990. The chapter benefited from the discussions at the
conferences and with colleagues at the institute. I would like to mention Jürgen Häusler,
Renate Mayntz, Andreas Ryll, Uwe Schimank and Raymund Werle for valuable discus-
sions and comments. For technical assistance, I would like to thank Marie Haltod-Hilgers,
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the HTS policy by showing the points of intersection between scientific
and technological opportunity structures and between the relevant actors'
different policy strategies.
An Outline of the General Approach: Policy Networks and
their Adaption to Change
Since the seventies political scientists have been departing more and
more from the traditional view of the state as a planning and regulating
authority, implementing political decisions that were taken by parliaments.
The end of the planning euphoria resulted in research into implementa-
tion devoted to finding out why policy programs did not work as they
were intended to. Societal actors that possessed information and resources
that the state was lacking were detected. A closer look at the implemen-
tation process even made clear that the distinction between policy imple-
mentation and the definition of policy goals and programs is often artifi-
cial. Blurring boundaries between public and private were observed.
The top-down approach of traditional implementation research was ques-
tioned. "Implementation structures before implementation" were discov-
ered that created policy issues and played an important role in policy
formation. As a consequence the interest of policy analysts turned away
from state regulation and hierarchical control towards forms of interest
mediation, bargaining and collective decision making, towards the role
of the state as a participant in these processes or as a designer of institu-
tional arrangements, and towards the question of how these processes
and institutional designs are related to the achievement of public goals.
On the national level concepts like corporatism and private interest gov-
ernment emerged, on the level of sectors or sub-sectors concepts like
meso-corporatism, policy community and policy network came up.
In the area of science and technology policy the problems of the
attempt to use science for societal ends ("Finalisierung der Wissenschaft")
are well known. The discussions on autonomy versus guidance of science
have provoked endless debates (Polanyi 1951, 1968; Bernal 1970; Luh-
mann 1968; Böhme et al. 1972, 1973; Daele et al. 1975, 1977, 1979:
Cynthia Lehmann and Günter Schröder. The remaining faults are of course the author's,
who alone rests responsible for the content of the chapter.
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Küppers et al. 1978; Krohn et al. 1987; Keck 1984; Schimank 1988).
Scientists are committed to defending the autonomy of science. Research
institutes again and again exhibit the tendency to escape state guidance
and to define their work on their own. The typical problems of top-down
implementation are especially virulent in science and technology. Scien-
tists are the only ones who have access to crucial information for the
evaluation of their work. This gives them large discretion in defining
their tasks according to their interests and equipment. They tend to define
their objectives in intra-scientific terms since this is often the only way
of structuring the task that is available. Basic science in particular is
characteized by fundamental uncertainties on promising research direc-
tions and methods that cannot be overcome by project descriptions and
policy goals.
- 
What actually happens in science and technology policy is that goals
and programs are negotiated and finally set up in a concerted process
between science, industry and politics. Wittrock, Lindström and Zetter
berg in their analysis of energy research policy have coined the word
of implementations structures before implementation proper, which
"exist in the sense of informal networks of interested parties before im-
plementation" and "might well be active in defining and forming a pro-
gram that will later reach the implementation stage" (Wittrock et al.
t982: L33). Another concept is that of "technical systems" (Figure 1)
introduced by Shrum, which he defines as "centrally-administered net-
works of actors oriented to the solution of sets of related technological
problems. They are characteized by relatively large size, cognitive com-
plexity, sectoral diversity, occupational pluralism, and formal organiza-
iion" (Shrum 1984: 63). Arguing against a superficial autonomy of sci-
ence Shrum and his colleagues see technical systems as initiated and
administered by the state with the aim of solving broad technical prob-
lems of social concern (Shrum et al, 1985: 47).2
2 See the differentiation between the competitive modality of network formation and the
cooperative mode by Laumann et al. (1978: 466ff.). While the relations between the
corporate actors in the competitive mode are basically antagonistic and linkages are based
on 
^resou.ce 
dependencies, the implicit philosophy in the cooperative modes of network
formation is thö attainment of a collective purpose, for which the interorganizational field
has responsibility, by conscious cooperation of various organizations. Especially 
-the 
case
of "mandated cooperation" seems to respond to the "technical system" concept of Shrum,
in which governmental organizations are central control agencies.
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I will use the concept of a policy network as a tool for the analysis
of the relationship between interests and governmental departments/ agen-
cies in the process of policy formation in the case of HTS. Kenis and
Schneider suggest the definition, "A policy network is described by its
actors, their linkages and by its boundary. It includes a relatively stable
set of mainly public and private corporate actors. The linkages between
the actors serve as communication channels and for the exchange of
information, expertise, trust and other policy resources. The boundary
of a given policy network is not primarily determined by formal institu-

























functional relevance and structural embeddedness." (Kenis/ Schneider,
this volume above).
Compared to other policy process concepts like corporatism, meso-
corporatism, negotiated economy, iron triangle, pluralism, policy commu-
nity, issue network, policy universe etc. that are crowding the literature,
the policy network has the advantage of being rather neutral. It can be
used to denote several kinds of functions of the network (the pluralism/
corporatism debate, lobbying vs. participation in policy formation and
implementation) and different levels of analysis (macro, meso and micro).
Varying numbers, types and mixes of actors (individual firms/organiza-
tions vs. interest groups/associations vs. chambers with compulsory mem-
bership/representational monopoly; mixes ranging from only public [= in-
tergovernmental networks, statisml to public and private actors and, final'
ly, to only private actors [- private interest government]) can be consid-
ered. Networks can be characterizedby varying degrees of conflict/com-
petition and consensus/cooperation between the actors, by the degree of
state domination or interest domination, of formalization/institutionaliza-
tion and by the degree of closure of the network (pluralism/open access
vs. elitism/closure).3 While Kenis and Schneider seem to exclude individ-
ual actors from participation in policy networks, I would like to include
them. In sectors which lack a high degree of "corporatization" and where
personal expertise and reputation is important, like in science, the ques-
tion of corporate versus individual actor has to be treated as an empirical
one.
One of the problems of policy networks that is widely discussed is
their resistance or adaption to change. Numerous policy studies show
how established networks try to defend the status quo and fail to cope
with external, mainly economic changes (see Midttun 1988a on heavy
industry and Grant 1985, 1987, 1990, Farago 1985 and Waarden 1985
on agricultural policies). Within an established network regularly a special
definition of the problems and issues involved emerges. Networks be-
come cohesive and tend to have a definite view about what and who
belongs to their field. New issues and actors are likely to face resistance
For a more encompassing discussion of the dimensions of policy networks and a lo-
cation of some of the more common concepts into a typology using number and type
of actors, function of the network and the power relation between state and interests see
Waarden (1990: 5ff.). For a discussion of the use of the concept in the British literature,
see Marsh/ Rhodes (1990).
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and exclusion from the network. This problem of adaption, of inclusion
or exclusion of new issues and actors is especially relevant in the case
of research and technology policy, which typically has to react to the
discoveries of basic science providing new knowledge. The explicit goal
of policy programs in this area is to scan scientific developments for
potential applications. The very quick exploitation of new opportunities
is crucial for international competitiveness in high-tech fields which are
charactenzed by cumulativeness, steep learning curves (Dosi 1982: 154;
1984: 86ff.) and first mover advantages (Williamson 1975: 34f). Any
inertia of networks in research and technology policy to respond to new
opportunities created by scientific and technological breakthroughs thus
poses serious problems.
My chapter will deal with the question of how the German supercon-
ductivity policy network reacted to the sudden breakthrough in supercon-
ductivity research. It shows first why and how the established network
included the new issue - ceramic high-T" superconductors - in its agenda
in a very specific way that is determined by the existing network struc-
ture and resources. And it shows secondly why and how an actor from
outside tried to enter the network, why it succeeded and how it shaped
the structure and policy of the transformed network. The analysis deals
with the transformation of the whole policy network and the formation
of an HTS policy program as a consequence of the intersection of actor
strategies and new opportunity structures4 that are offered by scientific
and technological change.
For the formation of the superconductivity policy I take as explanato-
ry variables (1) the structure of the old superconductivity policy network,(2) the opportunities opened up by scientific and technological change
(see section 3), and (3) the intentions and resources of the actors in-
volved. To begin with, the set of actors is defined by the old network.
New actors can enter the scene in accordance to the scientific and tech-
nological opportunity structure. With respect to the actors, I distinguish
between three types: scientists interested in working on scientifically
rewarding problems and in raising funds for their research, industrial
My use of the term "opportunity structure" departs from the use of Laumann et al.(1978: 471), who define an opportunity structure as a subnetwork within which ex-
change relations tend to be confined for several reasons. I use the term to denote the
structure of opportunities which are exogenous to the network and are brought about
by scientific, technological and market changes.
4
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R&D (Research & Development) managers interested in defending old
markets and developing new high-tech products and, finally, between
them I see the state and its science and technology agencies, interested
in guiding scientists to technologically relevant basic research, in organiz-
ing effective technology transfer from science to industry and in guaran-
teeing the competitiveness of the national industry.
3 HTS: Changes in Scientific and Technological Paradigms
Scientific paradigms (Kuhn 1962) form a frame of reference that guides
researchers on their way to promising research questions and research
objects. "Normal science consists in the actualization of that promise,
an actualization achieved by extending the knowledge of those facts that
the paradigm displays as particularly revealing, by increasing the extent
of match between those facts and the paradigm's predictions, and by
further articulation of the paradigm itself' (Kuhn 1962: 24).
Before HTS was discovered, superconductivity research was a declin-
ing field in science. The golden era of superconductivity in the sixties
and seventies was over. Scientists turned to more promising fields, espe-
cially to semiconductor physics. Normal science in superconductivity
was guided by the "BCS theory", developed in 1957 by Bardeen, Cooper
and Schrieffer (and named after their initials), who were awarded the
Nobel prize in 1972. Since the sixties, normal science consisted in prov-
ing the special mechanism of superconductivity, the "electron-phonon
interaction" in various uncommon superconductors. Numerous competing
explanations of superconductivity were almost all ruled out by experimen-
tal evidence in the course of "normal" superconductivity science. The
search for superconductors with higher critical temperatures had been
frustrated since 1973 when niobium-germanium with T" = 23 K was
found. The established electron-phonon mechanism even explained why
all the attempts to discover superconductors with higher critical tempera-
tures were in vain. The theory was thought to imply that superconductivi-
ty above 30 K was impossible. The only puzzle for the BCS approach
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was the superconductivity of "heavy fermions"S discovered in the seven-
ties, which did not seem to match up with the predictions.
The appearance of HTS fundamentally challenged the BCS theory
and changed the course of superconductivity research. Experimental evi-
dence on a traditional key experiment (isotope effect) processed with
the new material is inconclusive. Until now no one has succeeded in
designing a crucial experiment confirming or ruling out BCS theory. It
is far from clear whether superconductivity in HTS is based on the tradi-
tional mechanism. Many alternative theories have appeared on the scene.
HTS not only opened up new scientific frontiers for physicists -
experimental and theoretical - but also caught the interest of other
natural sciences, namely of chemistry and material science. The race for
the discovery of room-temperature superconductors was on, the dogmatic
limit of 30 K had been ovemrn. Chemists and material scientists were
highly motivated, because the winners would be sure to reap great scien-
tific (and economic) rewards. Other disciplines with different conceptual-
izations of superconductivity got involved; a chemical theory of HTS,
for instance, was proposed (cf. Simon 1987). Soon it became obvious
that the complex chemical structure and the ceramic nature of the new
materials made an interdisciplinary approach of physicists, chemists and
material scientists necessary, not only in applied science but also in basic
science. The ongoing race for nerv materials implies that only those
physicists who collaborate with the best preparative groups will have the
finest samples of materials and will have them in time. On the other
hand, only those preparative groups that collaborate with the best mea-
surement groups with arcane know-how and equipment will get their
samples characteized in every respect. This will guide them in their
search for new materials or material improvement. These are strong intra-
scientific incentives for the various disciplines to cooperate.
Another important feature of HTS research compared to traditional
superconductivity research is the closeness of basic and applied research.
While the heavy fermions - in the center of basic research in 1986 -
were technologically absolutely irrelevant, any know-how on HTS materi-
als is of direct technological value. Work in basic and applied research
Heavy fermions are f-electrons which have effective masses up to 102 times greater
than normal electrons. Some of the materials containing heavy fermions are super-
conducting. The micromechanism for the superconductivity of heavy fermions is con-
sidered to be spin-fluctuations (Fachlexikon ABC Physik 1989).
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often only differs in perspectives and conclusions but not in the actual
approach. For instance, thin films are necessary for many basic physical
eiperiments, but they are also the fundamental base of HTS electronics.6
In summary, the change in the scientific paradigm of superconductivi-
ty can be shown in three dimensions:
- the challenge of the physical theory of superconductivity,
- the incorporation of other natural sciences into the field with different
theoretical concepts, different know-how and equipment,
- the jump of basic research close to technological exploitation.
The change of direction in basic research also caused a change in the
technological paradigm of superconductors. The term "technological para-
digm" was coined by Dosi (1982) in analogy to the definition of a scien-
tific paradigm. "'We shall define a 'technological paradigm' as a 'model'
and a 'pattern' of solution of 'selected' technological problems, based
on selected principles derived from natural sciences and on selected
material technologies. ... In other words a technological paradigm (or
research program) embodies strong prescriptions on the directions of
technicil change to pursue and those to neglect" (Dosi 1982: 152).
Within superconductivity, technological research had been restricted
to metallic alloys, and the methods employed had been metallurgical
ones. Researchers had almost given up searching for materials with high-
er critical temperatures, and engineers had resigned themselves to the
ongoing struggle with the very low temperatures and the complicated
helium infrastructure required when working with low-temperature super-
conductors. Applications in electric power (superconducting cable, super-
conducting switches, transformers, energy storage) turned out to be feasi-
ble but not competitive. In the seventies the German project to develop
a superconducting magnetic train was abandoned in favor of a different
system. Superconducting magnets were only used where extraordinary
power was necessary and costs were secondary as in magnet technology
for the fusion project developed at the Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe
This is illustrated by the following example. To perform the "tunnel experiment", which
is essential for explaining the micromechanism of HTS, one must have a "tunnel ele-
ment". This is made up of a sandwich of a substrate, a thin superconducting film, a very
thin insulating film and another superconducting film. Under certain conditions, the
electron pairs in the superconductor can "tunnel" their way under the insulator. This
tunnel element, vital to basic HTS research, serves at the same time as a magnetic sensor
or a switching device in applied research.
6
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(KFK, a national research lab) or in magnet technology for high-energy
accelerators. In the eighties, to everyone's surprise, magnetic resonance
imaging (MRD magnets used in medical diagnosis turned out to be the
first respectable market for superconducting equipment.T Besides applica-
tions in electric power since the seventies, there were efforts to use the
"Josephson Effects"s of superconductors. Josephson junctions can be used
as very fast switching devices with almost no power dissipation or as
hypersensitive detectors of magnetic fields, for instance, in medical diag-
nosis. While the application efforts of superconductors in electronics did
not succeed - IBM gave up the Josephson computer project in 1983
work on superconducting sensor technology was still going on. Estimates
of the world market for superconductor equipment before HTS are
around DM 500 million annually, more than half of this being devoted
to medical application in MRI tomography (magnetic resonance imaging).
The industry involved belongs to the electrical and the electronics sector.
In Germany the main directions of research in 1986 were the improve-
ment of existing superconducting materials (niobium-tin, niobium-alumi-
num), new applications in the sensor technology, new cooling concepts,
magnet technology, application in magnetic-resonance-imaging devices
for medical diagnosis and the construction of a superconducting electrical
power generator.
The arrival of ceramic high-T" superconductors not only brought back
into consideration long-abandoned projects such as superconducting
power transmission, superconducting trains, superconducting supercompu-
ters. It also opened up new opportunities, for instance, in high frequency
applications, sensor technologies, cooling technologies. Market estimates
for the year 2000 range between DM 3 billion and DM 75 billion.
What is more far-reaching is that ceramic materials require special
chemical preparative know-how and processing techniques which are
available not in the electrical and electronics industry, which used to
work on superconductors, but in the chemical industry. The chemical
industry also has a long tradition in the search for new technologically
relevant materials (and is eager to be the first to patent them).
Siemens, which has been working on superconductivity technology since the sixties,
was able to take up this opportunity very quickly and for a long time was the market
leader in magnetic body scanners.




To sum up, the change of the technological paradigm concerns the
material aspect of superconductors as well as the application aspect of
superconductors:
- New and completely different materials open up the patent race for
higher T.s and even for room-temperature superconductors.
- New and completely different materials require different preparative
and processing technologies.
- The high-T" superconductors - and, to an even greater extent, poten-
tial room-temperature superconductors, provided they meet technical
requirements - will make many old application ideas for superconduc-
tors profitable, mainly in the area of power engineering'
- High-T" superconductors - and, to an even greater extent, potential
room-temperature superconductors, provided they meet technical re-
quirements - will open up new opportunities, mainly in the area of
electronics/sensor techniques.
These changes in the technological trajectory of superconductors bring
about several consequences:
- The market for existing superconducting equipment is challenged.
- The market for power engineering is challenged by the threat of
potential substitution by superconducting equipment.
- New market opportunities arise for electronic/sensor applications of
HTS.
- New market prospects open up for providers of the best supercon-
ducting system (appropriable by patents or licenses) and for providers
of preparative and processing technologies making the "system" a
useful material.
So, HTS technology crisscrosses the conventional sector structure of
industryr. The turn to ceramic materials challenges the old superconductor
industry and gives an opportunity to sectors with ceramic know-how and
produciion faiitities to-find their way into superconductors.e
see for instance Jaffe (1989), who analyzes the technological position of firms within
the traditional sector structure of industries and who links them to R&D successes.
9
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4 Identification of the Superconductivity Policy Network
The reconstruction of the existing superconductivity policy network can
begin with an analysis of research funding in the area of superconductivi-
ty in Germany in 1986.
Superconductivity funding in Germany is dominated by BMFT-fi-
nanced programs in 1986. The Bundesministerium für Forschung und
Technologie (BMFI = Federal Ministry of Research and Technology)
is the central state actor in the field of science and technology in Germa-
ny. Mission-oriented research (Fachprogramme of the BMFT), such as
research on nuclear and alternative energy, space research, medical re-
search and also technologically oriented research, belongs to the domain
of the BMF L IT is conducted either at universities, industrial labs or
non-university research institutes including the "Großforschungseinrichtun-
gen" (- GFE, big science centers, comparable to national laboratories
in the US). While universities, industry and research institutes get special
grants from the BMFI earmarked for certain projects, the thirteen Groß-
forschungseinrichtungen are institutionally funded.
There are four BMFT programs dealing with superconductivity, one
science-oriented "Basic Research Using Large Equipment", and three
programs on market-oriented research. The latter make for more than
two thirds of the total funding budget in 1986. These are programs for
the development of superconducting MRI devices in the medical field,
for the development of a superconducting power generator and the more
basic program on superconductivity technology within the scope of the
special program "Physical Technologies".
Since the task of funding HTS research later was assigned to the
latter program, a closer look at it may be worth while. After the change
in government the general strategy of the BMFT in direct project
funding of market-oriented science and technology research was the con-
centration of efforts on basic research in key technologies like informa-
tion technology, material research, biotechnology and physical technolo-
gies, that might generate large positive external effects legitimizing state
intervention.ro The funding concept was redesigned as to incorporate and
concentrate on basic research and to bring together science and industry
l0 In general, direct funding was decreased while indirect means of R&D subsidies were
intensified in the course of deregulation, Budgets for direct funding of industrial projects
have been cut down by DM I billion since 1982.
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in so-called joint research projects (Verbundforschung). "Verbundfor-
schung" is intended to address problems in R&D too large for one firm,
institute or university alone. In a jolnt project two or more firms and
several academic researchers are to work together in precompetitive re-
search on the principle of division of labor. Thus, existing R&D re-
sources can be employed more efficiently, public funding can be concen-
trated on major projects, and structures promoting technology transfer
can be built up (Mennicken 1988; BMFT I987a: 53ff.; Kulina 1988;
Chesnais 1988: 54). Funding for industry was deliberately intended to
be subsidiary to industry's own efforts and to be degressive over time
(see BMFT 1988b: 20).
The "Physical Technology" program in general and the superconduc-
tivity part in particular were lagging behind this general strategy of the
BMFL The program had the lowest rate of funding in the form of "Ver-
bundforschung". In 1986 only I4.9Vo of the industry funding in this field
was given in this form. By 1987 the rate increased to 31.67o still well
below the mean of 56Vo for all market-oriented technology programs.
32 joint projects were in progress in 1987, in contrast to 96 individual
research projects. Parallel with the increase of joint projects the share
of funding for industry declined. In 1984 before thejoint projects, indus-
try got 67Vo of the budget; in 1987, the rate of funding for industry had
declined to 52Vo with 32 joint projects.
The part of the program concerning superconductors was even more
dominated by large firms from the electrical and electronics industry.
Its share in the budget in 1984 was 84Vo.In 1984, the BMFT decided
that the program's orientation was not clear enough and reorganized
it. As a consequence, the participation of academia increased from l6Vo
in 1984 to about a quarter in 1986, the year before HTS appeared. Joint
projects did not play an important part in the program; there was only
one joint research project out of 10 projects in 1986.
Besides the BMFT there are two science-oriented funding agencies
involved in superconductivity research. The Volkswagen Foundation, a
private foundation founded in 1961 by the Federal Republic and the state
(Land) Lower Saxony, funded some projects on cryoelectronics in 1986,
as part of their program "Microstructure technology", which was to be
completed by 1988. The Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)
funded two special research areas (Sonderforschungsbereiche = SFB) in
1986. One of them was created especially for a research group studying
heavy fermions, the other was to be finished in 1988. A new program
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was, of course, intended by that research group. These programs were
devoted partly to superconductivity research and related phenomena. The
DFG also funded very few individual research projects in the "Normal-
verfahren" (normal procedure), mainly theoretical work on heavy fer-
mions. Unfortunately, figures on this kind of funding are not available.
The following table gives an impression of the funding intensity of the
six programs in 1986:
Thble 1: Superconductivity Project Funding in Germany in 1986
in million DM
BMFT Superconducting Medical Equipment
BMFT Superconducting Power Generator
BMFT Superconductivity in "Physical Technologies"
BMFT Basic Research Using Large Equipment
VW Foundation Program Microstructure Technologies







These figures do not include institutional funding for superconductivity
at the Großforschungseinrichtungen. In 1986 institutionally funded super-
conductivity research was done at two institutes of the Kernforschungs-
zentrum Karlsruhe. The Institut für nukleare Festkörperphysik (INFP)
focused on basic research on materials and the micromechanism of super-
conductivity. The Institut für technische Physik (ITP) worked on high-
field materials and magnet technology for the European fusion project.
Figures on their superconductivity budgets are not available.
On the basis of the funding information, I will now try to give a
picture of the relevant superconductivity network in Germany in 1986
before HTS was discovered (Figure 2). The two BMFT programs
devoted to prototype development in medical instruments and power
generators were excluded since these programs could not react to HTS
because of their advanced stage, and the four participating firms are or
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were involved in the basic program anyway. I regard funding, informa-
tion exchange and explicit collaboration on research projects to be link-
ages between the corporate actors that participate in the remaining pro-
grams. I assume that actors within the same program have some infor-
mation exchange as is indicated by the boxes around each program.
This can be validated at least for the VW program, within which confer-
ences for information exchange on cryoelectronics were held regularly,
and for the BMFT program "Physical Technologies", where meetings
of the project leaders were common, too. The arrows indicating collabo-
ration within each box are confirmed by funding information, and those
crossing the program boundaries are confirmed by interview informa-
tion. Only one collaboration tie was mentioned in an interview (by Sie-
mens to the University of Munich) which was not covered by the actor
network derived from the funding information.
Figure 2: The German Superconductivity Network in 1986
Kernforschungszentrum K.
lnst, L t€chn. Physik (lTP)























The central actor is clearly Siemens. They collaborate with three universi-
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the KFK involved in superconductivity research.l I All researchers collabo-
rating with Siemens are funded by the BMFT, either by project funding
or by institutional funding. Siemens is the only actor whose collaboration
ties cross the program boundaries. All the other collaborations of academ-
ic actors stay within program boundaries.
5 The Policy Formation: Defining an HTS Funding Program
5.1 The Reaction of the Established Policy Network
In June 1987 - surely influenced by the superconductivity technology
war between USA and Japan - the BMFT made up its mind to start a
national research effort in HTS. They were extremely dependent on the
evaluation of HTS by the leading scientists from academia. In January
1987 the program managing agency for the 'Physical Technologies'
held one of the regular meetings of experts and project leaders in the
superconductivity funding program. The ministry's and the agency's
officials had already learnt about the breakthrough in superconductivity
from newspaper articles. They wanted to get some evaluations from the
scientists in order to decide about the future directions of the program.
Contrary to their expectations, the scientists were very skeptical about
high-T" superconductivity. Obviously, nobody had yet succeeded in repli-
cating the findings, but this was not admitted freely. Nobody was ready
to change his research program and no one asked for special funds.
This situation was to change soon. Exactly on the day of the meeting
a group around Politis at the KFK succeeded in replicating the Müller/
Bednorz results (Politis 1987: l2l). This was the starting signal to the
superconductivity community in Germany. Now they began to trust the
sensational news from the US.l2 The KFK arranged a meeting of the
German superconductivity researchers at the KFK on February 19, 1987,
in order to evaluate the findings and to discuss organizational and re-
search strategies. They did invite the BMFI to this meeting but tumed
I 1 In the seventies the ITP was also funded by the program "Physical Technologies" for
the development of cryogenic infrastructure,
12 See Knorr-Cetina (1988) for an explanation of physical closeness and body-presence
as factors in the creation of scientific belief and certainty.
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to the department for'Material Research' where they had personal con-
tacts. The BMFT department 'Physical Technologies' was informed
only at the very last minute.
Since participation in the first days of the superconductor race was
not very expensive, no demands for large funding programs came up
at the first meeting of about thirty scientists. Only the university re-
searchers who were suffering from decreasing institutional budgets could
not even afford to buy the chemicals needed, to telephone with overseas
colleagues or to cover travel expenses. They asked for some seed money'
and on the basis of the established program the BMFT was able to re-
spond to these demands rather quickly. In April a small 300,000 DM
special program on HTS was lanced, that distributed small amounts of
money to 30 university institutes. Most importantly, the BMFT and espe-
cially the program managing agency, the "VDl-Technologiezentrum"
(VDI-TZ = the Technology Center of the Association of German Engi-
neers), acted as a mediator and information broker on the scene, organiz-
ing information letters and meetings, screening people and equipment
and attending the European HTS conferences'
The BMFT's final decision on a larger HTS program was based
on an intensive discussion of the technological potential of HTS and of
German science and industry resources within the "implementation struc-
ture before implementation". An important date in this process that may
have convinced the BMFT as well as the superconductor industry of the
technological irnportance of HTS despite the basic science nature of this
research was an IBM result showing that superconducting thin films were
able to carry currents as high as 105 Ncm2. This finding became known
in the first days of May 1987. On May 8, 1987, the project managing
agency and the KFK invited the whole superconductivity scene, including
science, industry and politics, for a discussion aimed at establishing the
important research questions and priorities. In June the minister himself
met with leading scientists. They strongly urged for the extension of
BMFI funding to basic science questions in HTS. Given the applied
orientation of the research done at the labs of the traditional supercon-
ductor industry this meant funding of university research projects. In July
the final version of the HTS program was checked in a meeting with
leading experts from science and technology.
When it became clear that the BMFT was going to engage in the
funding of basic university research in the case of HTS, the two science
foundations deliberately decided to leave this field to the BMFT largely.
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This was conditional on the very serious shortage of funding budgets
in both foundations caused by the strong demand of the universities for
project funding in the course of restrictions in the institutional budgets
of the universities. They both followed a policy of keeping only a small
but excellent part of their domain, namely two special research areas and
a large interorganizational project on Josephson junctions.l3
On July 23, 1987, the BMFT announced funding for application-
oriented basic research in HTS. The funding condition was that local
researchers from various university institutes and disciplines cooperate
on a common research project. The announcement was clearly addressed
to the universities, but industry was invited to participate under the con-
dition that they would fund their own part of a joint project or would
cover a substantial amount of the costs of the academic researchers.
Compared to the old superconductivity program this was a com-
pletely new approach, a definite turn to basic research, to university
research and to interdisciplinary research. The BMFT plan in summer
1987 was about three to five years of funding of interdisciplinary basic
research at universities and afterwards a long-term (7-10 years) phase
of application-oriented industrial projects (BMFT 1987c).
The BMFT saw an opportunity of taking part in the international
superconductor race successfully, since German academia and industry
had a long tradition of superconductor research and technology. Faced
with extreme international competition and protectionist measures even
in the basic science stage, the BMFI realized it was necessary to intensi-
fy and coordinate a national basic research effort. The electrical industry
of the old network was lacking experienced personnel for the handling
of the new ceramic materials. This problem could be overcome by rely-
ing on university scientists which were able to take up the topic quickly
and on a broad scale. There were strong intrascientific incentives for the
collaboration between various disciplines.
The physicists of the old community managed to catch the interest
of many colleagues from chemistry, crystallography, material science and
engineering sciences who were ready to start an HTS project. By Sep-
tember 1987, a total of eleven university-centered research groups had
formed. Fifteen institutes from the old network are non-industrial and
In 1990, the DFG again has lanced a program on the chemical edge of superconductiv-
ity research, a special research program on unusual valence states in solids (ungewöhn-
liche Valenzzustände in Festkörpern).
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non-GFE research institutes: Almost two thirds of them became the cores
of nine out of the eleven BMFl-funded groups, while another two have
received grants for individual research projects. There are only two new
groups (Saarbrücken and Regensburg) which are not based on an old
network institute.
The engagement of the university scientists from the old network
in the building of the joint projects was not only motivated by the fund-
ing opportunities offered by the HTS program. Another reason for their
involvement was that HTS was a unique chance for them to establish
the core of a material science institute at their university which for long
had been prevented by faculty interests and the unwillingness of the
faculties to give up any competencies. Such institutes were - this was
their opinion - well suited for attracting funds of industrial corporations
and state agencies in the future.
The BMFT and the program managing agency were well aware of
the problems concerning interdisciplinary research in universities, so
they gladly took the opportunity to establish interdisciplinary research
projects at the universities without facing any resistance of the scientists.
The foundation of a special HTS institute that might have provided the
best conditions for interdisciplinary work was deliberately disregarded.
It would have required a general political consent on the site and the
design of the institute, as well as a search for adequate buildings, direc-
tors and researchers. All this was too time-consuming and - after all -
too risky, since the technological future of HTS was far from being
clear. Another reason for deciding against an institute may have been
the consideration that once they get established, research institutes tend
to define their research tasks rather autonomously while universities fun-
ded by earmarked money showed to be more responsive to the demands
of application. This view was widely shared by the industry involved.
What was needed was a quick and cheap solution that could be revised
at a later stage. The best course of action was to take advantage of the
existing infrastructure and personnel at the universities. For the university
researchers a centralized approach would have created the situation of
"the winner takes all". Thus, a decentralized program was better able
to find their consent, too.
What remains to be explained is why the industry of the supercon-
ductivity policy network accepted the turn of the BMFT program towards
university funding at the expense of the industry. In 1986 more than
three-fourths of the program budget (DM 3.7 million) went to industry.
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As HTS research began to expand in 1988, industry's share in the in-
creased budget (DM 13.2 rnillion actually spent in 1988) declined to
187o. Although this was still an increase in absolute terms, the firms
could have been expected to object to their relative standing within the
program, but they did not, and their response to the BMFT's offer to
the industry to participate in the university projects was meager. Only
one of the old network firms joined one of the eleven university joint
projects that were founded in summer 1987. The large corporations de-
cided to start own research groups relying on their established informal
contacts to the university researchers of the old network. Why didn't they
try to get public funding for their own research efforts? Why did they
support the university-centered approach chosen by the BMFI? In my
opinion there were sevelal reasons:
- Industry as a collective actor was interested in building up an infra-
structure for HTS research at the German universities.
- The industrial actors were aware of the relative advantage of interdis-
ciplinary university research groups in the beginning of the supercon-
ductor race compared to their own research groups which were spe-
cialized for metallic superconductors and not for ceramic ones. They
were interested in maintaining the national position in the internation-
al competition. This was possible only by giving public funds to the
universities who could not work without such funding.
- The German electrical industry opted for a wait-and-see strategy in
the beginning. They set up only small groups within the corporations
leaving the first steps of research to the state-funded universities.
They were prepared to start larger efforts if a technical breakthrough
occurred, at which point they would be sure to get sllbstantial public
support (see the BMFI time schedule for HTS research in June 1987,
BMFT 1987c).
- The industry, along with the whole superconductivity community,
awaited a major increase in the public budgets for superconductivity
research. This made the distribution of funding a non-zero-sum game.
But this increase in funding was expected to be conditional on the
quick formulation of a sound program. This put large pressure to-
wards consent on the whole policy network.
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5.2 'The Challenge of the Established Superconductivity Network
The break in the scientific and technological paradigm of superconductiv-
ity challenged the established network to incorporate the chemical and
material science questions posed by HTS. This problem was handled
within the old network by relying on university researchers that estab-
lished interdisciplinary university groups. But there were other answers
to this problem. The break in the technological paradigm of superconduc-
tors offered new opportunities not only to university scientists possessing
ceramic and chemical know-how, but also to chemical industry. Hoechst,
a large German chemical firm, took up this chance and succeeded in
entering the established network.
Hoechst is one of the three leading German chemical corporations
which are known for their very high rate of self-financing of R&D
(98Vo), as well as for their high rate of in-house basic research (6.3Vo,
see Häusler 1989) and their good connections to the chemical depart-
ments of German universities (Rilling 1986; Grant et al. 1987; Krempel
1988).
In the eighties, world-wide competition and restricted resources forced
high-technology firms to think about new research strategies. Even the
largest corporations were no longer able to get along with internal R&D
efforts alone (Fusfeld/ Haklisch 1985). The ability of any firm to build
up the basis for innovation and economic growth on its own steadily
decreased. Technological change shortened product cycles and thus the
time available for amortization on R&D expenses. High+ech products
and processes depended more and more on the combination of know-
how and technologies from different fields. This made R&D more expen-
sive and, what is more important, considerably decreased the likelihood
of one company's possessing all the necessary know-how and equipment.
High-tech corporations responded to these challenges in two ways:
- They strengthened the cooperation with external research institutes
and universities, and
- they began to think about collective R&D, i.e. collaboration with
competitors in precompetitive research (Fusfeld/ Haklisch 1985; Ches-
nais 1988; Hagedoorn 1989).
Hoechst was one of the first German high-tech corporations to draw
conclusions from changing conditions for technical innovation. In 1981
Hoechst attracted the public's attention by deciding to finance a biochem-
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ical laboratory at Harvard University, and in 1985 it decided (along with
other chemical companies) to panicipate in the long-term, basic-research-
oriented BMFI programs on material research and on biotechnology.
The material research program was the first major state-funded research
in which the German chemical industry participated. It became the para-
digm for the new concept of "Verbundforschung" (oint industrial re-
search projects); it encompassed 120 joint projects by 1987 (compared
to only 20 single research projects), more than in any other special pro-
gram. The project managing agency is not the VDI-TZ responsible for
superconductivity technology, but the Kernforschungsanlage Jülich
(KFA), one of the big national labs of the BMFT. The industrial firms
involved in the material research program are generally large chemical
firms. Planned for ten years, the program's goal is to promote long-
term, scientifically and economically risky research projects. The scientif-
ic and technical potential of German researchers within academia and
within industry shall be focused on selected questions by means of joint
projects.
Probably due to the misrouted information within the BMFT - the
department for material research was invited to the first meeting of scien-
tists on HTS -, the R&D department of Hoechst found out about HTS
and the meeting. Looking for new products and new markets, the R&D
managers decided to attend the meeting as an information base. After
the Karlsruhe meeting, the Hoechst R&D management decided to invest
heavily in HTS research immediately. They saw HTS as a long-term
material research project with considerable market potential. In the eyes
of the managers the kind of approach that would be necessary to make
high-T" superconductors a technologically useful material fitted well to-
gether with the general concept of the material research program of
the BMFT. In Germany, Hoechst had not only the greatest chemical
expertise but also the best-suited equipment for developing the materials
that could enter (and win!) the superconductor patent race. Aware of their
competitive edge, they took immediate advantage of their inside informa-
tion to secure themselves an excellent starting position.
Hoechst rcalized quickly that in order to participate in the worldwide
patent race for HTS it needed to acquire knowledge about superconduc-
tivity in general and processing technologies, such as wire and thin-film
fabrication, in particular. This clearly could not be done by an internal
research group alone. In the very competitive patent race, it is especially
crucial to have a variety of approaches, since no one can tell which
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approach will be successful in the end. At the same time, collaboration
with competitors was impossible in the search for alternative supercon-
ductors. Too much was at stake.
Since knowledge about superconductivity was not available within
the company, Hoechst managers could foresee that learning processes
would require some time and external support. They decided to follow
a strategic networking approach to the problem, which made Hoechst
a factor that the BMFT and the old superconductor firms had to reckon
with in the evolving HTS scene. Within two months after the Karlsruhe
meeting they had an internal task force for HTS research made up of
about six researchers from the ceramics department and from the depart-
ment of technical physics. They augmented this in-house task force by
making cooperation contracts with scientists from universities and re-
search institutes as a strategy of minimizing risk, of getting access to
knowledge and equipment and of recruiting experienced personnel' The
criterion for choosing scientists as collaborators was expen know-how
in either superconductivity, processing techniques or solid-state/structural
chemistry which might provide clues for the search for new superconduc-
tors. By April 1987 the research management of Hoechst had concluded
contracts with twelve scientists from outside in a concerted action with
their patent department. HTS projects of collaborating scientists for about
DM 9.2 million were planned. Hoechst partly followed the joint research
model of collaboration between industry and science that had been estab-
lished in the material research program. Obviously they were convinced
that HTS would become a subject of this program soon. They deliber-
ately departed from the joint research approach as far as collaboration
with competitors in the material patent race was concerned. In spite of
this violation of competitive neutrality, they presumed that their ap-
proach would be approved by the BMFI. They intended to provide part
of the funding for the scientific research program and assumed that the
BMFI would pay for the rest.
Figure 3, showing the Hoechst collaboration network, is reconstructed
mainly according to interview information. While the scientists in the
upper boxes of the network are new in superconductivity research - they
are providing the chemical and ceramics know-how - all the scientists
in the three lower boxes come from the old superconductivity network.
Having managed to choose scientists from each program and even from
the two Großforschungseinrichtungen that were involved, Hoechst has
clearly succeeded in maximizing know-how and information flow. Sur-
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prisingly, there are two institutes among Hoechst's new collaborators,
the University of Erlangen and ITP-KFK (the Institute for Technical
Physics at the KFK), which collaborate with Siemens in conventional
superconductivity research.
Figure 3: Superconductivity Network of Hoechst, April 1987
Collaboration
Hoechst was successful in taking advantage of the opportunity presented
by the break in the technological trajectory of superconductors. Success
in entering a new technological field depends on organizing quick access
to knowledge and equipment, and success in the patent race is dependent
on following a variety of different approaches while preventing competi-
tors from doing the same. Collaboration with academic scientists was
the fastest and easiest way for Hoechst to achieve these goals. They
reacted to the challenge of HTS with the construction of a corporation-
centered research network in both fields.
Within the BMFT, the department of Physical Technologies was able
to establish its competencies for the new field of high-T" superconductivi-
























be expanded to include HTS. Not later than in July 1987 the research
management of Hoechst had to realize that HTS was not within the
domain of the material research program but belonged to the program
"Physical Technologies", which had not included the chemical industry
up to that date. They rcalized that this program was dominated by elec-
trical industry namely by Siemens, and that material science questions
were rather new. Joint research projects still were uncommon in this area.
The BMFT's decision to concentrate funding on basic research in this
context also meant the exclusion of industry from funding, at least in
the field of material research. Nevertheless Hoechst insisted on the opti-
mality of their industry-centered approach and tried to convince the
BMFI that it was necessary for industry to include industrial joint proj-
ects on the material science questions from the beginning. For the estab-
lished superconductivity policy network the solution to delegate the mate-
rial science questions to university research groups was viable, but not
for Hoechst. They tried to make clear that research on superconducting
materials was their genuine domain. Hoechst was in an excellent position
to bargain with the BMFI, having its own task force with fifteen scien-
tists in contact with twelve elite academic institutes. The chemical firm
reminded the BMFT of its general philosophy of industry-university
cooperation and technology transfer, and warned that the ministry's fail-
ure to fund this extraordinary group would give the wrong signal politi-
cally.la
In September 1987 Hoechst took the initiative and applied for a grant
for a joint Hoechst + collaborator research project, although the July
announcement clearly did not include funding for industry. Just two
weeks later, on September 23, 1987, the BMFT announced a second
funding program for industrial joint projects on the technical potential
of HTS. The design of the program followed the usual concept of joint
projects, with two or more firms joining academic researchers for a com-
mon project, and industry receiving a maximum of 507o of their count-
able project costs and paying for 257o of the costs of their academic
partners. So the BMFT formally adopted Hoechst's position and departed
14 Hoechst warned the ministry's officials that they were ready to complain about a failure
to include an industrial material research project in the HTS program on the highest
level. The fact that the minister of research and technology, Heinz Riesenhuber, belongs
to the "family of chemists" - he has a doctoral degree in chemistry - probably played
an important role in the considerations of both sides.
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from its initial "university-funding-only" policy. It augmented the univer-
sity-centered approach with an industry-oriented program.
The Transformation of the Policy Network: Compromise on
the Funding Priorities and the Emergence of an HTS Industry
Consortium
The BMFT department "Physical Technologies" had been forced by
Hoechst to expand its funcling to include an industry-oriented program,
but the thrust of the strategy changed only slightly - from "universities
only" to "universities first" - and the motivation remained the same.
Basic research in a completely new field (ceramic superconductors as
opposed to metallic ones) was needed, in which, from the point of view
of the old superconductivity policy network, only the universities could
provide expertise and people. Know-how not yet embodied in equipment
was in the heads of experts who were not available in industrial labs
at the beginning. Universities were leading in research in summer 1987
and needed public funding. Industry, especially the old superconductor
industry, needed some time to adapt to the new situation, to recruit
solid-state experts necessary for the new research questions. And the
large corporations that were able to go into basic HTS research were
strong enough from the BMFT's point of view to finance their research
expenses without public subsidies.
The BMFT had managed to get DM 12 million extra for HTS re-
search for 1988, supplementing the existing low-temperature superconduc-
tivity budget of DM 4 million. Further budget increases were not to
come until 1989 and the following years. Refusing to split the 1988
budget between cheap university and expensive industry research, the
BMFI decided that universities would come first. Although it formally
announced an industry-funding program, no money was actually set
aside for this program. In autumn 1987, the old superconductors in-
dustry sent their applications (abridged versions) to the BMFI. Among
them were large projects by Siemens and by AEG, the second-largest
electrical corporation in Germany now belonging to Daimler-Benz. All
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the industrial applications were simply postponed by the BMFI'I5 The
old superconductor industry consented to this, but the chemical industry
objected strongly. In December 1987, the BMFT set up an advisory
committee on HTS as a conflict-managing strategy' Members of this
committee came from industry (Siemens, AEG, Philips, Hoechst), from
the two involved national labs (KFK and KFA) and from two of the
universities of the old network (Karlsruhe and Darmstadt). Hoechst was
the only newcomer in the committee and presumably took an isolated
position. This committee was intended to work out recommendations for
the HTS science and technology policy of the BMF[. It also served the
BMFI as an information and coordination instrument for the developing
HTS network, especially for industry and national labs which were not
or not yet involved in BMFT projects. The committee also allowed the
BMFT to gain consent for its strategy - members were deliberately se-
lected not so much because of expert know-how but because of position
and influence - and to integrate the only opponent, Hoechst, into the new
network. By adopting this co-optation procedure, the BMFT managed
to absorb the newcomer Hoechst into the leadership of the HTS policy
network and averted threats to the otherwise accepted strategy of "univer-
sities first". This is quite evident in the committee's decision, finally
approved by all industry members, to reserve 1988 funding for universi-
ties and postpone funding for industry until 1989 when more resources
would be available. Instead of struggling over the own share in the fund-
ing budget, the efforts of the committee were focused on the provision
of political legitimacy for the whole HTS program in order to expand
future funding.
In summer 1987, even before the BMFT had applied for special
money for HTS, the parliamentary committee for research and technology
(Bundestagsausschuß für Forschung und Technologie) granted DM 12
million extra money for HTS research for 1988. This was a sort of na-
tional effort in reaction to the international competition and to newspaper
reports. The parliamentary committee connected this special grant with
the stipulation that a funding program for HTS research be submitted
soon. The HTS advisory committee of the BMFI took part in the formu-
15 The BMFT only offered letters of intent to the industry. These LOIs were sent out in
May 1988, stating that industry was expected to provide advance financing for HTS
research for 1988 which would be reimbursed if there were funds left over in the minis-
try's budget at the end of the fiscal year.
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lation of this funding program for HTS research which went through
several checks during 1988 and was finally published by the project
managing agency in February 1989. As far as can be investigated, the
amount of public funding that was considered to be necessary by this
funding recommendation was raised from DM 167 million to DM 390
rnillion and the program duration from four years to seven years. This
expansion of the program was a strong incentive for consent and compro-
mise among conflicting interests within the committee representing the
enlarged policy network.
In summer 1987 the old superconductor industry became aware of
the newcomer Hoechst on the HTS scene. They realized that HTS was
not only a domain of electronics and electrical industry but also a poten-
tial market for chemical corporations that could provide ceramic know-
how. In contrast to its strategic exclusion of other chemical firms,
Hoechst was very much interested in collaboration with component pro-
ducers, with whom the competitive overlap was very small. Hoechst
wanted to sell semi-finished products, wites, ribbons or films that the
electrical and electronics industry would then use to manufacture devices
(Chesnais 1988: 105; Fusfeld/ Haklisch 1985). Meetings between Siemens
and Hoechst on possible collaborations started. Some time later Daimler-
BenzlAEG indicated to Hoechst that they were interested in collaborating.
Negotiations on the board level between the three corporations were
initiated.
In autumn 1987 the BMFI was confronted with research applications
from Hoechst, Siemens and AEG among others, which were similar in
many respects. While parallel university research was definitely allowed
(though under scrutiny) in the HTS program, parallel industrial research
can not be financed by the BMFT. The high costs are prohibitive. The
BMFT wanted to combine several projects to form large joint research
projects, which would mean that all the firms involved would have ac-
cess to each other's research results. They also wanted to ensure the
compatibility of the research objectives of chemists and ceramists from
the chemical industry and of physicists and engineers fron the electrical
industry. Faced with the problem of having to cut the proposals in some
way to eliminate overlaps, the BMFT realized that its own informational
base regarding strengths and interests of the corporations was too re-
stricted and decided to ask the corporations thernselves. They were all
members of the advisory HTS committee, which may have been the
site for some bargaining between BMFT and industry and within indus-
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try. The attempt of the BMFI to stimulate collaboration between the
firms and between firms and university groups met with some resistance
of industry, which was concerned about its autonomy in defining cooper-
ative ties. They did not want to take advice from the ministry. The
BMFT's stated aim was only to arrange the proposals in order to form
joint research projects. This aim, along with the formation of the adviso-
ry committee, with the prospects of increased public funding for a na-
tional effort in HTS and with the companies' search for synergetic ad-
vantage and risk-minimizing approaches, finally triggered the formation
of the German HTS consortium. In spring 1988 Hoechst, having con-
sulted with Daimler-BenzlABG and Siemens, gave a press conference
and presented the research consortium, within which Hoechst once again
has a central position. Collaboration with AEG/DB and Siemens is rela-
tively easy for Hoechst (exception: Vakuumschmelze, a subsidiary of
Siemens which manufactures superconducting wires), while cooperation
between AEG and Siemens, which are direct competitors, is far more
problematic. This is reflected in the later development of the consortium.
The contract was finally signed by Hoechst and Siemens, while Daimler-
BenzlAEG decided to have just an option to come in later. Hoechst not
only is central in the industry network but also in the surrounding aca-
demic network. Hoechst has collaborative ties to fourteen academic part-
ners, Siemens to seven partners and DaimletBenz/AEG to six partners.
Even if one does not take into account the five partners for the search
for new materials, Hoechst remains the corporation with the greatest
access to external scientific experience in HTS research.
Hoechst has succeeded in building up a central position in the aca-
demic network and in becoming a member of an industrial consortium,
pooling resources and minimizing the uncertainties of basic research,
while at the same time remaining the only chemical firm in the network.
Within the industrial collaboration they occupy a gate position that allows
them to maximize the information flow, which is critical for success in
basic research. They had this opportunity when they got to know about
HTS very early by chance, and they took this chance without hesitating.
While old network people were still recovering from the shock of HTS,
Hoechst was making contracts with the top university researchers. From
this position they were able to convince the BMFT of the necessity of
funding joint industrial-university projects. Although the first plans to
incorporate HTS into the material research program failed, the net-
working strategy proved to be error tolerant. It allowed Hoechst to enter
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the established network and to achieve a central position in the industrial
consortium.
7 Summary and Perspectives
The discovery of HTS and the related changes in scientific and techno-
logical paradigms triggered a transformation of the old superconductivity
policy network and gave rise to a new approach to HTS research policy.
The HTS programs set up by the BMFI were largely determined by
those actors who took advantage of two special opportunities created by
the break in the superconductivity paradigm.
The change in the scientific trajectory could be handled within the
old superconductivity policy network. It gave the impetus for the BMFI
to set up a basic and interdisciplinary research program based on the
university researchers of the old network. The external conditions for
this network building by the BMFI were that the necessary combina-
tion of chemical/ceramic and solid state know-how was not available
within the industry from the old network and that these firms agreed to
rely on university research in a first program phase devoted to materi-
al science questions.
The second new opportunity deals with the break in the technological
paradigm of superconductors that offered chances to sectors which had
not been concerned with superconductivity before. Hoechst's arrival in
the HTS network was partly a result of chance and even misconceptions
- they found out about the first HTS meeting by chance, and were moti-
vated by the false assumption that HTS would become a subject of the
material research program. In the material research program, the super-
conductor industry would have been the newcomer; as it was, Hoechst
was the newcomer to the superconductivity network. Despite this status,
Hoechst shaped the evolving network with its strategic networking ap-
proach. The patent race and a technology exceeding the boundaries of
any single industrial sector were the arguments for Hoechst to build up
a network of collaboration with academic scientists. This starting position
together with the technological importance of the chemical industry en-
abled Hoechst to convince the BMFT to set up a second program on
industrial research, to monopolize the "new materials" aspect of HTS
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and to acquire a central and unquestioned position within the HTS indus-
try consortium.
This chapter showed how an established policy network adapted to
changes in the environment, in this case to a scientific and technological
breakthrough. Old definitions of who and what belongs to the field could
only be overcome by an extremely powerful and strategically planning
actor entering the scene and pushing forward its definition of the prob-
lem. Further research in the analysis of the German HTS policy should
be oriented to the question of whether public goals can be achieved
within the structure that has emerged from this intersection of actor strat-
egies and scientific and technological trajectories. In my view, there are
two main problems:
- the efficient coupling of the various disciplines cooperating (and
competing) in the university joint projects, and
- the efficient coupling of scientific and technological progress.
Contingent factors in the history of the HTS policy network have led
to the emergence of two partly competing research programs and
research networks: university-centered joint projects on the one side,
and the industrial HTS consortium on the other. Whether the rather
loose interaction between industry and university groups will result in
an effective exchange of information and know-how is not yet clear.
With one exception (ABB = Asea Brown Boveri, an electrical firm), the
corporations refused the offer to join a university joint project, preferring
to pick out some institutes for collaboration in the frame of their indus-
trial projects. While the BMFT is interested in facilitating the transfer
of scientific and technical know-how from the state universities to medi-
um-sized and small firms that are expected to join the HTS program
later, the large corporations are afraid of losing control over their know-
how. Reluctant to collaborate with a wide range of university groups,
the large corporations prefer to choose their partners on their own in
order to limit the number of participants and to reduce coordination and
control problems. They are not interested in creating the conditions of
technology transfer in general but only in particular, in so far as the own
company's concerns are affected.
Further research should be devoted to this relation between public
and private goals in HTS research policy and to the role of network
structures in their achievement.
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Political Exchange in the German and American
Labor Policy Domains
Franz Urban Pappi and David Knoke
Introduction
Labor policy is concerned with collective decisions at the national level
of a political system that regulate relations between capital and labor and
which affect the resource distribution between these factors of production.
The decisions we are interested in are bills, government regulations, and
decisions of federal courts as, for instance, the Bundesarbeitsgericht in
Germany. The actors interested in certain decision outcomes are con-
ceived as corporate actors such as interest groups, padiamentary parties,
federal agencies, and departments or ministries. These same actors partial-
ly control the decision outcomes, but the control they possess does not
necessarily fit their interest profile. Organization A may be interested
in bill I which is partially controlled by organization B. When B is
interested in government regulation 2 which is controlled by A, an ex-
change of control would guarantee higher satisfaction or interest realiza-
tion for both actors.
This concept of political exchange is more than a metaphor. The
practice of log-rolling in parliaments is a realistic example showing the
meaningfulness of the concept. But there exists a wide gap between
single, meaningful examples of political or social exchange and the
type of generalized exchange postulated by models which are available
for economic exchange on a perfect market.
Research for this paper was supported in Germany by a grant from the Volkswagen Stiftung
and in the United States by a grant from the National Science Foundation (SES - 8615909),
by a grant-in-aid from the University of Minnesota, and by a Fulbright Senior Research
Fellowship. The research assistance of Thomas König is gratefully acknowledged.
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What we shall do in this paper is to use an exchange model as a
baseline from which supply and effective demand for control can be
derived and possibilities of profitable exchange can be identified. Wheth-
er the actors will indeed get involved in profitable exchange is a second
question about which we shall speculate in the concluding section.
In the following, we shall first explicate the exchange model and
justify its use as a baseline. In the second section, we shall describe
our comparative study of decision making in the German and American
labor policy domain. Then, we apply the model, not to the concrete
decision process itself, but at the more abstract level of interest in and
control of the different subdomains of labor policy. The derived measures
of value or price of the subdomains and power or income of the actors
will be discussed. In a fourth section the exchange potential of the two
systems will be derived in the sense of the minimum exchange volume
necessary for the optimal interest realization of the actors, given their
interest profile and initial control.
1 A Model of Political Exchange
The exchange model developed by James Coleman (1986, 1990) which
we are using was successfully applied to political influence systems, the
basic idea being that actors gain generalized power by exchanging their
influence resources (Pappi/ Kappelhoff 1984; Marsden/ Laumann 1977).
We shall first outline the basic logic of this model and then show that
this model has a minimum interpretation in which the interest dependen-
cies among the actors are taken into account, but not necessarily ex-
change processes.
The basic elements of the model are the interest of actors j in events
i which are controlled by the same actors. A first assumption is that we
deal with a closed system in which all relevant actors and events are
included. Formally the interest matrix X is standardized rowwise with
the amount of interest of actor j in all events treated as a fixed sum of
t.
(1) Ex,' = 1.0
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In the same way the total amount of control over event i across all ac-
tors is fixed, too.
(2) I,c,, = l.g
These two input matrices X and C are given. We are thus able to derive
a matrix Z which tells us how dependent the row actors are on the col-
umn actors.
(3) Z = X C or z1r = ä X.;i cir
Z is a matrix of inter-actor-dependency and since X and C sum to I
rowwise, Z is row stochastic, too. Thus, z,r is a measure of the depen-
dency of j on k, which results from the fact that j is interested in some
events which are controlled by k. using the logic of sociometric status
measures we could already compute a power measure for which we take
into account only direct and indirect dependencies without any exchange
processes.
(4)p=pZor pr=!p1 zu
Thus actor k is powerful to the extent that other powerful actors depend
on him or her. In our case we interpret the power of j as j's share of
generalized control in the system with the constraint:
(5)4pi=1.0
For the exchange process, we need a decision rule according to which
the actors are supposed to exchange the control for power in their pos-
session. Coleman assumes that the actors will allocate their resources
or power proportional to their interests such that the effective demand
of actor j for control over event i is g x,i.
In equilibrium, effective demand equals the valued supply of control,
now c,,* indicating the control which actor j has after exchange has
reached an equilibrium and v, being the value or price of control over
event i.
(6) x1r pj = v,c*ü
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The value concept is directly related to power because value is an ex-
pression of the effective demand for control over event i under equilibri-
um conditions.
(7) v, = 4 p, 
^,,
The reverse equation for power is
(8) pj = E, v, c,,
Going back to the interpretation of power as a status measure, we are
now able to distinguish between a minimal and a full interpretation of
the Coleman model. The minimal interpretation is not based on the ex-
change logic. It is enough to assume that the actors know their depen-
dencies from other actors and are thus able to estimate the power of
actors from their mutual interdependencies. Only if the concept of
control after exchange is to be treated as meaningful, we need the behav-
ioral assumption of proportional resource allocation as the decision rule
for actual exchange processes (Kappelhoff 1988: 250).
Value and power are meaningful concepts under the equilibrium
condition, but these do not imply exchange. On the other side, exchange
on a perfect market does imply an equilibrium (Kappelhoff 1988: 172).
In this paper, we leave the question open whether the actors do
indeed get involved in exchanges. We assume that the actors use their
perception of power and of the value of events as orienting devices for
the actual exchange performed by them. Then we are able to recover
exchange possibilities between actors as an important information about
our system.
Formally, we have effective demand on the one side and valued
initial control of actors on the other side. The difference between the
two signals opportunities of profitable exchange.
(9) Po*, X - (Vor, C)'= D
D is the matrix of disaggregated demand for and supply of valued con-
trol. A positive d;i indicates how much excess demand actor j has for
control over event i, a negative d,, is the excess supply, respectively.
Excess demand and supply are weighted with the equilibrium prices of
control and the income or power of the actors with the consequence that
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the amounts of demand and supply of a given actor are equal. The sum
of the absolute values of demand or supply amounts are a measure of
minimal exchange necessary for optimal interest realization. The upper
limit of this measure is the power or resources of actor j. Seen from
the perspective of the event, the upper limit of supply of control avail-
able for exchange is the value of the event. In our closed system the
arbitrary scales of the sums of value and power are standardized to 1.0.
As an example let us assume that an actor is interested only in one
event for which he has no initial control. What is our measure of mini-
mal exchange necessary for interest realization?
(10) 4, = p;x;1 - vlci;
In this extreme caso, Xii = 1 and cij = 0, thus d1i = p,. This actor reaches
the upper limit of our measure, he is totally dependent on exchange
because he does not possess any initial control for that event in which
he is interested.
We could define the following relative measure of dependency on
exchange (g) for an actor:
(11) & =L'ldi1/2P:
Summed over the actors, this measure indicates the dependency on ex-
change for the total system.
(12) e = 4 (ätd,,l)12p1
The closer g is to 0, the more the system is already in equilibrium with-
out exchange. The closer g is to 1.0, the higher the dependency on ex-
change for an optimal interest satisfaction.
The parallel concept of g for the events is a measure of how much
valued control is already possessed by actors interested in that event
and how much is available as excess supply.
(13) e, = Eildiil /Zvi
The upper limit of supply made available by an actor is v, if he is not
interested in event i but does control it totally as a single actor. This
will normally be an extreme situation and the more probable case is that
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the upper limit is reached if the control is distributed among a set of
actors but none of them is interested in that control. The closer e, is to
0, the more the control of event i is already possessed by the actors
interested in i.
For the labor policy domain we would expect that the older, classical
subdomains are more in equilibrium than the more recent ones.
The German and American Labor Policy Domains:
An Overview of a Comparative Project
A policy domain is a basic policy making subsystem within a larger
polity. Sociologically speaking, we interpret a policy domain as a social
system,that is as a plurality of actors interacting on the basis of a shared
symbol system (Parsons 1951: 19). For a comparative study we could
not rely on concrete institutional delineations of a policy domain because
the institutions are different in the United States and the Federal Republic
of Germany. Our more concrete analytical definition of a policy domain
follows Knoke and Laumann (1982: 256), who define it as a subsystem
"identified by specifying a substantively defined criterion of mutual rele-
vance or common orientation among a set of consequential actors con-
cerned with formulating, advocating, and selecting courses of actions
(i.e., policy options) that are intended to resolve the delimited substantive
problems in question". For a delineation of such a system' two tasks
have to be performed: First, the theoretically guided definition of the
substantive concerns of the policy domain, and second the identification
of the relevant domain actors.
As already mentioned, we understand a "labor policy domain" to
involve collective decisions at the national level of a political system
that regulate relations between capital and labor and which affect the
resource distributions between these factors of production. For Americans,
the concept "labor policy" has somewhat the same meaning, but in Ger-
many the concept of "Arbeitspolitik" involves different connotations.
Thus, the next step was to make the concept more meaningful by enu-
merating the subdomains which belong to labor policy. These subdomains
are treated as elements of the labor policy not because we as experts
think that they should belong to the policy domain. This would give us
a completely analytical system which may not be used as a frame of
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reference by political actors. We had to pay attention to the major laws
and institutions organizing the labor policy domain in the two countries,
using the concepts of labor law and not our own. Table 1 gives an over-
view of the subdomains we thought are relevant together with the major
laws for the subdomains in Germany and the United States.
In a market economy, workers exchange their labor power for mone-
tary compensation from employers. All governmental policies that shape
the conditions under which these labor-capital-relations occur are encom-
passed by our analytical definition of the labor policy domain. The regu-
latory policies of the domain are identical to those codified in labor
law statutes, including collective bargaining rights, union election proce-
dures, codetermination, and workplace regulations. The domain also in-
cludes those aspects of social policies that are directly tied to workers'
wages and employers' contributions and not only indirectly to general
taxes. And, it embraces some aspects of macroeconomic policies that
attempt to regulate the labor market. For both nations, we classified these
various dimensions as labor policy subdomains. In most instances identi-
cal subdomains were identified in each country but three differences
occurred. The German institution of codetermination at the enterprise
level does not exist in the US and the formal representation of workers
at the plant level (work council in Germany, union elections in the US)
is quite different. Secondly, no equivalent exists in the US for the subdo-
main of labor law courts (Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit) although some aspects
of the National Labor Relations Board suggest a parallel. Thirdly, the
single American subdomain of employment conditions was broken into
two categories for Germany, one dealing with labor contracts (Arbeitsver-
tragsrecht) and another with labor hour standards (Arbeitszeitschutz).
The subdomains listed in table I structure the substantive content
of labor policy over longer periods of time. In Germany, the first laws
of this domain go back to the 19th century especially in the regulation
of working conditions, another part was first formulated in the early
years of the Weimar Republic when the ministry of labor was founded.
This period can be compared to the New Deal-period in the United Sta-
tes, when the first important US laws of the labor policy domain were
enacted.
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Iron Codetermination Act 1951,
Par. 76, 77, 77a, 81, 85, 87
Works Constitutions Law 1952
Works Constitutions Law 1972
Federal Staff Representation Law 1974
Art. 9 (3) Basic Law
Civil Legal Code,
Basic Business Law,
Notice of Termination Law
Working Time Regulations,
Shop Closing Hours Law 1956
USA
National Labor Relations (Wagner)
Act 1935, Labor Management Rela-
tions (Taft-Hartley) Act 1947,
Civil Service Reform Act 1978
National Labor Relations Act 1935
Labor Management Reporting and Dis-
closure (Landrum-Griffin) Act 1959
Fair Labor Standards Act 1938
Fair Labor Stardards Act 1938
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Youth Working Conditions Law
Implementation of EC-Regulations
Work Promotion Law 1969,
Employment Promotion Law 1985
Labor Court Law 1953
USA
Occupational Safety and Health Act
1970
Social Security Act 1935, Employee
Retirement Income Security Äct 1974
Fair Labor Standards Act 1938
civil Rights Act (Title vII) 1964,
Fair Labor Standards Act 1938
concepts (l to 9). For non-existent American
in parentheses. The sequence numbers indicate the
c German concepts of subdomains (I to XII) and equivalent American
subdomains, the English translation of the German concept is listed
sequence of subdomains in the questionnaire, not in this -table.
Sources: For FRG: Halbach et al. (1984); for USA: Aaron (19g6).
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The purpose of our comparative project is not to study labor law histori-
cally. We aim at explaining the decision process in this policy domain
over the last several years, in Germany for the 10th and 1lth legislature
of the Bundestag and in the United States for the period of the Reagan
administration. Thus, as a second step, we identified the most important
issues for these periods and then, as a third step, all important political
decisions of the policy domain for the same periods were collected in
a data bank.
This last step was important for the performance of our second task,
that is the identification of the policy actors. In Germany, we collected
all the available information of the participants in parliamentary hearings
for the bills in our data bank. All interest groups participating in at least
two hearings in the period from 1983 to 1988 are supposed to be actors
of this policy domain. At the level of the political system itself, we treat
all organizations as relevant actors which have a direct or indirect author-
ity over problems of this policy domain.
The actors of a policy domain of a modern national state are sup-
posed to be corporate actors, and normally not individual persons. For
our comparative project, we thought it useful to apply the concept of
the organizational state developed by Laumann and Knoke (1987). This
concept was developed to grasp the following crucial aspects of policy
making in the American polity: (1) The acting units are organizations,
or corporate actors; (2) both private and public actors compete for influ-
ence on the final decision outcome, and (3) the state is not participating
as a single actor, but as a loosely coupled system of agencies, each of
which has its own interest profile.
All these characteristics apply to the German polity, which can also
be conceptualized as a loosely coupled system of agencies (Behörden),
and political actors as the parties, and politically oriented organizations
(Interessenverbände). Thus, the overall concept was the same for the two
polities, but the details of the operationalization differed a little bit.
In the American project, four methods were used to compile the list
of labor policy organizations whose agents were to be interviewed:
(l) Organizations that testified before the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources and the House Committee on Education and
Labor in the 1980s through the l00th congress, as abstracted by the
Congressional Information Service. Only the 297 heaings dealing
with labor or vocational education matters were tabulated.
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(2) Organizations mentioned in New York Times' Annual Index Labor
Abstracts from 1981 to mid 1987.
(3) Organizations registered as congressional labor lobbyists, reported
annually from 1981 to 1986 by the Congressional Quarterly.(4) Organizations filing Supreme Court amicus curiae briefs in 16 major
labor cases, indexed in the LEXIS computerized database.
A total of Il2 organizations were mentioned five or more times during
the seven years. Because of criterion (2) federal agencies and the two
congressional labor committees were also on this list. Since we only
used criterion (1) for the German case, we had to add the members of
the political system itself using strictly authority criteria. This same crite-
rion was used in the American case, too, by adding five major units
within the Department of Labor and by separately listing the Republican
and Democratic "members and staff" of the House and Senate full labor
committees.
An overview of the most important corporate actors of the policy
domain in the two polities will be given when we present the power
measure and list those actors separately which possess more than the
mean power in the next section.
The fieldwork for the American study was in the spring and summer
of 1988 and the fieldwork of the German study in the fall and winter
of the same year and the first two months of 1989. The following anal-
ysis is based on those 124 German actors and 111 American actors for
which we have complete information on interest and control. For Germa-
ny we had to omit two actors and for the US eight actors due to missing
data.
The Power of Actors and the Value of Control for
Subdomains
We apply the model at the relatively abstract level of interest in and
control of the subdomains. We first asked the respondents as agents of
their organizations how strongly their organization was interested in
each subdomain. In Table 2 the mean interests and the variances are
listed for the two polities. We see that social policy is the one subdo-
main in both polities in which the actors are interested most. Interest
in the problems of disadvantaged populations in the labor market and
3
Table 2: The Interestso of Acton in the Subdomains in the USA and the FRG: Means and Variance Compared'
Subdomains USA Mean Variance Mean Variance Subdomains FRG'
l. Collective Bargaining Regulations
2. Participation of Labor in Management and
Control of Enterprises, Employee Stock
Ownership Plans
3. Internal Organization and Govemance of
Labor Unions and Employer Organizations
4. Working Conditions: Safety and Physical
Conditions
5. Employment Conditions: Hiring, Promotion,
Firing, Layoff, Retirement, Time and Wages
6. Social Policies: Pensions, Insurance, Maternity
kave, Job Rights
7. Disadvantaged Populations in the Labor Mar-
ket: Women, Minorities, Handicaped, Youth,
Elderly, Veterans, Welfare, Vocational Educa-
tion and Retraining
8. Discrimination in Employment
9. Labor Market Policies: Iob Creation, Immigra-
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d Interests are measured on a scale running from 5 = very strong to 0 = almost none. b Means and variance based on n = 111
in the US and n = 122 actors in the FRG. c Translations see Table l.
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in labor market policy is strong, too, in both polities, whereas Amer-
ican actors are more interested in employment conditions and discrimina-
tion problems and German actors in collective bargaining regulations and
codetermination both at the enterprise and the plant level.
To construct the interest matrix X we had to compute the relative
interest of an actor in each subdomain.
The control matrix C should tell us the share of control of the actors
for each subdomain. To recover this information we first asked the re-
spondents which subfield they know the most about, and then they
were asked to name those organizations that are especially influential
within this subfield. We had prepared a list of all participants in the
labor policy domain so that the relevant organizations had just to be
checked. Apart from a question on the general influence reputation
which is not used for our model we have therefore gathered data on the
subdomain specific influence reputation. The number of mentions an
organization received for a subdomain is used as a proxy for the control
distribution. When a respondent saw himself as an expert in several
subfields his mentions were counted for each one.
The power measure of the model is a summary indicator of the con-
trol the actors have in the different subdomains, weighted by the different
demands for subdomain specific control. The mean power is 1/n, that
is lll24 = 0.008 in the German case and I/109 = 0.009 in the American
case. Actors who possess more power than this mean are listed individu-
ally in Table 3 or 4. For the less powerful actors we just sum their
power and include this information in that actor category to which the
organizations belong. The organizational typology differentiates crudely
between interest groups and political actors in the strict sense of the
term. The more detailed categories had to take into account the institu-
tional peculiarities of the two polities.
The first important information on the power distribution is its in-
equality which we measure with the Gini index. What we expect is
that power is distributed more equally in the American pluralistic system
than in Germany whose system of interest groups is characterized by
few peak organizations. A Gini index of 0.439 for the Federal Republic
and of 0.405 for the US seems to verify the hypothesis, even if the
difference is quite small. This difference becomes larger when we include
only the non-political actors. Then the Gini index for Germany is 0.479
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Thble 3: The Power of Actors in the American Labor Policy Domain by
Organization Type
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Thble 3: continued
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and for the United States 0.397. This result does better fit the overall
hypothesis.
Differences for all actors may be partially influenced by our different
procedures to identify political actors. For the Federal Republic we in-
cluded more political actors in the system out of theoretical consider-
ations than were included in the American polity. Originally, subcommit-
tees of both the House and Senate Committee were also included in the
list of participants, but the party groups within subcommittees were not
interviewed due to practical considerations. Thus the subcommittees could
be mentioned as influential without the main committees being men-
tioned. We solved this problem in the following way: The mentions
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received by the subcommittees were counted as mentions of the respec-
tive full committee. With these corrections, the control data are better
to compare between the two systems.
Comparing first the power sums of the different types of organiza-
tions, the congressional actors in the US and the parliamentary actors
and political parties in Germany rank first, followed by the unions at
rank two. Since the number of organizations within the broad categories
is different, we get a better insight of the top of the power pyramid if
we focus on individual organizations. In Germany, the two peak organi-
zations of labor and business, the Bundesvereinigung Deutscher Arbeitge-
berverbände (BDA) and the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) rank
first, followed by the Ministry of Labor (BMA) at rank three and a
group of parliamentary actors at rank four. Within the latter group, the
CDU/CSU members of the labor committee are ahead of the SPD mem-
bers of the same committee, followed by the FDP members and the
CDU/CS U Bundestagsfraktion.
In the United States, the legislative actors are far ahead everybody
else. This may be partially an artefact of the procedure to include only
four actors within this category in the American case.
If we would sum up the power measures of the different political
actors in Germany which are of the same party, the majority party in
parliament would have a position very similar to the House Democrats
in the US. Thus, even if the top three organizations in Germany seem
to confirm the corporatist notion of a tripartite system consisting of
labor, business and government, the parliamentary actors are not less
important if we conceptualize them as collective actors organized along
party lines.
The biggest difference between the two countries concerns the posi-
tion of employers' associations in the power pyramid. In Germany, the
BDA ranks first among all organizations, followed closely by the DGB.
In the US, the Business Roundtable and some more specialized business
organisations are not on par with the more powerful unions, especially
the AFL/CIO. And, for example, the two peak business associations with
the highest general influence reputations (the Chamber of Commerce of
the United States and the National Association of Manufacturers) have
generalized control below the mean. This result may reflect the majority
situation in both House and Senate. Since 1986, the Democrats were the
majority party, not only in the House, but in the Senate, too; the unions
may therefore have had better access to Congress, being affiliated to the
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Democratic party. And on the other side, President Reagan had decided
quite consciously that labor policy should not be one of the areas in
which he was eager to perform a proactive role of leadership. A similar
decision was made by business associations which concentrated their
efforts on issues in other policy domains, for instance tax reform.
The values of the subdomains can be compared more easily between
the two countries than the power of actors (cf. Table 5). Here the num-
ber of categories is almost the same, 9 subdomains for the United
States and 12 for the Federal Republic. The values of the domains can
be interpreted as the prices of control for a specific subdomain. This is
a generalization of the demand factors weighted by the generalized re-
sources backing the single demands. Within the American polity, the
value of control of the following subdomains is almost alike and higher
than the value of control of a second group. To the first belong working
conditions, social policies, disadvantaged populations, discrimination in
employment, and labor market policies, and with a small difference,
employment conditions. To a second group of less important domains
belong collective bargaining, participation of labor in management, and
internal organization of union and employers' organizations. Within this
second group the collective bargaining regulations are a little bit more
important than the other two.
Within the German polity, the values are all a little bit smaller be-
cause we have 12 instead of 9 categories. When we compare the values
only within the German polity, we see that social policies, disadvantaged
populations, labor market policies, and "Arbeitsvertragsrecht" are within
a first group for which control is relatively expensive. "Tarifvertrags-
recht", "Betriebsverfassung", "Arbeitszeitschutz", and discrimination in
employment are within a middle group and codetermination at the enter-
prise level, internal organization of union and employers' organizations,
working conditions, and labor law courts all have in common that the
value of control is relatively cheap. This is especially astonishing for
"Technischer Arbeitsschutz", for which control is much cheaper than
for the equivalent working conditions in the United States. Interpreting
this result we have to consider that working conditions are in Germany
mainly regulated by government regulations and less by bills passed by
Parliament.
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Table 5: The Value of Control for American and German Labor Policy Subdomain
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4 Demand for and Supply of Subdomain-Specific Control
We are using power of actors and value of events as reference points
for use by participants in resource exchange systems. Therefore, we are
able to derive the volume of exchange which would be at least necessary
to realize one's interests. A first important comparative information on
the two polities are the dependencies on exchange (g).
When we correlate the xli and the cij across actors for a given event,
we get a first impression of the need for profitable exchange. The
highär these correlations, the more subdomain specific control is already
poisessed by those actors most interested in that event. These correlations
äre generaliy lower in the US than in the German labor policy domain.
Computing the percent of necessary exchange for an optimal realization
of inierests results in a figure of 58 percent for the US and 39 for the
Federal Republic. Thus, the initial control distribution in Germany is
already cloier to the equilibrium distribution C* than in the US. When
we aggregate the d,,'s across actors for each subdomain and standardize
this Jüm as a perientage of the event value, the resulting figures are
indicators of excess supply of control for this event. The closer the per-
centage is to 0, the more supply and demand are already in equilibrium
beforä exchange. One would hypothesize that the more settled a subdo-
main is the mbre it should be in equilibrium. For Germany one could
argue that collective bargaining regulations, codetermination, protection
of disadvantaged groups, and labor law court regulations are more settled
subdomains than the others which raised controversies more recently,
especially labor hours standards and labor market policies. But the results
of tuble 6 do not support this hypothesis. The simple result is, both for
the US and for Germany, that the lower the value of control for a subdo-
main, the higher the percentage of control which is offered for exchange.
The original matrix D, at the level of individual organisations, is
much too dätailed for an interpretation. But we can aggregate the d,i's
for the organization types and interpret the different supply and demand
volumes it tttir level of analysis. Due to the aggregation, we are losing
about half of the exchange volumes of the disaggregated matrix. Inter-
preting the results one has to remember that pi or vi are the upper
iirnitsof the demand of actor j and the supply of conrol over event i.
Among the American actors the unions would profit most if they
could "buy" control of subdomain 3, internal organization of employers'
Political Exchange in the Labor Policy Domains
Thble 6: The Excess Supply of Control over Events as Percentages of the Value
of Events (Upper Limit of dji)
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a Translations see Table I
associations and unions, and, with some distance, of subdomains 7 and
8 dealing with disadvantaged population groups and discrimination in
employment. The greatest suppliers of control for these latter domains
are the public interest groups which are most dependent on control of
the subfields of working and employment conditions for their interest
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realization. The Federal government is above all demanding control of
labor market policy which could be supplied by the legislative commit-
tees. These latter actors are mainly demanding control of collective bar-
gaining regulations and participation of labor in management' In general,
the governmental and legislative actors demand and supply less control
than the public interest groups, unions or employers' associations. With
the exception of discrimination and disadvantaged populations, it is aston-
ishing how much unions and business could gain from exchange between
their respective organisations. Their demand and supply vectors are al-
most complementary to each other indicating very good exchange poten-
tials. But since we already know that the cleavage between labor and
business is deeper in the US than in Germany (Knoke/ Pappi 1990), one
may doubt whether profitable deals are made across this cleavage line.
For the German system the mean entries of Table 8 are smaller
compared to the ones in Table 7, indicating less dependency on ex-
change. Concentrating on the most expensive subdomain, that is social
policies for employees, the unions have the highest demand, followed
by the employers' association and the Federal government. They could
receive the subdomain-specific control mainly from mandatory social
insurance institutions and from the associations of the health system.
The power of these latter two types of organizations is based to a large
part on their control of the most valued German subdomain. One is
ieminded that at the time of the fieldwork of our study the reform of
the mandatory health insurance system was hotly debated.
Table 8 contains many interesting details which we cannot comment
on due to space restrictions. Let us only focus on the two governmental
actors, the Federal government mainly represented by the Ministry of
Labor and its departments and the German states' representatives at the
Bundesrat in Bonn. The German states (kinder) rank in the power hierar-
chy in a middle position due to their role in implementing laws. An
important part of the implementation process is the formulation of gov-
ernment regulations (Verordnungen). Even in the labor policy domain
where many regulations are enacted by the Federal Ministry of Labor
or the Federal government, the Bundesrat has often to give its permis-
sion. Thus, it is not surprising that the kinder have an excess demand
for control of that subdomain for which this type of decision making
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is most important: working conditions with respect to health and security
standards. The Uinder could pay for this control mainly from their stock
of labor court resources.
Demand and supply is more evenly distributed across the subdomains
for the Federal government than for the kinder or the parliamentary
groups and parties. This is mainly due to the division of labor between
governmental institutions. Overall, the demand for control over discrimi-
nation in employment and social policies is the highest with an excess
supply of control for labor court influence and employment conditions
with the exception of labor hours' standards.
Since we have already learned that the higher the value of a subdo-
main the lower its share offered at the open market it is no surprise
to find out that the more resourceful actors are less dependent on ex-
change than the ones with fewer resources. The correlation between
power and dependency on exchange (g:) is -.67 In the US and -.65 in
Germany; and as one would expect the volume offered or supplied for
exchange correlates positively with power, in Germany a little bit more
(r=0.68) than in the US (r = 0.59).
Assuming for a moment that the actors do indeed exchange their
influence resources on a perfect market the control distribution C* after
exchange can be derived. As one would expect, the correlations between
power and the c*,, for each subdomain are very high. In Germany none
of 12 conelations is smaller than .81, in the US none of the 9 correla-
tions is smaller than .69. Besides power, the other important factor for
satisfying exchange results is interest concentration. The more one's
interests are concentrated on a few subdomains the better, ceteris paribus,
the chances of interest realization. Only two conelations are positive
between interest concentration of actors and their final control. In the
US, the positive example is discrimination in employment, a subfield
where many public interest groups are active, and in Germany it is the
law of labor contracts (Arbeitsvertragsrecht). In this field, in which for
instance hiring and firing rules are included, we observe the activities
of business organizations which have concentrated their interests in this
subfield. These two results may give some hope to intensive minorities
without a lot of power in the labor policy domain.













































































































































































Up to now, with the exception of the last paragraph, we did not assume
that the actors do indeed exchange their influence resoufces. Following
a minimal interpretation of the Coleman model we just assumed that the
actors are familiar with their interdependencies so that they know, at
least vaguely, which exchanges would be profitable. But which type of
political exchange makes sense in a situation in which no generalized
medium of exchange is available and in which mutual trust may be an
important precondition?
Exchange on a perfect market is a theoretical concept for which
transaction costs such as mutual trust do not count. In addition, the con-
cept is silent concerning concrete dyadic interaction' The idea of a
central clearing house which clears the market at equilibrium prices
does fit the concept better than a sequence of dyadic exchanges. All
exchange has to go on at once, when the system is at equilibrium.
These strong assumptions can not be made for political exchange.
If we can expect exchange of influence resources at all, then we should
start with the simple idea of barter. A and B will be able to exchange
their influence resources only when there exists a double coincidence
of wants, that is when A demands what B can supply and B demands
what A can supply. This is exactly the type of information contained
in the D matrix. A comparison of the demand and supply vectors of two
actors informs these two actors about the possible amount of barter be-
tween them. Such measures derived from D would be plausible predictors
of actual exchange processes.
But there exist competing predictors. If trust is a precondition of
political exchange, a social network of amicable cooperation would be
a second plausible predictor, provided that exchange is at all possible
because of a double coincidence of wants.
Since we are dealing with collective decisions, the actors having the
right to make these final binding decisions are the plausible targets for
influence attempts. Part of this information should be contained in the
control matrix. But it is plausible to assume that an interest group having
the alternative of barter with another interest group or a political actor
with authority, will choose the latter one. Such a behavior would be
contrary to the exchange logic of the organizational state according to
which all consequential actors of a policy domain are treated as equal.
Some of these actors may be more equal than others, and in a parliamen-
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tary system these actors could well be the govemment and the parliamen-
tary parties. Or, to give another example, in a corporatist system, these
actors could be the peak organizations of labor, of the business commu-
nity, and the Ministry of Labor. We are exploring these possibilities as
our analysis continues.
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Chapter 7
Fencing Off: Central Banks and Networks in
Canada and the United States
William D. Coleman
This chapter examines the extent to which macropolitical institutions
shape both the formal structural relationships and informal networks in
a policy arena. By focussing on monetary policy, a policy domain where
the state seeks to constrain sharply the avenues for networks between
central banks and other institutions, the role of macropolitical variables
is brought into clear relief. In this respect, this chapter seeks to redress
somewhat the balance between macropolitical and sectoral variables in
the study of public policy. Recent analysis both of formal relationships
and of informal networks linking actors in a policy domain has tended
to focus on sector-specific variables for explaining particular policy out-
comes. Thus scholars have stressed the importance of assessing the rela-
tive capacity and autonomy of various sector-specific state agencies,
the degree of co-ordination or conflict among them, the interdependence
between these agencies and societal actors, whether these be large firms
or interest associations, and the policy capacity of these societal actors.
In many instances, these assessments have yielded results that diverge
from expectations: strong sectoral state actors and anticipatory policies
have been found in polities normally considered to possess a weak and
reactive state and reactive policies have been identified in polities
usually understood to have strong, interventionist states. Some scholars
have responded to these findings by calling for a new "disaggregated"
approach to the study of the state (Cawson et al. 1987: Skocpol 1985),
The author would like to thank the following persons for comments on an earlier draft of
this chapter: Michael M. Atkinson, Charles Freedman, Henry J. Jacek, Louis Pauly, Grace
Skogstad and participants at the conference on "Policy Networks". Research for the chapter
has been supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, grant
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a study that would distance itself considerably from the holistic state
theories developed in radical political economy or in international rela-
tions studies.
Although it is evident that studies of sectoral policy have raised
serious doubts about existing holistic state theories, it would be a mistake
to take this criticism to the point where policy studies focussed on sec-
toral variables alone. Broad institutional factors implicit to such concepts
as a state tradition (Dyson 1980), policy styles (Richardson et al. 1982),
or national paths (Grant 1989) do have effects both on the formal struc-
tures linking state and society and on the relative importance of informal
networks. These effects can be sufficiently important that the relationship
between macro-level institutions and the organization of communication
in policy arenas should be treated as a variable in its own right. Thus
we can expect that the capacity, autonomy and policy decisions of sector-
al state actofs will be more or less constrained by macropolitical institu-
tions. In some policy arenas, the specific properties of the firms or indi-
viduals in a sector, of their interest associations, and of the sector-specif-
ic state agencies will determine largely the nature of policy outcomes.
But in other policy arenas, a national policy style or state tradition may
be an important factor in shaping formal structures and informal net-
works, and thus the character of policy outcomes.
The introduction of this order of variable into policy analysis
presents a major challenge. As Hayward (1982: ll2; 1986: 19) has
noted, a policy style does not itself determine patterns of conduct in any
given instance. Rather it affects the capacity of the state to act and its
propensity to impose its will in a given situation. Hence the analyst
must identify carefully the principal characteristics of a policy style or
state tradition and then trace how these characteristics encourage net-
works among some actors and discourage them among others. Perhaps
the most systematic attempt at this kind of analysis is found in Dyson's
(1980) work on state traditions in Western Europe. He suggests (1980:
5) the concept of "'political world pictures', in terms of which political
conduct is defined, and attitudes towards the accommodation of interests
typical of different polities are closely related to an experience of author-
ity ... exercised through both public institutions and a particular set of
social relations." Hancher and Moran (1989: 280) second this emphasis
on an experience of authority and add that such national traditions may
condition which societal actors participate in a given policy arena. In
these perspectives, then, an experience of authority as determined by
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broader macropolitical institutions will enter the political world pictures
of sectoral actors, shape to some degree both who participates and the
patterns of networks among participants in a policy arena, and thereby
affect ultimately the decisions reached.
One can hypothesize further that the importance of this experience
of authority in structuring a given policy domain will vary depending
on the relative strength of state actors. Thus in policy arenas where state
actors have a pre-eminent role, macropolitical influences will be greater
than those where state actors have a weaker position. If this hypothesis
is credible, then we might expect to find some considerable evidence
of macropolitical influences in policy arenas where state actors assume
a dominant role. State-directed policy arenas are those where highly
capable and autonomous state agencies are faced with weakly developed
associational systems representing societal actors (Atkinson/ Coleman
1989). Consequently, organized interests play neither an important advo-
cacy nor a participant role in the policy process. Networking should
thus be more pronounced within the state itself than between state and
societal actors. In other arrangements such as corporatism or clientele
pluralism where societal actors are stronger, the influence of macropoliti-
cal institutions should be weaker. Here the organizational characteristics
of the sector being represented and of the associational systems them-
selves may become more important in shaping paths of communication.
Informal networks between state and societal actors are given freer rein.
In an attempt, then, to trace the effects of state traditions or broader
experiences of authority on the organization of a sectoral policy arena,
this chapter focusses on arrangements for formulating and implementing
monetary policy in Canada and the United States. Quite consciously,
the chapter utilizes what Przeworski and Teune (1970) identify as a
"most similar systems" design. In both countries not only are state actors
dominant in the policy arena, but also the rules of the game loosely fit
Dyson's "adversary" model. In addition, the shape of the monetary
policy community in the two countries assumed its present configuration
at about the same time, viz. during the Great Depression. As Hancher
and Moran (1989: 284) stress, the historical timing of the crystallization
of a policy "space" is crucial to understanding its subsequent develop-
ment. Finally, both policy communities developed in tandem with a
capital-markets based financial system (Zysman 1983). Despite several
idiosyncrasies of their respective banking systems, monetary policy in
both countries came to rely relatively quickly on market-oriented policy
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instruments rather than on moral suasion, exchange controls and informal
credit controls. These similarities are all useful because they make it
easier to isolate the effects of broader experiences of authority in deter-
mining which actors become involved in informal networks and in formal
structural ties in a policy arena.
The analysis is carried out in two steps. First, the chapter reviews
Dyson's definition of an adversary polity and then seeks to delineate
differences within this broad type relevant to Canada and the United
States. Specifically, it outlines the different experiences of authority asso-
ciated with a Westminster model parliamentary system as opposed to
a congressional system. Second, with these differences in mind, it ana-
lyzes the organization of the monetary policy communities in the two
countries focussing on three properties: the "independence" ofthe central
bank, the internal structure of the central bank and the relative transpar-
ency of the policy process, and the patterns of consultation with private
sector actors. The chapter shows that broader macropolitical institutions
in Canada facilitate a more significant limitation of informal networks
and formal linkages involving the central bank than occurs in the United
States.
1 Defining Experiences of Authority
In his study of state traditions and experiences of authority, Dyson de-
vises a nine-fold typology of different types of polity which he applies
to the study of Western Europe. One of these nine types, the "adversary"
polity which he associates with the United Kingdom, provides a useful
starting point for the analysis of national traditions in the United States
and Canada. A competitive, accusatory style of politics dominates in this
"adversary" polity. This system stresses the role of public debate, is
hostile to inter-party coalitions and power sharing, and discourages the
effective functioning of investigative machinery within Parliament' Con-
sistent with the absence of an abstract conception of the state, power
is diffused away from the center to a host of independent decision mak-
ing agencies. Accompanying political world views are "not informed
by a deep institutional consciousness or constitutional awareness but
rather by the notion of politics as a game in which the rules, which
are often vague and subject to various interpretationso are mainly the
Central Banks and Networks in Canada and the US 213
result of mutual understandings between contestants who compete for
the favor of the spectators" (Dyson 1980: 67).
Interest groups give precedence to the advocacy of policy rather than
to participation in the making of policy. Relations among groups are
fluid and pluralistic, alliances short-term, and networking extensive but
informal. With the executive perceived as a broker among contending
interests, groups compete with one another both for the ear of the state
and for members. Establishing stable, tripartite arrangements with the
government at the peak level proves an elusive quest (Dyson 1980: 66).
Rather, informal networking among elites becomes an essential tool for
policy change. In such circumstances, permanent integrating mechanisms
across sector and territory in the interest intermediation system are not
encouraged. Peak associations either will not emerge at all or, if they
do, will be mixed associations that give equal precedence to the concerns
of individual and associational members.
This conception of an adversary polity fits broadly pattems of politics
in Canada and the US. Yet within this general type, distinct experiences
of authority emerge in the two countries consistent with differences in
their basic constitutional principles.l Canada possesses what has been
termed a Westminster model of parliamentary government. Central to
this model is the principle that "the Cabinet is in charge of, and respon-
sible for, the conduct of parliamentary business" (Atkinson 1990: 337).
Accordingly, in the Westminster model, authority and responsibility are
concentrated in the hands of a ministry drawn from a party that enjoys
the support of the electorate. The concentration of authority is assumed
to be essential to good government. In contrast, in the United States,
authority and responsibility are divided among the executive, the Con-
gress, and the judiciary. Behind this separation of powers lies the notion
that authority must be dispersed in order to produce good government
and to avoid the abuse of power.
Translated into institutional forms, these principles provide somewhat
distinctive experiences of authority in the two polities. In Canada, the
norm of ministerial responsibility prevails; there is strong pressure not
The following discussion focusses primarily on executive-legislature relations. Other
constitutional principles such as federalism and charters of rights also affect experiences
of authority in the two polities. But when it comes to monetary policy, neither of these
principles is particularly relevant. Monetary policy is the responsibility of the central
government in both countries with the states/provinces having virtually no systematic
involvement. Nor has monetary policy to date raised questions of human rights.
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only to trace policy responsibilities back to one person who is in the
Cabinet but also to hold that person accountable for the exercise of those
responsibilities. Hence there is a decided reluctance to grant any bureau-
cratic agency "independence" because such a conferral of authority
would weaken the accountability and the authority of the government.
Although power might be diffused away from the center, at least the
formalities of ministerial responsibility will be retained. In the US, mem-
bers of Cabinet are accountable to the President who, in turn, shares
power with the legislature. The notion of an "independent" agency fits
better in such a system because it is broadly consistent with the idea
of dividing rather than concentrating power. If there are lines of account-
ability, they will flow both to the President and the Congress; having
two, often competing, superiors often reinforces independence rather than
weakening it.
Consistent with the US experience is a determination that the civil
service not be an independent power base in its own right. The civil
service exists to serve the President and accordingly a large number of
its senior and middle-level officials change with the election of the Presi-
dent. These officials often participate in partisan debates with the Con-
gress on behalf of the President and possess relatively less discretion
over policy (Vogel 1986: 280). In the Canadian Westminster model by
contrast, the civil service is cast as an apolitical reservoir of policy ex-
pertise and advice for the Cabinet. Its relations with ministers are con-
ducted in secret as ilre its own internal deliberations. Officials normally
enjoy considerable discretion in formulating policy to be submitted for
ministerial consideration.
These several norrns governing relationships among the chief execu-
tive, members of Cabinet, the legislature, and the civil service affect,
in turn, modes of consultation between state and societal actors. The US
system, with its aversion to any concentration of power, frowns upon
any mode of consultation that privileges one group over another or that
smacks of collusion. The preference is for "open, unstructured competi-
tion among interest groups" (Vogel 1986: 279). Relations between gov-
ernment agencies and groups tend to be more formal, with disputes
often resolved in the courts rather than in private negotiations. In con-
trast, the Canadian system is biased toward conciliatory, collaborative
networks between groups and state actors (Grant 1989: 8l). Consultation
tends to be frequent, routinized and discrete; unlike the US example,
there is a strong preference for resolving disputes in private discussions,
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with public debates being reserved for politicians only who conduct
themselves in the more stylized and less significant forum of the House
of Commons.
This admittedly sketchy summary of different national policy styles
or traditions in Canada and the United States provides us with several
key norms for comparing monetary policy arrangements in the two coun-
tries. These arangements lead to somewhat distinct patterns of communi-
cation within the respective policy communities. Such differences become
evident in an examination of three sets of relationships: the central bank
and the political executive, the internal structure of the central bank, and
the central bank and private sector actors.
2 Comparing Monetary Policy Communities
John Woolley (1984: 4) describes monetary policy as being concerned
with maintaining large economic variables - interest rates, exchange rates,
bank credit and so on - in some appropriate relationship to broad eco-
nomic goals related to inflation, employment, economic growth and inter-
national payments flows. More specifically, monetary policy involves
the regulation of the stock of money in the pursuit of these goals. Al-
though the specifics of implementation vary somewhat across states
and the instruments involved are very complex, the approach may be
roughly summarized as follows. Monetary policy involves the use of a
set of instruments that affects bank reserves or balances held on deposit
at the central bank that, in turn, are aimed at a "proximate" target
(short-term interest rates) which trigger movements in "intermediate"
targets (exchange rates, monetry aggegates) that, finally, assist in reach-
ing ultimate targets or goals (price stability, employment, economic
growth).2
In Canada and the US, expert, highly centralized and autonomous
state agencies design and implement monetary policy with minimal input
from societal interests. Interest associations and large financial firms
may be consulted for their impressions of the development of the econo-
my, but possess neither the expertise nor the capacity to act as strong
2 For a discussion along these lines, see Freedman and Dingle (1986).
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advocates or participants in the policy process. Nonetheless, different
kinds of networks have developed within the state in the two countries,
particularly as they involve the Finance Ministry and the legislature, and
between the central bank and private sector actors. In the United States,
contacts tend to be more prolific, taking place informally and through
formal representative affangements. Some of this variation appears to
be related to different national policy styles'
2.1 Central Bank Independence: Networking within the State
Assigning responsibility for the conduct of monetary policy has long
been a controversial issue in liberal democracies. On the one side are
ranged those who argue that monetary policy is sufficiently crucial to
a capitalist economy that it merits special constitutional arrangements.
A recent editorial in the Financial Times (1990) summarizes this posi-
tion: "Painful experience with the modern manipulation of monetary
policy suggests that money is more appropriately an element of the con-
ititutional framework of democracy than an object of political struggle.
Monetary stability is a necessary condition for a working market econo-
my, which is itself a basis for a stable democracy." on the other side
can be found those who argue that monetary policy is not special nor
any more susceptible to political mismanagement than any other policy
aräa. In the words of the late Harry Johnson (1972: 173)' any other
assumption "involves the establishment of a special position in Govern-
ment ior the owners of one form of property - owners of money and
of assets fixed in terms of money - a position which is inconsistent with
the principles of democratic equality and the presumption of democracy
that the purpose of government is to serve the social good"'
Cential io this debate is the relationship between the central bank,
the agency responsible for the implementation of monetary policy, and
the finance ministry. The more political leaders favor the position that
monetary policy is a special policy area, the more they will want to
assign tüe central bank responsibility for policy formulation as well as
impiementation and to keep it independent from this ministry. Practically
rpeating then, independence involves an attempt by the state to constrain
sharply both formal relationships between central banks and finance
ministries and the content of communications in informal networks'
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Political leaders in both Canada and the US have tended to favor
this independence position. Yet the institutionalization of this idea has
varied in the two countries and this variation appears to be related close-
ly to their different experiences of authority. The Canadian central bank
is formally accountable but informally independent. A direct structural
link exists between the Governor of the central bank and the Finance
Minister creating a personalized policy network. But other ties tend to
be underdeveloped and less relevant to policy formulation. The US coun-
terpart is formally independent in the sense that no formal accountability
exists between the Federal Reserve and the Department of the Treasury
or the President. But this absence of a formal tie with the executive
branch is counterbalanced by extensive informal networking with Trea-
sury officials and Congress.
Central to the monetary policy arena in Canada is the relationship
between the Bank of Canada and the Minister of Finance. The ties be-
tween the two institutions are complex because they seek to balance
the perceived need for an autonomous institution, one removed from
short-term political concerns, and the parliamentary principle of ministeri-
al responsibility, the idea that the government of the day must be ac-
countable to Parliament for policy. Canada attempts to achieve this bal-
ance in the following way: the Bank of Canada has ongoing responsibili-
ty for formulating monetary policy, but the Minister of Finance has ulti-
mate responsibility.
J.F. Ilsey, Minister of Finance during the early 1940s, articulated the
spirit of this relationship in the following way: "Conflict between Bank
policy and govemment policy cannot arise for these are the same. The
only conflict possible is that management of the bank may disagree with
the basic policy desired by the government. Should this happen, the
procedure is clear - management would at some stage be expected to
resign" (Neufeld 1958: 13). This spirit was not given legal form until
the 1960s following a series of disputes between the Governor of the
Bank of Canada and the Minister of Finance. ln 1967, a legislative
change institutionalized a procedure already adopted informally in 1961:
in the event of a disagreement between the Governor and the govern-
ment, the Minister, with the approval of cabinet, may issue a directive
to the Bank as to the monetary policy to follow. If such a directive were
to be issued (none has been to date), it is most likely that the Governor
would resign. The law takes the additional step of creating a network
by requiring regular meetings between the Minister and the Governor.
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The directive power plus the legislated network symbolize that the gov-
ernment retains ultimate responsibility.
But the implication is that, in the absence of a directive, the Bank
of Canada is responsible for monetary policy. Asked what this meant,
a close observer replied:
Full responsibility. It's not like being an agent where the Bank says, 'Well, they told
us to do this.' The Governor cannot appear before the House of Commons Finance
Committee and say Michael Wilson [the Minister] made me do it. Not on monetary
policy ... The Bank of Canada would not take that way out. As long as there is no
directive, it has responsibility for monetary policy. That is why I use the term 'co-respon-
sibility'. In practice, of course, the way that works out is that the Governor and the
Minister talk over the issues. The Minister can have his views and they will discuss
it, but ultimately the Bank feels that it has responsibility for monetary policy.3
In short, given that no directive has been issued over the 22 years that
this instrument has been available, the Bank of Canada has been pre-
eminent in the formulation and conduct of monetary policy in Canada.
This pre-eminence is reinforced by several properties of the Gover-
nor's position, properties, in turn, that discourage extensive informal
networks with other agencies of the state. First, the nature of the Bank
of Canada's Board of Directors places the management of the Bank at
arms length from the Minister. Responsibility for the affairs of the Bank
is vested in the Board which is composed of 12 persons appointed for
three year terms by the Minister of Finance with the approval of the
Governor in Council. They oversee the expenditures of the bank and
have the occasional, but important, task of selecting the Governor and
Senior Deputy Governor.a But the responsibility for the formulation and
implementation of monetary policy lies with the Governor. Second, the
Governor is appointed for a seven-year term and holds office during
good behavior. In this respect, the office enjoys similar legal protection
to that afforded to the judiciary, the Chief Electoral Officer and the
Auditor General. Third, the Bank is financially independent of the gov-
ernment, drawing its revenues from profits on its own operations.
This arrangement between the Bank and the Minister, in turn, creates
a very tenuous tie between the central bank and the legislature. The few
relationships that exist are highly formalized; informal networks are virtu-
ally non-existent. Major policy changes are announced by the Governor
3 Confidential interview, April 1989.
4 Their choice is then approved by Governor-in-Council, that is, by the Cabinet.
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and not by the Minister in the House of Commons. The Minister will
defend the Bank's policy when questioned in the House and the Gover-
nor appears before Commons committees to present his Annual Report.
But the House cannot hold the Governor accountable directly; the West-
minster model dictates that accountability be routed through the Minister.
Yet, as we have seen, the Minister does not have primary responsibility.
As a consequence, the formalities of the Westminster model create con-
siderable ambiguity when it comes to accountability for monetary policy.
Furthermore, they facilitate greatly the limitation of networks between
the central bank and members of Parliament.
In the United States, anangements for monetary policy take a differ-
ent form. The national policy style, as we have argued, leaves more
room for the creation of agencies that are "independent" from the execu-
tive branch. It also favors a larger role for the legislature in policy mak-
ing. Both of these properties shape the conduct of monetary policy
which is the responsibility of the Federal Reserve.
The Federal Reserve System, which embraces central banking as one
of its principal functions, was established in 1913. Although the original
structure of a central board based in Washington and 12 regional reserve
banks dispersed throughout the country, each with its own governor and
board of directors, remains, criticism of the System following the 1929
Crash led to major amendments in 1935 that established the modern
structure. At this time, members of the central board were given the
title of "governor" while the heads of the regional banks were down-
graded to "president", signifying a shift in power to Washington (Melton
1985: 9). An informal committee to oversee open market operations,
originally created at the urging of Benjamin Strong, the first head of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) (Greider 1988: 293), was
recognized in legislation, given the name of the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC), and assigned functions that have allowed it to be-
come the pre-eminent organization responsible for the formulation of
monetary policy. The committee is composed of the seven members
of the Board of Governors, the President öf tne FRBNY and four other
reserve bank presidents who serye on a rotating basis. All 12 presidents
attend and speak at FOMC meetings.
Unlike the Governor of the Bank of Canada who is ultimately
subject to the Minister of Finance, the FOMC is described as "indepen-
dent within government" (FRB 1985: 2). Neither the Canadian minister's
analogue, the Secretary of the Treasury, nor the President have any direct
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responsibility for monetary policy. The basis for independence was laid
in iggs when the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the
Currency were removed from the FRS Board. Autonomy was reaffirmed
following a protracted dispute with the Treasury in the late 1940s and
early 1950s that led to an agreement that Treasury would not interfere
o, fr.rurn" to tell the FOMC how to conduct monetary policy'5 Since
thai time, the FRB has guarded its independence zealously. As late as
the fall of 1989, the Congress was proposing that the Secretary of the
Treasury be made a member of the FOMC. Current Chairman Alan
Greenspan reiterated the by now traditional line in testimony before
Congress:
... expanding the Secretary's responsibilities in that manner could have significant adverse
effecis on monetary policy ... As the Administration official responsible for funding the
federal government, the Secretary might face conflicting goals - on the one hand, the
immediite need to finance the deficit at the lowest possible interest rates, and, on the
other, the obligation to support a monetary policy consistent with a stable economic
environment over time (Greenspan 1989: 9).
In short, as Beck (1987: 198) emphasizes, the President through the
Secretary is in no position to command the FOMC to do anything'6
Vari-ous institutional affangements reinforce the independence of
FOMC members. Members of the Board of Governors serve long 14
year terms. Reserve bank presidents are appointed by the respective
Lank's board of directors and not by the President. The law provides
that the boards of reserve banks consist of nine persons: three Class
A directors, who represent member commercial banks and three class
B directors, who represent the public (A and B directors are elected by
member banks in the Federal Reserve district); and three Class C direc-
tors, who also represent the public, but who afe appointed by the Board
of Governors. Nonetheless, the Board of Governors must approve the
appointment of regional bank presidents. In practice, the Governors,
particularly the Chairman of the Board of Governors, play an active role
in the seläction of presidents. The Fed does not submit its budget to
the office of Management and Budget, and key staff persons are ap-
pointed by the Board and not the Administration.
5 For an analysis of this dispute, see Clifford (1965).
6 This fact ii illustrated very well by Greider (1989: 378) when he describes the ex-
traordinary meeting between Chairman Paul Volcker and Ronald Reagan at the height
of the challenge by monetarists in 1981.
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In view of the paucity of formal ties between the Fed and the Execu-
tive branch, informal networks become the only means for communica-
tion. Chairmen of the Board of Governors serve four-year terms, are
appointed by the President, and are approved by the Senate. Given that
the Chairman enjoys considerable influence within the FOMC, sometime
during her or his term a President has an indirect opportunity to influ-
ence monetary policy through making this one key appointment. The
Chairman meets once a week with the Treasury Secretary and Treasury
officials lunch weekly at the Fed with FRB staffers. Informal networks
link economists at the Fed, the Treasury and the President's Council
of Economic Advisers; these are buttressed by regular exchanges of
personnel at the highest levels (Woolley 198q.7 The so-called Quadriad
(the FRB Chairman, the Treasury Secretary, the Director of Office of
Management and Budget, and the Chairman of Council of Economic
Advisers) also meets frequently.s In short, the Administration and the
FOMC keep well-informed about each other's concerns through informal
networks. Yet even here there are clear limits on what can be transmitted
in these channels. In the words of a Fed official, "There's no reason why
they [the Administration] can't tell us what they think. But it's very,
very clear that they could tell us what they think all they want, but they
can't tell us what to do."9
Reliance on informal networks and indirect communication creates
a more public style of monetary politics in the US. In Canada, the direc-
tive power of the Minister of Finance, coupled with the legally required
meetings between the Minister and the Governor, leave little room for
protracted disagreements. The Canadian Governor never criticizes or
offers opinions in public fora on fiscal policy. In contrast, public disputes
do occur in the US; the Administration often uses the press to increase
7 For example, Paul Volcker was former Treasury Undersecretary for Monetary Affairs,
Alan Greenspan the former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and Manuel
Johnson, the former Vice-Chairman, the former Assistant Treasury Secretary for Economic
Policy. David Mullins, the latest appointee, was formerly the Deputy Treasury Secretary
for Domestic Finance.
8 Nonetheless Alan Greenspan has rejected publicly the idea that the Quadriad be re-
quired to meet prior to each FOMC meeting. In his congressional testimony, he said:
"Although intended only to improve the coordination of economic policy making, the
proposal, by subjecting the FOMC to a more intensely political perspective, could risk
bending monetary policy away from long-term strategic goals" (Greenspan 1989: I l).
9 Confidential interview. 30 October 1989.
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the political heat on the FOMC and members of the Board of Governors
may criticize publicly both the executive branch or Congress.
If there is any analogue in the US system to the directive power of
the Canadian minister, it lies with the Congress. Congress, if it wished,
could not only end the independent status of the Federal Reserve, but
also could issue very explicit instructions on how monetary policy should
be conducted. But having this directive power rest in the hands of a
legislature rather than a government minister reduces significantly the
likelihood of its ever being exercised. Woolley (1984) notes that the
distributive consequences of monetary policy, the consequences that might
prompt a political response from legislators, do not flow from one or
two discrete decisions but from a series of decisions made over a period
of time. Monetary policy is established incrementally on close to a
monthly basis with small adjustments being made daily. The nature of
these decisions is not always obvious from a reading of policy reports
of the FOMC, and these reports are not released until after the next
FOMC meeting in any event. Hence effective oversight by the legislature
would require sustained attention to the policy area, considerable exper-
tise, and much more frequent information. The Senate and House Bank-
ing Committees concern themselves with too many other issues to give
this sustained attention to monetary policy and have little political moti-
vation to provide it in any event (Woolley 1984: chap. 7).
Yet, in contrast to Canada, the presence in the US of a legislature
with independent law-making ability has produced stronger formal ties
and much more extensive networking between the legislature and the
central bank. The Congress has increased its oversight by requiring
semi-annual reports on progress on monetary targets. These reports allow
for regular interchange between the Fed and the Congress. In addition,
the Chairman and other governors keep a set of informal contacts on
Capitol Hill to help ensure that there are no legislative surprises. The
Fed has an office responsible for Congressional affairs that tracks legisla-
tive activity and that cultivates relationships with crucial individual mem-
bers. The Federal Reserve can never take its independence for granted
politically. Woolley writes:
... congressional interest is quite real. Congress possesses the capacity to force great
changes on the Federal Reserve and on the way it conducts monetary policy. The Federal
Reserve obviously respects this capacity and fears that Congress might, in the heat of
the moment, take action largely for symbolic reasons that would later, again for symbolic
reasons, be very difficult to reverse. Fear and respect seem to lead to Federal Reserve
efforts to defuse congressional ire ... (Woolley 1984: 152).
Central Banks and Netuvorks in Canada and the tlS 223
2.2 Central Bank Structure: Creating Opportunities for Networks
The two central banks at the heart of monetary policy formulation in
Canada and the US also differ substantially in the way in which they
are organized internally. These differences, in turn, reflect the varying
experiences of authority found in the two countries. They also yield
rather different styles of monetary politics: policy making in Canada is
more hierarchical, secretive and discouraging of networks that might
provide societal input; the US system creates more opportunities for
networks and thus appears better able to incorporate a greater diversity
of views on policy issues.
Primary responsibility for monetary policy in Canada is concentrated
in the hands of one person, the Governor of the Bank of Canada. The
Bank of Canada Act confers on this person the power to chair the Board
and to act as chief executive officer. Only the Governor and the Senior
Deputy Governor are both directors and full-time officers of the Bank.
As the Bank states: "Since other directors are expected to devote only
a small part of their time to the affairs of the Bank and are not required
to be expert in the field of monetary policy, it would not, as a practical
matter, be reasonable to look to them to formulate monetary policy ..."(BOC 1987: 6).In no way then is a directorship of the Bank of Canada
analogous to being a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
The Governor oversees the day-to-day conduct of monetary policy
utilizing a Management Committee composed of senior Bank staff and
reports on the Bank's activities once a week to an Executive Committee
of the Board composed of the Governor, the Senior Deputy Governor,
two to four directors, and the Deputy Minister of Finance (without a
vote). The Executive Committee does not act as a decision making body
on monetary policy; decisions are taken by the Governor following con-
sultation with the Management Committee. Rather, the Executive Com-
mittee acts as a conduit to keep both the Board and the Department
of Finance informed of policy developments.
Such a hierarchical structure is perfectly consistent with the Westmin-
ster model - one person, the Governor, reports to the Minister who is
responsible to Parliament. And it produces a style of politics also to be
expected with such a model. Policy discussions within the Management
Committee are confidential as are briefings to the Executive Committee.
The Bank does publish the remarks of the Governor given to the approx-
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imately eight meetings per year of the Board of Directors, but these
remarks simply convey the Governor's point of view on the current
economic sitüation. They give little, if any, indication of various policy
options being considered or of the subjects of debates internal to the
Bink. The Management Committee works on the model's conception
of the civil service; Bank staff provide the Governor with impartial ad-
vice in secret. Hence it is not an arrangement that encourages the expres-
sion of diverse views in formulating policy. The Management Committee
exists to serve the Governor who oversees the staff of the Bank and
hence chooses its members.
The US system, as should already be clear, differs significantly.
whereas the canadian system concentrates power in the hands of one
person, the American system devolves power onto a council of persons.
Members of the FOMC share the responsibilities that the Canadian gover-
nor controls. The formation of this council virtually ensures that it will
reflect a greater diversity of views than is found in the Management
Committee of the Bank of Canada. In fact, when appointing members
of the Board of Governors, the President is required by the Federal Re-
serve Act to "have due regard to a fair representation of the financial,
agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests, and geographical divi-
si,ons of the country." Reserve bank presidents, who also sit on the
FOMC, are not chosen by the President but by the boards of directors
of the regional reserve banks. Although the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board normally has considerable influence over these appoint-
ments, again the chances are greater for a diversity of viewpoints. Conse-
quently, even though the h.e^terogeneity of the US policy making group
should not be exaggerated,l0 there is a greater likelihood of diversity of
views at the policy center in the US. The Reserve Bank presidents and
boards of diräctors have their own networks that allow them to keep in
relatively close contact with developments in their regions and serve as
a conduit of information on regional conditions to the FOMC (Melton
1985; Reagan 1963). Woolley's (1984) close study of FoMC minutes
prior to 1975 and a casual reading of FOMC records of policy actions
l0 For example, Woolley (1984: 56) notes that 45 per cent of the governors between
1955-l9St had been ecönomists; 26 per cent of them had had a previous career in
private finance. At the time of writing, 8 of the_presidents,had a..Ph.D.^in economics,
ä were lawyers, and 2 had a financial/business background. S,imilarly, four of the six
governors had economics doctorates and two had a business/finance background. One
seat on the Board was vacant.
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since 1975 indicates that dissent occurs frequently within the FOMC.
Governors and reserve bank presidents seek out their own personal
sources of information as a supplement to analysis by the Fed staff. In
short, the council structure at the center of US monetary policy affords
more opportunities for networking, and provides a better forum for the
voicing of dissent and for a dialogue between competing policy para-
digms than the hierarchical Canadian arrangement.
Similarly, although the US network has been criticized for its secrecy
(Goodfriend 1986), it is still more open than its Canadian counterpart.
The FOMC does publish, after the fact, a summary of the minutes of
its meetings. These summaries suggest where there have been disagree-
ments and make it possible to divine who the dissident governors or
presidents might be. The FOMC also publishes a record of its policy
decisions which again can be decoded yielding a useful assessment of
the direction of monetary policy. There are no public records of these
kinds in Canada. Consistent with the national policy style, rhe US ar-
rangement seeks to avoid concentrating authority while favoring networks
that encourage more public debate and interchange over policy.
2.3 Private Sector Consultation
Our analysis of national policy styles suggests that consultation with
private sector actors should be somewhat more informal in Canada than
in the US. The US national style should demand a somewhat more for-
malized and more competitive interest group process. Some differences
consistent with these hypotheses do exist but it would be a mistake to
overemphasize them. In order to identify these differences, it is useful
to distinguish between the formulation and the implementation of mone-
tary policy.
When it comes to the formulation of monetary policy in the two
countries, the two countries have similar approaches: systematic consulta-
tion does not take place. In both Canada and the US, increased reliance
on market-based instruments in the 1980s at the expense of moral sua-
sion, exchange controls and selective credit controls which had been
more common previously, makes the policy process more distant to poli-
cy advocates. Decisions on intervention are made on a day-to-day, incre-
mental basis and are not discussed publicly for fear of distorting market
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responses. In interviews in both countries, interest associations and finan-
cial firms indicated that they did not really "lobby" on monetary policy.
If the central banks have any constituency in civil society that is
relevant to policy formulation, it would be academic economists. Partici-
pation in monetary policy formulation more and more requires profession-
al economics credentials. Here some one-way networks exist in the sense
that central bank economists participate in academic economics circles
and may even invite certain specialists to serve as "scholars-in-residence."
Still academic economists do not have a direct influence on the formula-
tion of monetary policy.
When it comes to policy implementation, thete are again important
similarities between the two countries. Both central banks rely on close,
reciprocal working networks with major financial institutions. Through
offices in major financial centers, the Securities Department of the Bank
of Canada and the Open Market desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York (which assume respectively primary responsibility for imple-
menting day-to-day monetary policy) maintain daily contact with money
market participants. These contacts help the central banks to understand
the psychology of market players and to gauge the reception these play-
ers are likely to give to their actions. When it comes to broader policy
issues relating to the functioning of money and capital markets, the Bank
of Canada meets regularly with the Investment Dealers Association of
Canada and the New York Fed with the Securities Industry Association,
the Public Securities Association, and the National Security Traders Asso-
ciation which represent dealers and traders.
It is when one moves beyond the discussion of the technicalities
of monetary policy implementation to gaining assessments of the impacts
of monetary policy that some differences between the two systems
emerge. Such assessments, in turn, are used by policy-makers in subse-
quent attempts to formulate policy. Central to understanding the differ-
ences between the two countries is the fact that the Federal Reserve
functions in a congressional system and must pay close attention to influ-
encing the legislature. The Bank of Canada needs to be far less con-
cerned with the Canadian House of Commons. Influencing a Congress
requires a different kind of politics than influencing a single minister.
In a political battle, the central bank has to be able to draw on the ready
support of its own political constituency, what Woolley (1985: 338-339)
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has termed the sound finance community.ll Hence, we hypothesize that
the linkages between the central bank and the sound finance community
will need to be rnore institutionalized and extensive in the US with its
stronger legislature than in Canada where the legislature is largely irrele-
vant. In noting these links, we by no means imply that the sound
finance community participates in the making of monetary policy. Rather,
we suggest that institutions will function such that the members of the
FOMC are more likely to be aware of this community's concerns than
those of any other community. The FOMC will also be better placed
to communicate its own policy objectives and to highlight its political
worries to this constituency than to any other. If that community needs
to be mobilized politically to fight attacks from the Congress, the FOMC
has the linkages to make this need known.
Four structures provide a framework for networking with the sound
finance community. First, as we have noted, in appointing members of
the Board of Governors, the President is required by the Federal Reserve
Act to have "due regard" to a broad representation of economic interests.
Practically, this provision has meant that at least one member of the
Board, if not more, has a banking background. Second, the Act provides
for a Federal Advisory Council composed of twelve persons, one ap-
pointed by each reserve bank district. Invariably, the members of this
Council are chief executive officers of commercial banks. It is required
by law to meet four times per year in Washington with the Board and
it may discuss any or all aspects of the Board's responsibilities, including
monetary policy.12 Third, as we have noted, commercial banks elect three
of their own as Class A directors of reserve banks, and three others as
Class B directors. Nonnally, the Class B directors are chief executives
of non-banking corporations. A cursory survey of Class B and Class C
directors (appointed by the Board of Governors) indicates that 1 in 6
is not from a business background; academia provides most of the non-
11 Woolley understands this community to consist of those who wish to protect the cur-
rency against inflation, to sustain rnoderate, stable economic growth, to dampen sharp
market fluctuations, to promote prolitable strong financial institutions, and to protect the
financial system from panics.
12 Two other advisory councils exist, the Thrift Advisory Council and the Consumer
Advisory Council. Neither has relevance to monetary policy. The Thrilis council helps
keep the FRB infonned of development in the savings and loan sub-sector while the
Consumer council arises out of the FRB's responsibilities for consumer protection in
the financial services area.
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business directors. In short, the commercial banking community has a
decisive say on the composition of the boards of directors of the regional
reserve banks. These directors, in turn, play mediating roles in networks
joining the Board of Governors and the sound finance constituency in
each of the regions of the US.
Finally, distinct from the Bank of Canada, the Federal Reserve has
a direct role in the regulation and supervision of commercial banks. The
Board of Governors is the primary federal regulator for bank holding
companies and for state chartered banks that belong to the Reserve Sys-
tem. The FRB also plays a direct role in running the payments system
and has been assigned responsibility for enforcing consumer protection
laws in the financial services area. In its own words the Fed argues:
Experience gained in the process of supervision and regulation also enables monetarlr
policy decisions to be made against the background of a more practical and knowledge-
able assessment of how such decisions will flow through and interact with the banking
and depository system and financial markets generally (FRB 1985: 87).
Virtually to a person, interviewees at the FRB echoed this sentiment;
the formal ties and informal networks that develop between the regulator
and the regulated foster a certain mutuality and again attune the FRB
more closely to commercial banks than to any other constituency.
Relationships between the Bank of Canada and the sound finance
constituency do not have the formal framework found in the US and thus
tend to take the form of informal networks only. Whereas it is normal
for a banker to be a governor of the Federal Reserve, such ties are es-
chewed in Canada. Except for the first governor of the Bank of Canada,
all governors have been chosen from within the Bank following a long
central banking career. Similarly, formal ties with the banking sector are
not allowed in forming the Bank's Board of Directors.l3 No structure
similar to the FAC exists in Canada. Rather, regular consultations take
place in informal private networks with the chartered (commercial) banks,
who are both the largest direct clearers and most important players in
money markets. The Governor meets two to three times a year with the
chief executive officers of the domestically-owned chartered banks. To-
13 Members cannot be a director, officer or shareholder of a chartered bank or any other
member of the Canadian Payments Association that maintains a deposit with the Bank,
or an investment dealer that acts as a primary distributor for new Government of Canada
securities (BOC 1987: 9). Generally, they are lay persons in the sense that they are
normally neither economists nor persons with any specific expertise in monetary policy.
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gether with senior staff, he also meets twice a year with the Executive
Council of the Canadian Bankers' Association (CBA) which is composed
of the chief operating officers of the domestically-owned chartered banks
plus two representatives of foreign-controlled banks. Finally, the research
staff of the Bank has ongoing contact on policy issues related to pay-
ments and money market matters with expert committees of the CBA.
Contacts also take place with representatives of other financial institutions
(trust companies, financial co-operatives, insurance firms), but these net-
works are less well-established and viewed as less important by the
Bank.
Nor are there analogous institutions to the other linkages found in
the US. The Bank of Canada has no regional reserve banks or even
regional committees that provide a direct tie to sound finance communi-
ties in various parts of the country. The Bank does not have any direct
responsibilities for the supervision of banks. In short, in contrast to the
US monetary policy arrangements, a restricted amount of informal con-
sultation is the only avenue available to the Bank when seeking informa-
tion on the impact of monetary policy. That said, macropolitical struc-
tures do not require the Bank of Canada to broaden its networks. Its US
counterpaft must keep a close watching brief over Congress and be pre-
pared to play congressional political games. The Fed's more structured
relationship with the sound finance community is an asset in this process.
3 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to examine how patterns of consultation in a
specialized sectoral policy arena are shaped by broader macropolitical
institutions. It took as its starting point monetary policy communities in
Canada and the US, both dominated by state actors, and hence both
particularly susceptible to macropolitical constraints. It argued that within
the broad outlines of Dyson's adversary polity, impoftant institutional
differences exist between the central governing institutions of Canada
and the United States. Canada inherited from the United Kingdom a
Westminster model of parliamentary government. This model tends to
concentrate power in the hands of the Cabinet and to balance this con-
centration by drawing clear lines of responsibility between ministers
and the parliament. Parliament itself acts as a deliberative assembly and
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functions primarily as an organization exercising surveillance over the
government/cabinet. The civil service is non-partisan and prefers closed
collaborative consultation in informal networks with private sector groups
as it offers advice and prepares policy proposals for the consideration
of ministers. The United States departed consciously from this Westmin-
ster model stressing, in particular, the avoidance of the concentration of
power. Accordingly, the US constitution provides for the division of
power between the legislature and the executive. Congress is a law-mak-
ing body in its own right and not simply an institution exercising surveil-
lance over the President. In dispersing power, the US system attenuates
lines of responsibility and creates a setting that indulges willingly the
creation of "independent" agencies. The fear of a concentration of power
also favors supplementing closed, collaborative relationships with more
open, competitive relationships and with formalized interest representation
on advisory councils.
The question then became whether these contrasting experiences of
authority had any impact on the organization of the monetary policy
space. The analysis reveals differences that clearly correspond to these
macropolitical constraints. The Canadian central bank was formally tied
and subject to the Minister of Finance with the Minister possessing a
legal directive power. In practice, this formal tie was not supplemented
by extensive informal networks. The US central bank prided itself on
its "independence" from both the Secretary of the Treasury and the Con-
gress, with the President through the Secretary having no direct control
over the actions of the Federal Open Market Committee. But in the
absence of a formal tie, a wider range of informal networking betrveen
the Federal Reserve and the executive branch has developed. In addition,
whereas the Bank of Canada spoke primarily to parliament through the
Minister of Finance, the Federal Reserve had a direct relationship with
Congress, reporting on its activities twice a year. Managing this formal
tie required extensive informal politicking between the Fed and individual
members of Congress.
Consistent with the US bias in favor of dividing power, the conduct
of monetary policy was left in the hands of a council of appointed gov-
ernors and reserve bank presidents. This structure leaves the way more
open again to a variety of networks and thus encourages a certain diver-
sity of viewpoints and the introduction of competing policy paradigrns.
In contrast, the Canadian system concentrated authority in one person,
the Governor, and gave this person complete control over the choice of
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advisers. These arrangements significantly dampen networking with other
actors, whether within the state or outside, and thus decrease the likeli-
hood of diverse viewpoints and the introduction of competing policy
paradigms. If diversity of opinion and a broader range of ideas help
improve the efficacy of policy making, then the Canadian system suffers
in comparison with that of the US.
Finally, when it came to relationships between central banks and
private sector actors, differences were less pronounced but still related
to macropolitical institutions. In both countries, little lobbying or advoca-
cy politics was evident when it came to the formulation of monetary
policy. But active networks were maintained with private sector firms
and associations for managing the implementation of monetary policy.
Differences arose only when it came to the methods used by the respec-
tive banks for collecting information on the impact of policies. The US
system formally incorporated banking interests into the policy process
through the appointment of members of the Board of Governors, the use
of the Federal Advisory Council, the selection of reserve bank presidents,
and through contacts developed in the supervision and regulation of
banks. None of these mechanisms occurred in Canada. Rather, again
consistent with the Westminster model, relations with private sector
groups tended to be limited to informal, private and collaborative net-
works.
When all of these findings are reviewed, they provide considerable
support for treating relationships between macropolitical institutions and
the patterns of communication in a policy arena as a variable. Yet it
must also be cautioned that the analysis may be more straightforward
when policy arenas are state-directed. If a policy arena is structured in
another way, whether it be corporatist, clientelist, or pressure pluralist,
the analysis is bound to become more complex. In each of these types,
the organizational development of intermediary associational systems
becomes a more central variable. And their level of organizational devel-
opment will be affected by the autonomy and capacity of sector-specific
state agencies, the specific characteristics of the sector being represented
(banking, coal-mining, dairy farming, consumers), the labor relations
system, as well as macropolitical institutions. Despite these added com-
plexities, careful comparative analysis of public policy must include basic
macropolitical institutions in its assessment of communication patterns
and its evaluation of policy outcomes.
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Chapter 8
Policy Networks, Opportunity Structures and
Neo-Conservative Reform Strategies in Health Policy
Marian Döhler
I Introduction
This chapter is about structures and strategies, or to be more precise:
it deals with the "goodness of fit", i.e. the t'unctional matching, between
a new political strategy aimed at expanding market forces and the estab-
lished institutional configurations in health care. Starting with the election
victory of the British Conservative Party in 1979, several changes in
government took place in the early 1980s which were perceived as going
beyond the normal routine of alternating pafiy governments. The leader-
ship takeover by Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan and the Christian-
Liberal coalition in the Federal Republic of Germany appeared to mark
a watershed between the Keynesian interventionist strategy of the post-
war period and a "neo-conservative" strategy which intended to replace
governmental regulations and interventions, if not completely then percep-
tibly, by virtue of the free market. The novelty of neo-conservatism
consisted in the explicit revocation of the post-war consensus regarding
the active role of the state for counterbalancing the business cycle and
smoothing out social inequalities. The scope of this strategic reorientation
seemed to be more than a national extravagance since the general aim
of the three governments coincided to a remarkable extent: the goal was
"more market and less state".
After roughly a decade of neo-conservative reform efforts, it became
increasingly certain that the extent to which the rhetoric of the political
I would like to thank Jens Alber, Christa Altenstetter. Henry A. Landsberger. Bernd Marin
and Renate Mayntz for their helpful cornments on an earlier version of this paper which
was presented at the International Sociological Association XIIth World Congress of Sociology.
9-13 July 1990, in Madrid, Spain.
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"turn-around" - in Germany it was called Wende - had been translated
into reality differed from country to country. In principle, it is fair to
maintain that compared with the Christian-Liberal government in the
FRG, the Reagan and Thatcher governments were more successful in
enforcing a market-oriented strategy. This leads one to question what
the conditions for changing the political course are and how variances
in the government's enforcement capacities can be explained. In the
following, this problem is examined by analyzing first, how successful
the three governments have been in broadening the sphere of market
governance in health care and second, which variables have guided the
course of policy.
2 Reconciling Institutional and Network Approaches
In recent years a number of researchers have stressed the potential contri-
bution of a "neo-institutional" approach (March/ Olson 1984) to the anal-
ysis of public policy (most notably Zysman 1983; Evans/ Rueschemeyer/
Skocpol 1985; Scharpf 1987). The main difference between the traditional
understanding of political institutions which has centered around formal
organizations such as parties, parliaments and interest groups and the
neo-institutional way of thinking consists of the range of what is sub-
sumed under the term institution. In the modern version, patterns of
behavior, structures of economic distribution and non-political organiza-
tion are also defined as institutions. One of the outstanding innovations
of neo-institutional thinking was to take into consideration the organiza-
tion of markets as an important independent variable (Zysman 1983;
Hollingsworth/ Lindberg 1985; Hall 1986), which shapes actors' incen-
tives through different forms of economic coordination, i.e' markets or
hierarchies.
A common denominator of these scholarly works has been the obser-
vation that governments' performance in economic problem solving has
differed, even in cases when the same strategy was employed. Having
found that the outcomes of governmental policy differ even when the
economic problems are similar, the neo-institutionalists have rejected
explanatory models in which economic pressure is assumed to be the
major determinant for public policy. Instead, political institutions are
being reconsidered as independent variables. One of the important conclu-
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sions is the thesis that the state capacity for successful intervention in
the industrial or welfare spheres depends on the congruence between
the interventionist strategy and the institutional structure of the policy
field.
Another train of thought running through the neo-institutional litera-
ture is the emphasis on prior choices for future decisions (Weir/ Skocpol
1985: 120-125; Krasner 1988). This consideration has far-reaching impli-
cations for the understanding of the political process. By pointing out
that the current institutional structure of a policy field has to be regarded
as the result of historical course setting, it is no longer sufficient to look
at policy outcomes simply from the perspective of pressure group activi-
ties or to expect that "socially rooted demands" (Weir/ Skocpol 1985:
117) have an immediate and undiluted impact on public policies. If there
is anything novel in the institutional perspective then it is the notion of
institutional resistance to change. Following Stephen Krasner, an institu-
tional perspective has to ask two basic questions. First, "how institutions
persist over time, even though their environment may change", and sec-
ond, "how preexisting structures delimit the range of possible options"
(Krasner 1988: 91). The impact of institutions on political life was nicely
summarized by Johan Olson:
Institutions regulate the use of authority and power and provide actors with resources,
legitimacy, standards of evaluation, perceptions, identities and a set of meaning. They
provide a set of rules, compliance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioral norms
which buffer environmental influence, modify individual motives, regulate self-interested
behavior and create order and meaning (Olson 1988: l3).
The conditioning impact of political and economic institutions on the
strategies of corporate actors, the feasibility of political options and the
contents of public policy has been convincingly demonstrated. However,
what is usually referred to as "institutional arrangement" not always
contributes to conceptual clarity. In order to avoid the often used mere
enumeration of institutions with relevance for the political process, in
this chapter the institutional argument is merged with parts from interor-
ganizational and network theory. Since Hugh Heclo (1978) and Peter
Katzenstein (1977) first introduced the network metaphor into political
science, the idea of analyzing policies in terms of sectoral systems of
patterned interrelations between public and private actors has gained
increasing recognition. The concept of the policy network, as it is applied
in the following sections, denotes a sectoral system of interaction which
links public and private actors through resource dependencies (Benson
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1982: 148) around a certain policy subject such as energy, environment
or health. Those segments of the political system which are relevant for
health policy are treated as a part of the network.
The integration of institutional and network perspectives aims at
bypassing the weak points of each approach and combining the advan-
tages. In simplified terms it can be said that the strength of institutional-
ists was to elucidate the political impact of institutions, while they often
lack an integrative perspective which allows one to grasp the single
components of an institutional arrangement as interrelated and not as a
more or less arbitrary set of institutions. Network analysts, on the other
hand, have been strong in the detailed description of interaction systems
but often are not able to link mappings of relations to underlying institu-
tional frameworks. By stressing the institutional foundation of policy
networks, this chapter tries to combine the strength of both analytical
concepts.
Aside from the heuristic value of the term policy network which
forces the analyst to think in terms of an interrelated set of structufes
and actors and thereby could help to avoid the traditional "dialogous"
construction of politics, as is reflected in political science idioms like
"government-industry relations", there are several conceptual ideas, de-
rived from interorganizational and network theory, which could be used
to the benefit of policy analysis. First, the application of the network
perspective provides a joint framework for the comprehension and classi-
fication of structural characteristics of a policy field in different countries.
Second, analytical dimensions like the cohesion of a network, the inter-
lacing between actors and between institutions, or the separation from
other networks create instructive points of reference for comparative
research. Finally, the idea that interactions inside a network are fused
into a set of standard operating procedures points to an important source
of "structural inertia" (Hannan/ Freeman 1978). Policy networks achieve
stability through interactive routines which cannot be overturned straight
away because often they form the basis for cooperative relations between
the äctors and already the problem perception is taking place under the
influence of belief systems and cognitive maps structured by the network.
The argument of this chapter is based on the notions of network
structLrre, stability and goodness of fitlselectivity. The basic idea is that
policy networks, as a result of previous political decisions, produce cer-
tain interactive routines, modes of interest intermediation and decision
making. This "sedimentation" (Lehmbruch 1990: 223) of preceding poli-
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cies, which is likely to suit particular political strategies, is a process
that closely resembles the notion of "lock-in" (Arthur 1989) used by
economists to explain the persistence of certain technologies despite a
competitive environment. In other words, the "old" political strategy has
left its imprint on the institutions and patterns of collective behavior of
a policy network, so that the successful enforcement of a "new" strategy
depends on the opportunities embodied in the network.
Political opportunities emanate, inter alia, from the goodness of fit
between new strategy and old structure. This implies thinking of policy
networks in terms of constraints and opportunities which both together
form a particular strategic adaptability, i.e. selectivity. An important
assumption in support of this consideration is the idea of a "contingent"
relationship between network structure and policy (Scharpf 1978: 362).
This assumption refers to the fact that each policy has a distinct set of
"interaction requirements" (Scharpf 1978 363). Whereas the political
strategy "more market" may be confronted with serious resistance in
one country, it may be facilitated by the network structure of another.
Thus the feasibility or the incompatibility between an established network
structure and a new policy is inferred only from the practical confronta-
tion of both.
For the problem at hand, it is justified to expect a certain degree
of misfit since the formative influence of regulations and other forms
of public control and guidance, inherited from the interventionist post-
war era, will most probably be at odds with a strategy based on competi-
tion and market transactions. This suggests that a change in the operating
structure of the network is an important precondition for the enforcement
of a new political strategy (Olson 1988: 10). Such a "window of oppor-
tunity" which provides a reform-minded government with a starting-point
for introducing a new strategy is most likely to appear if the network
structure is modified, for example, by the occurrence of a new actor or
the break-up of coalitions, or runs into a state of instability caused by
economic troubles or technological innovations (Aldrich/ Whetten 1981:
381f.). As opposed to the standard type of analysis, where policy net-
works are treated as steady state structures, in the followin g a dynamic
research strategy is employed in which network structures are analyzed
at three points in time.
In a first step the policy network is analyzed at the point of change
in government (t). Then, in a second step (t,), the confrontation between
old structure and new strategy over a period of time is described. This
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Figure 1: The Structure of the Argument
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confrontation is expected to result in goodness-of-fit outcomes ranging
from a to d. Finally, the impact of the new strategy on the old structure,
and vice versa, are described (q) by detecting the alterations in the net-
work structure and the degree to which the new strategy has been suc-
cessfully implemented.
3 The Characteristics of Health Policy Networks
In the following sections, health policy networks in Britain, the US
and the FRG aie described through five characteristics each of which
is divided into a more fine-grained set of variables: (1) the structure of
the network, (2) the actors and their coalitions, (3) the governance struc-
ture, (4) patterns of interaction, and (5) the strategic selectivity of the
network.
Heabh Policy Nehvorks 241










,t- incenliv e structure
_ 
prevailing mode of
\ resource allocationL Public/private mix

















(1) Structure: The structure of a policy network encompasses the organi-
zation of medical care administration and those parts of the political
systems which are relevant for health policy. In this conception of policy
networks, the state appears not only as part of the structure but also as
an actor with a distinct strategic orientation (see infra). An analysis of
the network structure has to take into account the four different features
of centralization, system integration, sectoralization, and homogeneity.
With respect to their degree of centralization, the health policy net-
works of the three countries represent a maximum of variety. Certainly,
the most centralized system is Britain's National Health Service (NHS).
At first sight, the NHS, founded in 1948, appears as a hierarchically
ordered and governed system of service delivery where political responsi-
bility and control is concentrated at the top, i.e. in the Department of
Health and Social Services (DHSS) which is empowered with consider-
able authority to guide the subordinated administrative entities. However,
it also true that the center-periphery relations were never unambiguously
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in favor of the central government (Haywood/ Alaszewski 1980; Hunter
1983). The Health Authorities, which are mainly responsible for hospital
care, and the Family Practitioner Committees (FPCs), the Health Authori-
ties' equivalent for ambulatory care, traditionally had an impervious life
of their own. This was caused by the collegial administration of NHS
agencies recruited from the ranks of physicians, nurses, technicians, local
government officials, including union representatives, and finance officers
(Levitt/ Wall 1984: 47ft.). The result was a strong orientation of the
NHS periphery towards professional and local needs. The professional
point of view was additionally reinforced by an extensive system of
advisory boards reaching from the bottom to the top of the DHSS. Even
though the NHS administrative machinery was never simply in the weak
position of being a recipient of central orders, the control of the DHSS
over NHS finances and manpower planning has placed the central gov-
ernment in a more powerful position than the German or American feder-
al governments.
The United States shows quite an opposite picture. According to an
influential analysis, US health care is a "non-system" (Alford 1975:
257). This is as true for the organization of health services as it is for
the structure of decision making in health policy. Aside from the two
dominating programs Medicare and Medicaid, through which the basic
health needs of the elderly and the poor are financed, there is a large
variety of governmental health activities scattered among a vast universe
of programs such as the Black Lung Program, the Children Mental
Health Services Program, the Indian Health Service etc. (Altman/ Sapols-
ky 1981: Appendix A). There is no clear focus of state involvement in
health care. Governmental activities range from financing, to regulation
and the direct provision of medical services, for example through the
medical care system of the Veterans Administration. This fragmented
pattern is continued in the administrative structure of the federal govern-
ment (Rosenthal 1983). The Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) is divided into four principal units and alatge number of highly
autonomous "bureaus", each of which is entangled in its own idiosyncrat-
ic operating ideology based on different clientelist linkages and adminis-
trative traditions (Starr 1982:283-289). A first step towards an internal
homogenization was achieved, however, through the creation of the
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) which became responsible
for both Medicare and Medicaid in 1978 (Balutis 1984). Yet compared
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to Britain and the FRG, the structure of the US network has to be char-
actenzed as highly fragmented and decentralized.
In between the two extremes stands the German case with a decen-
tralized but fairly clear cut structure. The core of the German health
policy network is formed by the statutory health insurance (Gesetzliche
Krankenversicherung, GKV), comprising roughly 1,200 individual health
insurance funds, which are organized into seven peak associations and
financed through equal contributions from employers and employees. This
system is largely based on collective bargaining between the associations
of health insurance funds and organized providers. On the provider side,
physicians are organized into 18 regional associations of fund doctors
empowered with quasi public legal status and bargaining rights on behalf
of their member physicians. Hospitals are more loosely organized into
11 private peak associations. The federal government has mainly the
function of providing statutes and guidelines for the self-administered
associations. There are two federal ministries, the Department of Labour
and Social Affairs and the Department of Youth, Women, Family, and
Health, each of which is primarily concerned with preparing federal
legislation. Due to German federalism, there are no subordinated adminis-
trative units charged with implementing policies. The main responsibility
of carrying out federal policies is delegated to the associations which
in fact gives a strong decentralized bias to the German health policy
network.
System integration refers to the institutional as well as ideological
affiliation of the health policy network with the welfare state. The con-
sideration behind this variable is based on the expectation that the inte-
gration of health care into the broader sphere of the welfare state serves
as a protective cover since a political assault on health care is perceived
as threatening the whole system. Whereas in the German and British
cases, health care has strong ties to welfare state structures and belief
systems, the integration of the US network is almost non-existent (Lau-
mann/ Knoke 1987: 39lff.). The reason is simple. The underdeveloped
American welfare state provides neither a solid institutional nor an ideo-
logical fundament for lending stability to any other subsystem.
A somewhat different relation between a network and its environment
can be described as sectoralization. This denotes the degree to which
a network is protected by isolation from other policy domains. Sectorali-
zation is important for regulating spill-overs of problems or strategies
from other networks. The most well developed sectoralization is to be
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found in the German case, where the health policy network in many
aspects is differentiated from the federal government and other branches
of social security, both with respect to organization and financing. A less
well developed sectoralization is encountered in Britain. Although the
NHS is a separated administrative branch of its own, it remains part of
the state apparatus which controls the money flow. Thus the central
government does not have to bridge a gap between separate sectors. The
US health policy network, finally, is too fragmented to maintain any
solid boundary as is confirmed by the lack of an autonomous ideology
of health care such as the notion of health as a "special commodity",
which prevents it from being treated as just any other commodity in
Britain and Germany.
An analysis of network structures would be incomplete without mak-
ing reference to "networks of networks" (Heclo 1978: 106). Each policy
network is likely to consist of several segments in which a number of
actors and institutions are clustered around a special issue such as hospi-
tal policy, health research or drug safety (Laumann/ Knoke 1987). The
number of distinguishable network segments is a good indicator of the
internal homogeneity which in turn is a crucial measure for institutional
and interactive stability. The most heterogeneous health policy network
can be found in the US where virtually dozens of governmental health
programs are distinguished from each other (Milward/ Francesco 1983)
through special bureaus in the DHHS, often narrowly defined target
groups, especially appropriated funds and political supporters located in
different congressional (sub)committees. The German and British net-
works are characterized by a much stronger homogeneity. Although in
both countries subsystems exist, in contrast to the US, they are inter-
locked by means of a common source of money, a joint institutional
framework and an almost generalized entitlement by the whole popula-
tion.
(2) Constellation of Actors: Actors are the dynamic element of every
network. Not everything is a result of their intentional behavior, but
nothing happens without the participation of corporate or individual ac-
tors. Of decisive importance for the stability and the strategic selectivity
of a policy network are the questions of who participates, how many
actors are involved, and how they are linked to each other and to the
network.
It will not come as a surprise that in health policy, the state, the
medical profession, hospital and insurance (third party) associations are
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involved in all three countries. But when it comes to the participation
of employers associations and labor unions, some marked differences
appear. Whereas in the FRG, labor unions and employers are firmly
integrated into the decision making process of the self-government of
the health insurance funds and a corporatist institution at the federal
level, no such participation is institutionalized in the British NHS. Al-
though labor unions are present as representatives of the NHS work
force, British employers appear to have almost no interest in health poli-
cy. This finds a simple explanation: The NHS has socialized the costs
of medical care via taxes and is a comparatively cheap arrangement so
that there is no need for employers to change anything in the health
domain. In the US network, up to the late 1970s, labor unions were
much more involved in health policy than employers.
In all three countries the state appears not as a united but as a multi-
ple actor. The "balkanized" structure of the US federal government has
already been mentioned. But also in Britain, the state does not act as
a single entity. The DHSS has to deal with a "syndicalist" NHS, in
which Health Authorities, FPCs, and local governments all pursue their
own agendas. This is also true for the FRG where the major rift is be-
tween the federal government and the 11 regional governments (Länder)
which are powerfully represented through the Bundesrat, the second
chamber of the German parliament.
In his classic essay on "The Semi-sovereign People", Schattschneider
has argued that "the number of people involved in any conflict deter-
mines what happens" (Schattschneider 1960: 2). This assumption is par-
ticularly valid for the internal operations of a policy network. The
greater the number of actors involved, the more difficult it becomes to
achieve a cooperative or consensual solution. The number of relevant
actors in the health policy network is much greater in the US than in
Britain and the FRG. This is not simply based on the sheer size of the
country, but is rather a result of the balkanized state structure and the
lack of a European-like system of peak associations which effectively
have monopolized interest representation. In short: "fragmented groups
face a divided government" (Wilson 1982: 225). Additionally, the entry
for new actors is almost unrestricted in the US system because of its
multiple points of access. As early as the 1970s, the number of actors
increased (Scott/ Lammers 1985), most notably through the establishment
of subcommittees in Congress and the foundation of new influential
interest groups such as the American Federation of Health Systems, a
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commercial hospital association, or the consumer group American Associ-
ation of Retired Persons. In the British network, there is no such increase
in the number of actors. In general, the ability for new actors to partici-
pate in health policy is more restricted since the NHS provides a domi-
nant and fairly exclusive framework for interest representation' The cor-
poratist network in Germany has not only a small number of participants
but has also been most effective in containing the growth and entry of
new actors.
The linkage or interdependence between the actors is also an impor-
tant structural variable that has a strong impact on the mode of coalition
building. The British and the US health policy networks are characterized
by varying degrees of vertical linkage of the actors. In the British NHS,
due to its hierarchical structure, there is no need for a horizontal coordi-
nation of actors. Therefore, only vertical interconnections between state
and associations are of relevance. In the US, the vertical linkages also
dominate mainly through policy subsystems, earlier often referred to as
"iron triangles", which link parts of the Washington bureaucracy to a
congressional committee and a number of affected interest groups. Verti-
cal linkage is not only a measure for inter- but also for intra-organiza-
tional relations (Lehmbruch 1984: 68f.). In this respect, the German
health policy network is characterized by a strong vertical integration
of single associations which is complemented by an additional horizontal
interdependence between peak associations at the regional and the federal
level which is a result of corporatist concertation. This latter trait distin-
guishes the German case from Britain and the US where there is almost
no horizontal linkage in health care and no indicator for corporatist poli-
cy processing.
A higher degree of convergence appears with respect to coalitions
in health policy. In each of the three countries the providers of medical
care could find powerful coalition partners. In the FRG physicians were
in charge of close connections with the pharmaceutical industry and both
actors in crucial decisions could count on the political support of the
CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union/ Christian Social Union). Health
insurance funds were highly fragmented and often divided in the face
of physicians' associations. In Britain, the British Medical Association
(BMA) was able to rely on a clientelist relationship with the DHSS
(Eckstein 1960). However, there was also tension between center and
periphery where the medical profession, nurses, local government repre-
sentatives and administrators often joined forces against the DHSS. In
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the US, providers were in the strongest coalition. The medical profession,
represented powerf'ully by the American Medical Association (AMA),
was not only linked through interlocking directorates with the market
leaders among the voluntary health insurers, i.e. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield, but additionally formed a close coalition with the American Hos-
pital Association (AHA). Consumers were classified only as a "repressed
coalition" (Alford 1975: l5f .) with almost no influence.
For the problem at hand, the question which policy instruments are
available for the government to intervene with in the health sector is of
central concern. Governmental control of the resource flow in health care
is most effectively developed in Britain. The DHSS, with approval by
the House of Commons, determines the annual budget of the NHS, has
the right to appoint administrative personnel at the regional level and
is equipped with a fairly broad political leeway derived from so-called
"delegated legislation" (Hayhurst/ Wallington 1988). The day-to-day in-
strument of governing the NHS are the so-called circulars which contain
advice and guidance to the NHS administration (Parkin 1985). This form
of executive orders is also available to the American president but his
power to influence the health bureaucracy is more circumscribed. In
addition, the president has to share the budget power with Congress
which is eager to preserve its budgetary prerogative. In the German case,
neither executive orders nor a direct parliamentary or executive control
of the health budget are regularly available as policy instruments. The
civil law system has a tradition of detailed legislative drafting and execu-
tive orders are a rather unusual instrument. Finally, the greatest part of
the health budget is not included in the annual budget bill of the federal
government but is administered by the para-fiscal health insurance funds
or, in the case of hospital investment, is appropriated by the Länder. If
the federal government wants to achieve a change in health expenditure,
it has to enact a federal law which alters the range of services provided
or population covered. This rule generally applies to health policy making
so that in Germany there are no convenient political opportunities for
intervening in the policy network.
(3) Governance: In recent years "governance" has become nearly a
catch-all phrase running the risk of losing its analytic value. Therefore,
the term is used here in a more restricted sense, namely as a description
of the mode of economic coordination in the health sector. By taking
into account the problem at hand, governance could be split into two
components. First, the coordinating mechanism for resource allocation
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in health care and second, the publiciprivate mix which refers to the size
and the vitality of the private health sector in relation to its public coun-
terpart. Both components of governance help to shape the actors' incen-
tiväs, i.e. their pieferences for or against markets in health care and
the opportunity for governments to deploy the private sector's impulse
for expansion as a lever to strengthen market forces.
With respect to governance structures, the differences between the
three countriäs are straightforward. In Britain, governmental planning is
responsible for the predominant part of health resources, whereas in
Germany, the flow of resources is controlled mainly by collective bar-
gaining between physicians, health insurance funds and, increasingly,
hospitals. Even though during the 1970s numerous regulatory laws were
enaited for health care, the dominance of private, market-oriented trans-
actions in the US has prevailed.
In Britain, the private medical sector has experienced a modest eco-
nomic consolidation in the post-war decades but its size was almost
negligible when Margaret Thatcher came to power. In 1980, only 5 per-
""nt of the British population 
had private health insurance and only
153 out of 1,560 non-psychiatric hospitals were private (DHSS 1987a:
55; IHA 1988). It is interesting to note that due to its existence in the
shadow of the NHS, the private medical sector in Britain has adopted
a subsidiary and non-expansive market strategy'
A similar attitude can be found in Germany, although the private
sector in health care is much greater than in Britain. In 1980, roughly
10 percent of the population was covefed by private health insurance
and, at any rate, about two thirds of German hospitals were owned by
voluntary ässociations or private owners. Additionally, office-based physi-
cians, who worked as fund doctors, have the status of private, indepen-
dent professionals. Despite the significant size of the private sector in
health care, there has been no expansionist tendency or even a political
demand for broadening the sphere of the free market to physicians' pri-
vate hospitals or health insurers. As in Britain, private owners of health
care faciiities have flourished and thus had no cause to demand a change
of the status quo. Neither the British nor the German government thus
had the opportunity to build on an already existing demand for more
market in health care.
The US differed in many respects from both other cases but most
important was the developmental timing that determined the relation
between the public and private sectors. As opposed to Britain and Ger-
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many where public or semi-public organization models were introduced
early enough to lay down the "terms of trade" for the public/ private
relationship, in the US the private sector was already well developed as
the welfare state expansion started during the New Deal (Stevens 1988:
145-148). This applies primarily to the prevailing system of private insur-
ance carriers and employment-based health insurance whose existence
diluted public interventions. For example, as Medicare and Medicaid were
enacted in 1965, this most important expansion of the government into
the health sector was not linked to an expansion of governmental organi-
zations. For the most part, the program administration and claims proces-
sing was delegated to private insurance firms which acted as "fiscal
intermediaries" on behalf of the government. Thus, despite increasing
state intervention since the mid-1960s, the private sector always played
a powerful role in determining the incentives and operating ideology of
health sector governance. The Reagan administration, therefore, faced
a situation in the early 1980s in which the path for private sector solu-
tions was already paved. Health care was undergoing a large scale com-
mercial transformation (Relman 1980; Stan 1982:420-449) and a stron-
ger orientation towards competition and market transactions, liberated
from restrictive governmental regulations, dominated the health policy
agenda.
(4) Patterns of Interaction: This dimension refers to what is usually
called "policy style", i.e. a standard operating procedure which is con-
stantly used in a particular policy sector or on the national level. As
far as possible, in this chapter patterns of interaction should describe
sectoral rules of decision making, interest intermediation and conflict
regulation because the possibility of sectoral variations has to be consid-
ered. Often, however, it will be very difficult to distinguish sectoral
from national styles (Freeman 1986).
This is particularly true for the British case where lhe consultation
principle has dominated in most policy sectors, including health (Page
1985: 103ff.; Haywood/ Hunter 1982). This consensual way of policy
making was expressed, for example, by the use of Royal Commissions
which based on a broadly representative membership had the function
of preparing crucial political decisions. Another manifestation of the
consensus-oriented decision making style was the extensive consultation
between government and interest groups which preceded the passage of
nearly every law (Haywood/ Hunter 1982: l54ff.).
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At first sight, this pattern of interaction closely resembles the rules
of the game in Germany. In the health policy network, negotiations
between the federal government and peak associations have dominated
the political decision making process. Because in corporatist bodies of
interest intermediation, such as the Concerted Action in Health Care
(Konzertierte Aktion im Gesundheitswesen, KAG), antagonistic interests
like physicians and health insurance funds are integrated and urged by
the federal government to coordinate their behavior according to general
systemic needs, this arrangement can be called corporatist concertation
(Lehmbruch 1984: 62). An important by-product is a close and institu-
tionalized policy interpenetration between the federal government and
the associations as well as between the associations. Aside from the
KAG, this interpenetration takes place through the Bundesausschuß der
Arzte und Krankenkassen, a corporatist decision making body that has
to issue obligatory guidelines about pharmaceutical prescriptions, materni-
ty treatment, the regional distribution of physicians etc. (Thiemeyer 1984:
91). This self-government is extremely difficult for the federal govern-
ment to bypass in policy formulation as well as in policy implementation.
What makes the difference between German and British health policy
making is the ability of the British central government to declare certain
policy issues as "non-negotiable" (Page 1985: 94) which is tantamount
to the government's exercising final decision making authority. In Ger-
man health policy, the resource dependence of the federal government
on the association network, resulting from the extensive delegation of
regulative and allocative functions towards self-administration, almost
excludes this kind of action. Thus collective bargaining is not only the
dominating mode for structuring the economic relations between corporate
actors but also applies to the process of making health policy.
Again, a different picture is presented in the US where health policy
is dominated by a pluralist mode of decision making and interest inter-
mediation. Although the federal government intervened during the 1970s
by means of several regulatory initiatives in the health domain, the "de-
mand for legislation" (Feldstein 1977) by interest groups and a competi-
tive and controversial relationship, which also applies to the governmental
system of "adversarial institutions" (Kelman 1981: 131), dominates the
health policy network. As opposed to the more cooperative relations in
the German and British health policy networks, the logic of decision
making in the US is aptly described by one single question - "who
wins?" (Feick/ Jann 1988: 215). For generations of political scientists,
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it was also clear that only in a few cases the US government would
resist group pressure (Page 1985: 94). The non-cooperative and competi-
tion-oriented operating ideology is reflected in a 1975 decision by the
Supreme Court in which collective agreements between the medical pro-
fession and third-party payers were classified as a "violation of the anti-
trust laws" (quoted in Glaser 1978: 182). This underlines the American
aversion against negotiated prices and reflects the preference for market-
governed relations even in health care. One implication of this mode of
interaction is that the underdevelopment of cooperative structures of
decision making, which enable the actors to ground their behavior on
complementary expectations, supports ad-hoc interactions with few stable
patterns and high insecurity.
(5) Selectivlry: This network dimension is used as a summarizing
category that results from the constraints and opportunities provided by
the previously mentioned variables. The selectivity of a policy network
determines the range of available strategic options. There are two dimen-
sions of network selectivity: One coming from the "real world" of actual
institutions, actors and legal regulations and a second dimension derived
from the "world of ideas". The structure of the policy network is impor-
tant for both dimensions. First, the real world dimension permits only
a certain number of strategic options and second, the network serves
as an object of reflection by the actors, as an "institutionalized thought
structure" (Milward 1982: 472).If decision making elites are scanning
for solutions to urgent problems, the existing structures are permanently
retrieved and thereby form a cognitive map which structures the problem
perception and the range of "thinkable" alternatives for the status quo.
This effect will be amplified if current solutions are linked to successful
political junctures and are stored as collective memories.
The selectivity of health policy networks at to and their strategy
profiles can now be summarized as follows. Both German and British
health policy strategies during the 1960s and 1970s appeared to be con-
tinuous. In Britain, the health policy repertoire focused on central budget-
ing, organizational reform and an increase of managerial efficiency (Hay-
wood/ Alasziewsky 1980:26-43). The German health policy was charac-
teized by an expansion of the realm of collective bargaining in the
hospital sector (Thiemeyer 1984: 93ff.), the formalization of political
negotiations through the introduction of the KAG and an increasing reli-
ance on self-administration ("Vorrang der Selbstverwaltung") as the prop-
er arena for problem solving. The American health policy strategy
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seemed to be more discontinuous during the two decades preceding the
Reagan presidency. Despite the apparent predominance towards expanding
the realm of governmental responsibility for health care financing, strate-
gic orientations teetered between competition and regulation. Aside
from the already mentioned regulatory and interventionist programs, there
were also legislative steps aimed at more competition since the early
1970s. Most important in this respect was the HMO Act of 1973 which
provided federal funds for qualified Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs) (Brown 1983). The intention behind this law was to spur the
growth of competitive HMOs as a means of restraining health care ex-
penditures. Although of limited success, the Nixon administration enacted
a pro-competition law when this strategy was nearly unthinkable in most
Western countries. Even under Jimmy Carter, some competitive elements
were included in the health planning program (Havighurst 1981). The
following table provides a summary of the network conditions at the time
of the change of governments.
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Table 1: Health Policy Networks in the Early 1980s
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4 The Process of Policy Formation
As the majority of industrialized nations had to face the end of the
post-war growth period in the aftermath of the first oil price shock in
1973, health care expenditures, as a substantial portion of welfare service
provision, became increasingly scrutinized and marginal costs were ques-
tioned. However, the perception of health care cost increases, the strate-
gic response and the radicalism of changes in health policy strategies
from regulation to competition have not been simply determined by
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economic pressure but rather influenced by the selectivity of health poli-
cy networks. Because conservative parties functioned as upholders and,
once in office, as executors of the pro-market strategy, their role in the
formation of the neo-conservative strategy is emphasized.
One important point of departure is the programmatic commitment
of the conservative parties to the existing structures and principles of
the welfare state in general and health care in particular. In Britain as
well as in the FRG, a neo-conservative approach was confronted with
a well elaborated set of fairly binding principles in favor of the status
quo in health care. The dominating policy legacy in Britain was the
"welfare consensus" which included the government's commitment to
full-employment policy, an active economic policy and the pronounced
belief in the British welfare state model (Kavanagh 1987: 26-60). This
comprised the basic construction principles of the NHS: public ownership
of health facilities, the responsibility to guarantee free access to health
care for everybody without financial barriers and the method of tax fi-
nancing. Similarly, in Germany a set of "Strukturprinzipien" guided the
CDU's philosophy in health policy: self-government, a plurality of statu-
tory health insurance funds, the solidarity principle and the idea of subsi-
diarity (Wittkämper 1982: 256-269).
The different degrees to which both parties embraced a neo-conserva-
tive approach to welfare is determined, inter alia, by the structure of
party organization and the interpenetration with external interests. Where-
as the Conservative Party in Britain is strongly centralized and hierarchi-
cal, the German CDU is a "polycentric" party with a complex and highly
decentralized structure which inhibits the central formulation of policies
(Schmid 1984, 1988). In the Conservative Party, the "Tories", with a
commitment to preserve the essentials of the welfare consensus, were
superseded by the "dries". This group, led by Margaret Thatcher, obvi-
ously had abandoned the consensus principle. Thus, around 1979, several
prominent conservatives entertained the idea of replacing NHS tax fund-
ing with insurance contributions (Krieger 1986: 91; Howe 1981) and
supported a massive roll back of social service provisions. This radical-
ization became possible due to a lack of institutional barriers which could
have restricted programmatic changes in the Conservative Party.
In the German CDU, it was not possible to overcome the resistance
of supporters of the status quo. Neo-conservatives, although in a strong
position in the late 1970s and early 1980s, never dominated the process
of policy formulation. As opposed to the British Conservatives, the Ger-
Health Policy Networks 255
man cDU has a well developed division of labor which allows internal
party organizations to occupy "their" policy domains (Schmid 1988:
228t.). Neo-conservatives, mainly recruited from the party's auxiliary
organization of industry and business middle classes, have been thus
unable to intrude in the social and health policy area which is the do-
main of the christian Democratic trade unionists. Another institutional
variable that had a dampening effect on the radicalization of the cDU's
health policy was the existence of a system of special committees (Bun-
desfachausschüsse) which were highly important for the formulation of
policies during the 1970s. The special committee for health is an excel-
lent example for the party's consociational pattern of decision making
and its close interpenetration with the health policy network since almost
every special interest group was represented (Döhler/ schmid 1988: 21-
30). Due to the principle of unanimity, the committee's recommendations
for a health policy program, which was adopted by the CDU in 1978,
were biased in favor of status quo-oriented interests.
The process of formulating a neo-conseryative health policy was
affected by quite a different set of factors in the uS. Due ro the lack
of a well-organized and disciplined party apparatus, institutional factors
linked to the party organization played no important role. Instead, the
following three events deserve mentioning. A first intrusion into the
established structure of governance resulted from the emergence of the
Federal rrade commission (Frc) as a new actor in the health policy
network. During the second half of the 1970s, the FTC actively chal-
lenged several anticompetitive practices by the American Medical Associ-
ation and private health insurance carriers (Döhler 1990: 205ff.). The
file of antitrust suits against health providers had a two-fold impact.
On the one hand, several strategic positions of providers, based on the
ability to restrict competition, were destabilized, for example, by prohibit-
ing interlocking directorates between insurers such as Blue cross and
Blue Shield, and the AMA. On the other hand, it was dernonstrated
that health care could be treated as any other branch of the economy.
closely connected to the antitrust debate was a second development that
contributed to the penetration of pro-market doctrines: the spill-over of
the deregulation debate into the health domain. Already under president
carter, the successful deregulation of fixed prices in civil air traffic cre-
ated a momentous precedent that invited being taken over in other
policy areas. The weak sectoralization of the health policy network facili-
tated the new strategy's full adoption in health care. Third, the congres-
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sional defeat of Jimmy Carter's Hospital Cost Containment Act in 1979,
which stipulated public controls on hospital rate setting, was perceived
as a vital signal that the period of regulation in health policy had come
to an end. Concomitantly, health economists like Alain Enthoven devel-
oped a flood of pro-competition plans (Enthoven 1980; Sigelman 1982).
As opposed to Britain's scientific expertise, which was dominated by
the social administration school with strong preferences for the NHS and
against the market strategy and to Germany, where pro-market proposals
were filtered and diluted by a complex party organization, no such selec-
tivities slowed down the victory of the market strategy in the US.
5 Bringing the Market Back In
5.1 Great Britain
The Thatcher government did not immediately launch radical changes
in health policy. During the first phase of Conservative health policy
between 1979 to mid-1982, the strategy of the Thatcher government
aimed at budget austerity and a strengthening of the private medical
sector. In the 1979 Conservative Manifesto, there was no announcement
of a cut-back in public health expenditures. Although there was repeated
conjecture that the Thatcher government might cause a funding crisis
of the NHS in order to justify a radical reform, the government's health
expenditure does not support this suspicion. Compared to other sectors
oflhe British welfare state such as housing or education, in which there
was a real decline in public expenditure, the NHS fared comparatively
well, although the small increases afe no more than a "stand-still budget"
(Klein 1985: 44; Social Services Committee 1986, 1988).
Similarly moderate was the increase of co-payments as a means of
financing the NHS. Although the Conservatives extended prescription,
dental and optical charges perceptively, the share of charges as percent-
age of total NHS expenditures only increased from 0.3 percent in 1979
to 0.9 percent in 1988 (Social Services Committee 1988: 77). With re-
spect to privatizing the costs of the NHS via charges, the Conservatives
were entangled in an inherited policy. Traditionally, low income groups
are exempted from paying charges because otherwise free access, one
of the basic philosophies of the NHS, would be no longer secured. Even
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the Thatcher government shied away from breaking with this principle
(Birch 1986: 165-169). Thus, the means test has to be employed as an
instrument to ascertain claims for being exempted from charges. Because
of the high administrative costs of the means test, an increase in charges
may raise rather than cut costs (Klein 1985: 46).
The most popular argument for explaining the moderate health spend-
ing approach and the lack of other reform measures refers to a culturally
rooted, nearly sentimental public support for the NHS. However, the
overwhelming public support is based rather on an encompassing cover-
age so that the whole population is a beneficiary of NHS services. In
addition, among the actors in the British health policy network there was
almost no supporter for a market-oriented strategy. Even from the per-
spective of the government, except for ideological reasons, there was no
plausible explanation for a strategic change since the NHS is not only
a really cheap system but also allows almost complete control of health
spending. These traits served as an institutional cover against extensive
reform plans.
This is not to say that the Thatcher government had completely aban-
doned the idea of implementing radical reforms. The most notable move
during the first period in office was a ministerial working group on
alternative methods of NHS financing which was appointed in 1980
by then DHSS secretary Patrick Jenkin. The report, leaked to the press
in late 1981, caused a furor because it entertained the idea of switching
NHS financing from taxes to insurance contributions. The Thatcher gov-
ernment strove to calm matters down with the famous slogan "the NHS
is safe with us" (New Statesman 1982) which was to become part of
the successful election campaign of 1983. This, however, should not
lead to the conclusion that the Thatcher government was very receptive
to public opinion.
An indicator for the restricted role of public preferences as a deter-
rent to unpopular political measures is the "contracting-out" initiative(Asher 1987; Key 1988). Since June 1980, the DHSS issued several
circulars in which the Health Authorities were requested to invite tenders
from private firms for ancillary services such as cleaning, laundry or
maintenance. This initiative has met not only resistance from the affected
NHS work force, but also from NHS administrators, who had misgivings
concerning quality of the work performed by private firms which em-
ployed both badly-paid and -educated workers. In 1987, roughly 20 per-
cent of the service contracts were assigned to private competitors; this
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percentage, however, stagnated (Sheaff 1988: 97). NHS employees, with
the support of their administrators, had successfully resisted a more ex-
tensive privatization through "in-house tendering", i.e. NHS workers
made concessions which allowed them to undercut private competitors.
Contracting-out, however, did not affect the core of medical service
provisions in the same way as did the reversal of the Labour Party's
policy rowards the private medical sector (Higgins 1988: 84-90). In their
1979 manifesto, the Conservatives had announced to end the "vendetta"
(Conservative Party 1979: 26) of the Labour Party against the private
medical sector. In May 1980, the government abolished the Health Ser-
vices Board (HSB), a kind of regulatory agency which was introduced
in 1976 to reduce private "pay beds" in NHS hospitals. The Health Ser-
vices Board's right to approve private hospitals was transferred to the
DHSS, which had an obvious interest in the expansion of private facili-
ties. Additionally, Health Authorities were allowed, for the first time,
to contract with commercial providers (Mohan/ Woods 1985: 207), thus
enabling hospital physicians to devote a larger percentage of their work-
ing capacities to the private sector, and for persons with an annual in-
come up to 8,500 pounds private, health insurance contributions were
made tax deductible (Forsyth 1982: 62),
Interestingly, the private medical market was not very receptive to
Conservative policies. After a short boom period in the early 1980s,
when provident societies experienced a growth rate in subscribers of 25'9
percent (1980) and 13.9 percent (1981), the annual growth declined to
1.9 percent in 1983. Obviously, the infusion of "bad risks" through the
expänsion of occupational insurance schemes for blue collar workers has
diitorted the fragile risk srructure of private health insurers (Higgins
1988: 98-99) which were forced to dramatically increase their premiums.
This, in turn, has reduced the attractivity of private health insurance.
Private hospitals were entangled in a similar chain of events. The deregu-
lation of the HSB, at first sight, appeared to be an effective measure for
unchaining market forces. Between 1980 and 1988, the number of private
hospitals increased from 153 to 204 (IHA 1988). But a second look
reväals that the boom period ended as early as 1984 when already 199
private hospitals were in operation. Ironically, the unleashed private hos-
pital growth itself produced obstacles to a further expansion. Due to a
high spatial concentration in wealthy south-east England and the Thames
region and the declining supply of privately insured patients, private
hospitals have experienced fierce competition resulting in occupancy rates
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as low as 50-60Vo in general and even down to 40Va in London (Econo-
mist 1988: 35).
The fact that the private medical sector proved not to be an effective
strategic lever fbr the Thatcher government has to be explained by mak-
ing reference to the governance structure and the ensuing incentives
for private market actors. This is not so much a question of siie, but
rather a question of the interrelations between public and private sectors
and the ensuing strategic opportunities. Of crucial importance for under-
standing the restricted growth capacity is the assumption that private
health insurers and hospitals in Britain have accommodated their market
operations to the existence of the NHS as the dominant health-care pro-
vider. Private providers are thus not equipped to compete with the
NHS, rather they have been forced to occupy subsidiary "niches" result-
ing in high specialization, a selective market strategy and an overall
restricted capacity for expansion.
The first period of Conservative health policy ended with an almost
undisputed NHS administrative reorganization in April 1982, the basic
outlines of which originated from a report of a Royal Commission al-
ready appointed by the Labour government. The 1982 reorganization
reduced one tier of the NHS administration by merging 90 Area Health
Authorities and roughly 220 District Management Teams into 192 District
Health Authorities (DHAs) (Ham 1985: 28-32). Although in the public
perception this administrative reform was largely a technical measure,
the accompanying DHSS circulars indicate a strategic direction consistent
with the Conservative's overall philosophy. The DHAs were provided
with greater leeway to cooperate with the private sector and were thus
cautiously pushed into "an almost entrepreneurial role" (Davies 1987:
306). This suggests that the selectivity of the health policy network is
far more receptive to a strategy in which already existing structures are
slowly transformed into a business-like direction, as opposed to a blunt
promotion of the private health sector or using the budget as an instru-
ment of reforming the NHS.
As was demonstrated at the beginning of the second period of con-
servative health policy, the Thatcher government passed through a pro-
cess of policy learning. Especially the new DHSS secretary Norman
Fowler appeared to have leamed the lessons of the previously mentioned
events. Fowler replaced the Conservative's rhetoric of decentralization,
local autonomy and the virlues of the private sector with the language
of a centralist new managerialisru which was dominated by strategic
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orientations like "value for money", "managerial efficiency" and "upwards
accountability".
The new managerialism started as a transfer of efficiency strategies,
such as the Treasury's Financial Management Initiative, from the Civil
Service into the NHS (Pollitt 1986: 156-158). The first step was the
introduction in January 1982 of so-called "annual reviews", in which the
chairmen of Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) have to defend the
financial and service performance of their RHA before the DHSS. Since
September 1983, a set of "performance indicators" has upgraded the
review process into "a tighter system of control and accountability than
had ever existed in the previous history of the NHS" (Klein 1989:204).
Thus the balance in the center-periphery relation has shifted increasingly
in favor of the center, i.e. the DHSS.
The single most important step in the government's managerial offen-
sive was to become the "Griffiths Reform", named after the chairman
of the NHS Management Inquiry Team, Roy Griffiths, formerly managing
director of a large supermarket chain. Appointed by Norman Fowler in
early 1983 and charged with looking for a more efficient use of re-
sources within the NHS administration, the group presented its inquiry
report in October of same year (DHSS 1983). The Griffiths team, domi-
nated by managers from private business firms, offered a blunt diagnosis
and a no less clear-cut therapy. The lack of "leadership" and clear re-
sponsibilities caused by consensus management was identified as the
single most important flaw in managerial efficiency. To take remedial
action, the Griffiths team proposed the introduction of a new administra-
tive elite, the general management, on every level of the NHS with the
exception of FPCs. General managers, preferably recruited from the ranks
of private business firms, should function as "final decision takers". This
new hierarchy, equipped with broad and exclusive decision-making rights,
was to be led by a NHS Management Board and a Health Services Su-
pervisory Board inside the DHSS, both of which should provide central
guidance and thus overcome bureaucratic inertia. After an unusually short
period of public consultation, the DHSS started implementing the Grif-
fiths reform in June 1984 and completed it during 1986.
The Griffiths reform did not represent a complete break with the past
but rather an upgrading of an already existing drive towards manageri-
alism. However, without altering the public/private mix, the Griffiths
reform has changed the governarrce structure of the NHS by linking the
incentives of managers to an increasingly tight efficiency regime.
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Although the clear majority (62vo) of roughly 800 newly created posi-
tions were filled with former NHS administrators, with only L2% re-
cruited from outside (Harrison 1988: 66), it is justified to regard the
general management as a new actor in the network. The new elite very
rapidly adopted an independent attitude towards other occupational groupi
and local interest representatives by adhering to the three "Es", efficienry,
economy, and effectiveness, as a new operating ideology. Their expanded
rights to ovemrle consensus management furthermore chalrengid the
established balance of power, particularly with regard to nurses and,
to a lesser extent, the medical profession (pollitt et al. 19gg). In addi-
tion, the integration of general managers into a complete new hierarchy
has further strengthened central control capacities, although it has not
affected the network stability.
Although the Griffiths reform remained within the range of the estab-
lished health policy repertoire, its successful implementation was far from
being self-evident. Ever since its inception the NHS has been fairly ro-
bust in preserving a particular organizational culture (Bourn/ Ezzamel
1986) based on the predominance of the medical profession, a consensus-
oriented and representative decision-making style and the prerogative of
the "curing and caring" philosophy over efficiency. Thar the thatcher
government successfully challenged this entrenched operating ideology
was due to the characteristics of the British health policy network. Firii,
the opportunity of a spill-over of the managerialist attitude from the civil
service in the NHS was due to an incomplete sectoralization of the
health policy network. second, and probably even more important was
the activation of governmental authority reserves by utilizing policy in-
stuments such as delegated legislation and the central government's
ability to declare a policy issue as non-negotiable. Not only the com-
pletely unusual appointment of private businessmen as advisors and the
concomitant renunciation of the use of a Royal Commission was a breach
of the standard operating procedures, but furthermore, the governments'
declaration of the essentials of the Griffiths recommendation as non-nego-
tiable degraded the "consultation" phase into a mere acclamation event.
Finally, the Griffiths Report was implemented via delegated legislation
so that parliamentary hurdles were bypassed. All in alr, the Griffiths
Report has marked the beginning of a new policy sryle. consulting inter-
est groups is no longer regarded as a "must" of a proper decision making
process, but rather as an annoying procedure, as confirmed by the vigor-
ous conflict with the pharmaceutical industry in l9g5 ovei a "limited
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list" of reimbursement for drugs (Hogwood 1987: 57f.) that proved the
ability of the government to violate the interests of even powerful actors'
In the following two years, the conservatives' health policy was
consistent with the managerialist orientation. The contracting out initiative
was vitalized throughout 1983 and was extended to the "buying in" of
medical services. DHAs were asked to reduce waiting lists for non-emer-
gency operations, such as hip-replacement, by having them performed
in private hospitals (Birch 1985) in contract with private firms for the
purpose of "iniome generation" or to engage in joint ventures with the
priuute sector (West 1986). All these initiatives contributed to a blurring
-of 
th" fo.-"rly clear boundaries between the NHS and the private sector,
a goal explicitly formulated in the 1983 Conservative Manifesto: "We
shäll promote closer partnership between the state and the private sector
..." (Conservative Party 1983: 296)' However, the NHS was not endan-
gered, rather a new kind of symbiotic relationship emerged which helped
6oth sectors to supplement each other and strengthened the weight of
efficiency concepts within the organizational culture of the NHS (Hay-
wood/ Renade 1988:24).
A clear example for the upgrading of a centralist managerialism was
the new administrative atrangement for the FPCs which became effective
in April 1985. By making the FPCs directly responsible to the DHSS,
the ministry not only improved its interventionist capacity in face of the
NHS periphery, i.e. by influencing the appointment of FPC members and
the introduction of performance reviews but also contributed to a newly
acquired managerialist self consciousness of FPC administrators (Ellis
1985: 610f.) who hitherto had a reputation for having servants' attitudes
towards the medical Profession.
The Thatcher government entered a third phase of their health policy
strategy during 1985. The crucial innovation was the increasing reliance
on the idea of internal markets, first introduced to a greater public by
the already mentioned American health economist Alain Enthoven (1985).
This renewed twist of the Thatcher governments' health policy could be
described as variant c (see Figure 1) of the goodness-of-fit relationship.
The mutual accommodation between strategy and network structure in
the British case stands for a partial success of governmental reform ef-
forts and an intelligent accommodation of the pro-market strategy to
the opportunity structure of the British health policy network.
By focussing on the primary care sector, comprising the FPCs and
their contractors, i.e. general practitioners, dentists, pharmacists, opticians,
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the Thatcher government discovered another object for their strategy: the
economic cartel of medical providers which restricts the range of choice
for a sovereign consumer. Presumably, both British antitrust authorities,
the Office of Fair Trading and the Monopolies and Merger Commission,
acted on behalf of the Thatcher government when they launched a series
of inquiries into restrictive trade practices among medical providers. Their
critical reports caused the government to implement several deregulation
measures. In 1984, opticians lost their dispensing monopoly and the
market for spectacles was radically liberalized. One year later, the gov-
ernment urged the General Dental Council to ease the restrictive regula-
tions for dentist's advertising and in early 1989, even the medical profes-
sion came under pressure to ease their advertising rules (Harvard 1989).
When the Thatcher government issued a green paper on "Primary Health
Care" in 1986, even the opportunity of introducing competitive HMO-
like "health shops" was discussed. However, the white paper "Promoting
Better Health", issued in November 1987 (DHSS 1987) and implemented
in 1989, included several concessions to the BMA. Whereas the idea of
introducing competitive units of physicians was dropped, the govern-
ments' strategy swung back to managerialism by broadening the monitor-
ing authority of FPCs vis-ä-vis general practitioners. The decisive nuance
of this policy episode was to focus on competition within existing struc-
tures of the NHS rather than looking for a private sector alternative.
On the verge of its third period in office, the Thatcher government
appeared to have an ambiguous attitude towards the NHS. On the one
hand, with John Moore, nick-named "Mr. Privatization", an outspoken
dry had been appointed as new DHSS secretary. On the other hand, no
radical policy proposal emerged on the agenda. The familiar managerialist
ideology was presented once again in a different rhetorical guise: "The
NHS ... is not a business, but it must be run in business-like way" (Con-
servative Party 1987: 50). Then, unexpectedly, conventional wisdom
about the unlikeliness of radical reforms (Klein 1985) seemed to lose
its relevance.
During the 1987 election campaign, the Labour Party succeeded to
mobilize public doubts about the conservative's "safe in our hands" pro-
mise and thus triggered a heated debate about the shortcomings of Con-
servative health policy (Withney 1988: 5ff.). The public diagnosis of a
dramatic NHS underfunding, resulting in urgent problems such as
nursing shortages, hospital and operating theatre closures, and delayed
or even cancelled operations forced the Thatcher government to an un-
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precedented extent into the political defense. In this critical situation
Margaret Thatcher decided to take the offensive. In late 1987, the gov-
ernment announced for the first time a radical reform of NHS funding
which was to be prepared by a "NHS review group" set up in January
1988.
This review process, which lasted a year, was a vivid confirmation
of the earlier mentioned ability of the British central government to
employ a powerful set of policy instruments. By setting up a small group
of ministers and advisors, working isolated from the political battlefield,
the government constructed a barrier between "insiders" and "outsiders"
(Grant 1984: l32ff.). Otherwise influential actors such as the BMA were
effectively cut off from the decision making process and even the bu-
reaucratic apparatus of the DHSS was bypassed. Instead of established
interest groups, the three neo-conservative think tanks, Center for Policy
Studies, Institute of Economic Affairs and Adam Smith Institute, became
for the first time "insiders" to the health policy network. Under their
influence, the review group considered a number of radical reform op-
tions and finally ended with the white paper "Working for Patients",
published in February 1989 (DoH 1989). In the following highly critical
discussion, the Thatcher government once again declared a policy issue
as non-negotiable and violated the consensus principle.
"Working for Patients" was halfway radical and halfway moderate.
The moderate side of the review consisted in its affirmation of the basic
principles of the NHS, tax financing, equal access, public ownership and
responsibility for service provisions. As opposed to the original purpose
of the review, no reform of NHS funding was planned and the manageri-
al strategy was continued. By decreasing the number of non-management
members of the Health Authorities and FPCs, the power of general man-
agers was enhanced vis-ä-vis physicians, nurses and local government
nominees. This also means that a new coalition between center, i.e. DoH,
and periphery, i.e. general management, is likely to emerge.
The radical side comprised the introduction of internal markets in
the NHS. Hospitals with over 250 beds have the opportunity to become
self-governing "NHS Hospital Trusts". These hospitals will be no longer
subject to DHA supervision and are free to decide their budget, payment
of personnel, and to negotiate service contracts with public or private
customers. They may retain operating surpluses but also have to finance
deficits. Similarly, general practitioners with more than 11,000 patients
on their list may opt to act as "budget holders". As opposed to the exist-
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ing system of capitation payment, budget holders will receive a fixed
sum out of which also hospital services have to be paid. The intention
is that budget holders negotiate with hospitals for cheap services because
similarly to independent hospitals, they are allowed to retain surpluses
and have to balance deficits out of their budgets. Whereas it is still
unclear to what extent these reforms will be enforced, it is justified to
expect that internal operations of the post-review NHS will become more
market-like.
5.2 United States of America
The Reagan administration entered office with an ambitious health
policy program (Arras 1983). The four most important proposals where
a reduction of federal health expenditures, a termination of several regu-
lation programs, a decentralization of responsibilities to the state level,
and the introduction of a pro-competitive law (Döhler 1990: 319ff.).
What particularly fuelled the expectation that these programmatic aims
would lead to a sweeping change was that they enjoyed a bipartisan
support in both houses of Congress (Iglehart 1981: 179ff.).
However, as can be illustrated by the administration's successful
budget strategy during the 97th Congress (1981-1982), the political com-
pliance of an otherwise highly idiosyncratic Congress was decisively
promoted by taking advantage of procedural rules as policy instruments.
Medicare and Medicaid almost automatically became the focus of budget
cut efforts. Since 1970, expenditures for both programs doubled every
five years corresponding to an annual increase of 15 percent (Feder et
al. 1982: 274tt.). Within the scope of the first two budget laws, the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA) and the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), the Reagan administra-
tion succeeded in getting the most sweeping reductions through Congress
ever since 1965 when both programs were launched (data in US General
Accounting Office 1988). OBRA and TEFRA also included several pro-
competition elements which aimed at promoting HMOs and other alterna-
tive insurance plans (Gornick et al. 1985: 17; Iglehart 1985). Despite
the bipartisan popularity of the Reagan cut-back program of expenditure
increases, congressional approval would not have been possible without
resort to a set of "fast-track" legislative procedures such as "reconcilia-
tion" and "omnibus bills" (Ellwood 1985: 329tt.: Hoadley 1986). An
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important role was played by the new director of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB), David Stockman, who successfully exploited
the streamlined budget procedures to the advantage of the Reagan admin-
istration. The executive's dominance over the congressional budgeting
process, however, lasted only during the 97th Congress. Afterwards, the
bipartisan cut-back coalition gave way again to the constituency oriented
individualism embedded in the American party system.
Reagan's "New Federalism" initiative was less successful. Whereas
the administration succeeded in consolidating 2i federal health programs
earmarked for four block grants permitting the states greater freedom
for allocating these funds for multiple purposes, the second and decisive
step, a "turnback" of roughly 40 federal grant-in-aid programs to the
states designed to restore full responsibility but also transferring large
additional costs to the states was rejected by Congress without extensive
deliberation. Although the block grant consolidation reduced the federal
share by 16,4%o (Bovbjerg/ Davis 1983: 530), "many programs have
continued to operate largely as they did when Ronald Reagan was a
presidential contender" (Peterson et al. 1986: 218).
The relevance of the network structure for political opportunities is
well reflected in the case of deregulation. As already mentioned, deregu-
lation in other policy sectors spilled over into health care' During the
early Reagan presidency, deregulation ranked high on the political agenda
and the health sector was a specific target. The first agency to be abol-
ished was the National Center for Health Care Technology (NCHCT)
which ceased to exist in October 1981. The Center had only been set
up in 1978 to make recommendations to the HCFA as to whether newly-
developed medical technologies and procedures should be reimbursed
through the Medicare program. This quasi-regulatory mandate soon pro-
voked strong criticism from the affected medical technology industry and
the AMA, which rejected the NCHCT's assessment activities as an inroad
in the medical professions' prerogative to judge medical technologies.
However, the termination of the Center was not mainly a result of pres-
sure group politics but rather reflected a lack of internal bureaucratic
backing (Blumenthal 1983: 602). Because the activities of the NCHCT
overlapped with those of three other agencies with a more powerful
constituency inside the DHHS and Congress (Blumenthal 1983: 595),
opponents easily mobilized congressional and executive support against
a re-authorization of funds.
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The deregulation of the Professional Standards Review Organization
(PSRO) program came about under similar circumstances. Since 1972,
roughly 200 PSROs had to monitor the quality of medical services reim-
bursed under Medicare and Medicaid. However, the program never devel-
oped a strong anchorage within the policy network and was hampered
by operating obsracles rhroughout the 1970s (Smits l98l: 254-256).
Through the Peer Review Improvement Act (a part of TEFRA), Congress
drastically reduced federal funding and stipulated a transformation of
PSROs into Professional Review Organizations (PROs). As opposed to
their predecessors, PROs are no longer required to be managed chiefly
by physicians and are allowed to obtain the status of private profit-ori-
ented enterprises which may contract with a large variety of private
customers (Jost 1989). Similarly, the Reagan administration also suc-
ceeded in dismantling the 200 health sysrems agencies (HSAs), the single
most important regulatory program of the 1970s. As in the case of
PSROs, the administration could build on the weakened stabilib of the
network segment which had hitherto supported the program. One of the
most important functions of HSAs was the implementation of the states
certificate-of-need (coN) laws which imposed capital investment controls
on the hospital industry. With the growing commercialization of the
hospital sector since the early 1980s, however, CON regulations were
increasingly perceived as threatening restrictions on capital investment
as the hospitals' most vital instrument for dealing with an increasingly
turbulent environment. Thus the hospital industry, which earlier was a
moderate supporter, formed a new coalition together with the OMB and
republican market advocates which were eager to kill another "liberal"
health program (Mueller 1988:722). Federal funding ended in 1986 and
only 40 HSAs survived this financial cutback (Kinzer 1988: I 16). Inter-
estingly, some of the HSAs are now maintained and financed by private
business firms who are interested in preserving some measures of regula-
tory control over the health care industry (Perrin 1988). The appearance
of private firms as a new actor in the policy network was even more
evident in the case of PSRos. The deregulation/ privatization of this
program enabled employers to use the control capacities of pROs for
the first time to scrutinize hospitals and physicians who provide medical
care for employment-related private health insurance.
The successful deregulation efforts during the early Reagan presiden-
cy were based on three network-related variables. First, congressional
budget rules provided the administration with several essential policy
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instruments such as feconciliation and fast track legislative instruments.
Second, the enforcement of financial cutback and deregulation measures
was strongly bolstered by the heterogenei'J' of the health policy network'
what in the uS is usually referred to as "subsystem politics" suggests
that only a restricted number of actors and an equally restrained number
of affected groups is linked to a program. This has counterbalanced the
mobilization of broad opposing forces. To the same degree as centraliza-
tion constituted an opportunity for the Thatcher government, the fragmen-
tation of governmental institutions and organized interests has enabled
the Reagan administration to pursue its strategy. Third, there was an
overall abatement of network stability that fostered the erosion of estab-
lished configurations.
If there is any proper term for describing the US health policy net-
work since the mid-1980s then it must be instabilifl. Two large-scale
processes have reinforced this development to a considerable extent. First,
the rise of a "new medical industrial complex" (Relman 1980). Discus-
sions about the commercial character of health services originated the
early 1970s, but the prefix "new" was not chosen arbitrarily. The new
entrepreneurialism differs from its predecessor by the rapid transformation
of formerly independent hospitals, HMOs, nursing homes etc. into large
multi-institutional conglomerates.In 1987, already 429Vo of US hospitals
were integrated into multi-unit systems (Bell 1987: 44)' Although the
transformation of voluntary and religious hospitals into commercial hospi-
tals did not cover more than l3.l7o of all US hospitals (Gray 1986: 28)'
their commercialization is more intense than this data suggests, because
non-profitmaking hospitals and HMOs are increasingly involved in "con-
tract management" relations or are forced to imitate the market behavior
of their commercial competitors (Marmor et al. 1986). Thus the rise of
large-scale entfepreneurialism had a two-fold impact on the health policy
network. By pushing the actors' incentives even further into a market-
dominated direction (Arnold 1986), the new medical industrial complex
has spurred the competitive behavior of health care providers. The arrival
of new associations representing profit-oriented health care enterprises
has also contributed to the increase in the number of political actors in
Washington and thus furthered the fragmentation of interest representation
(Kosterlitz 1986; Tierney 1987).
An analogous effect emanated from a second development: the ap-
pearance of employers as a new actor in health policy. As late as in
1979, employers showed no particular interest in the issue of rising
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health care costs (Sapolsky et al. 1981). But this stance dramatically
changed during the following years. Since 75 percent of US employees
are covered through employment-related private health insurance (Staples
1989: 416), soaring health care costs also became a problem for private
actors, particularly for large firms with generous fringe benefits. As an
ever growing number of firms was exposed to double digit health premi-
um increases, the business community reacted with a complete new rep-
ertoire of cost containment strategies (Bagby/ Sullivan 1986; Döhler
1990: 348ff.). Business firms tried to hold down their health bills by
tightening the screws of utilization and peer review programs and negoti-
ating with "preferred providers" about cheaper rates and organizing re-
gional "Business Coalitions" which acted as a political arm in the strug-
gle for state legislation (Bergtold 1988) and provided consulting and
negotiating support against physicians, HMOs, hospitals and the like.
Whereas these activities have intensified the competitive behavior among
physicians, hospitals and other providers, business organizations such as
the Washington Business Group on Health or regional Business Coali-
tions could not be regarded as outspoken advocates of a competitive
health policy. Several legislative initiatives by the Reagan administration,
such as the reform of tax treatment for employment-based health insur-
ance premiums, were forestalled by the business community (Demkovich
1984: 1509).
The combined effect of the emergence of two new actors in the
health policy network was to transform the governance of the health
economy and to rearrange established coalitions. The "structural interests"
identified by Robert Alford (1975: 190-217) during the early 1970s
ceased to exist. The professional monopolist coalition is now fragmented
into competing providers and large-scale corporate enterprises (Immers-
heim/ Pond 1989); the corporate rationalizers' coalition is divided into
federal and state bureaucrats and health care managers in corporate head-
quarters; the consumers, finally, are no longer represented solely by
the "repressed" coalition of "equal health advocates" but are supplemented
by powerful business firms such as Chrysler and General Motors which
have identified themselves as consumers within an overcharged health
care market. The result of this reorganized coalition landscape is a new
distribution of power which is no longer dominated by the medical pro-
fession or stable "structural" coalitions but rather by unstable "action-
sets" in which organized interests "have formed a temporary alliance for
a limited purpose" (Aldrich/ Whetten l98l: 387; Iglehart 1987: 640f.).
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The US health policy network has thus moved from relative stability and
policy stalemate into a state of fragmentation and instability with a novel
opportunity structure.
As was pointed out earlier, network instability provides the most
promising opportunities for enforcing a new strategy. If this state of the
network did not lead to a complete victory of the market strategy envis-
aged by the Reagan administration, then it was because the window of
opportunity for a pro-competition strategy proved to be unstable. Thus
since the mid-1980s, regulatory health policy re-emerged in the guise
of an alternative policy which was implemented amidst an almost hege-
monic market discourse. After all, the Reagan administration was success-
ful in deregulation and cutback of federal health expenditures but failed
to get a pro-competition law through Congress (Fuchs 1987: 220-224.).
The ambivalent character of the Reagan administration's health policy
thus consists of two contradictory policy legacies. On the one hand,
health services were embraced as a new field of commercial trade, on
the other hand, it was the Reagan administration that introduced the
most powerful regulatory instrument ever to be at the disposal of a feder-
al government - the so-called "Diagnostic Related Groups" (DRGs).t
This new payment system for Medicare hospital patients was "passed
through Congress at the legislative equivalent of the speed of light"
(Morone/ Dunham 1985: 263). DRGs were announced by DHHS secre-
tary Richard Schweiker in December 1982, the bill was introduced in
January 1983, approved by Congress without much debate in March
1983, and signed into law by President Reagan in April 1983. Aside
from the unusual velocity, this legislative process was remarkable
because it emanated as a bureaucratic initiative which was orchestrated
by the HCFA with pressure group politics only playing a minor role
(Fuchs/ Hoadley 1984). As opposed to the conventional "interest-group
liberalism" (Lowi 1979: 50-52) image of the American political process
where the role of government is restricted on "ratifying the agreements"
(Lowi 1979: 5l) of organized interests, in the DRG case the federal
government appeared as an autonomous actor (Morone/ Dunham 1985:
As opposed to "retrospective" payment by which the hospital is reimbursed after the
event for all "usual, customary and reasonable" costs, DRGs categorize each hospital
patient into one of 471 diagnostic cases, each of which has a fixed "prospective" price.
The hospital receives exactly this sum of money and is allowed to retain surpluses but
also has to bear additional costs.
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288ff.) which successfully seized the opportunity to extend its regulatory
power in health care. Since the full implementation of DRGs in 1987,
it is a federal agency, the HFCA, which controls roughly 407o of total
US hospital revenues through a system of "administered prices" (Sloan
et al. 1988: 210).
By aiming at the income of health care providers, DRGs created an
influential strategic precedent which was buttressed by the dwindling veto
power of formerly influential health associations. Unlike in former years,
when budget cuts were largely obtained by increasing patients' cost shar-
ing or tightening eligibility criteria, since 1984 physicians' pay has be-
come a major target for cost containment efforts (Ginsberg 1989: 7-9).
In 1984, Congress included a two year "fee freeze" for physicians' Medi-
care reimbursement in the Deficit Reduction Act (DEFRA), a restriction
on the medical profession's income unbelievable only a decade ago. As
part of the 1985 budget law Congress created the Physician Payment
Review Commission which is charged with developing a prospective
payment system analogous to hospital DRGs for office-based physicians.
Again, reconciliation and "omnibus bills" provided the vehicle for legisla-
tive proposals that were not supposed to occur under a neo-conservative
administration.
These steps already signalled a departure from the market strategy
of the early Reagan presidency. Furthermore, Congress increasingly seized
the initiative and implemented its own health policy agenda (Brown
1990). But the Reagan administration also deviated from its own ideology
as the formerly hegemonic market discourse was increasingly superseded
by the discussion about the growing number of uninsured Americans.
In his last year in office, President Reagan signed into law the Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act which aimed at narrowing the so-called "me-
digap", i.e. the costs for long-term hospital stays and drug bills which
are not covered by Medicare, by introducing a small additional premium
that - almost revolutionary - was linked to individual income, a financing
mechanism promoted by Democrats (Iglehart 1988). Although the law
was repealed only one year later under the pressure of an influential
faction of wealthy elderly persons opposed to income-related premium
financing of Medicare (Financial Times 1989a), it was an important indi-
cator for the end of the market strategy in US health policy.
This re-emergence of regulatory health policy was permitted by a
network characteristic that previously contributed to the rise of the pro-
competition strategy in the late 1970s: a policy network which does not
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allow a stable strategy lock-in. A good indicator for the deficient anchor-
age of health policy strategies is the revival of an issue of bygone
däys: the discussion about a comprehensive national health insurance
which, ironically, was fuelled at the end of the Reagan presidency
(Brown 1988; Kinzer 1989). Anthony King's charucteization of Ameri-
can politics as "building coalitions in the sand" (King 1978) appears to
be pärticularly true in the case of health. Employers, an almost traditional
opponent of national health insurance and therein united with health
piöviders, are currently reconsidering their stance because a national
Lealth program is more likely to relieve private firms from rising health
care costs than the private market (Brown 1988: 608; Financial Times
1989; New York Times 1989). Therefore, it is no longer far-fetched
to expect a new coalition in which labor and business are united in their
suppört for a national health program (on unions cf. Jacobs 1987)'
5.3 Federal Republic of GermanY
when the three-party coalition of cDU/cSU and FDP replaced the so-
cial-Liberal coalition in October 1982, the neo-consefvative faction in
the new government was at the zenith of its influence. But compared
to Britain and the US, the range of realistic health policy alternatives
was far more restricted. Despite a then dominant anti-welfare state rheto-
ric, which also applied to the health sector, only two concrete measures
were announced: an increase of co-payments in the statutory health insur-
ance, and a reform of hospital finances (Kohl 1984: 23, 127). The imple-
mentation of these programmatic intentions hardly amounted to the "sig-
nificant structural changes" (Biedenkopf 1984: 499) as they were envis-
aged by leading neo-conservatives.
- Contrary to a widespread expectation and despite a supportive public
mood, the Christian-Liberal govemment did not manage to introduce a
sweeping expansion of cost-sharing elements in the early period of gov-
ernment. Two elements of the network configuration turned out to be
of particular importance for this policy outcome. First, the strong inter-
connection of the CDU with the associations in the health policy network
through several subdivisions of the party organization. The social com-
mitteö, a party sub-organization representing the faction of Christian
Democratii union members and employees, was then an outspoken oppo-
nent of increased cost sharing. Second, the resistance of this moderately
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influential party faction was amplified by the fact that the major strategic
aim of government, a reduction of federal deficit spending, could not
be advanced by health care savings because the statutory health insurance
is organized into a system of parafiscal health insurance funds, each of
which is equipped with a separate budget and financial autonomy. Thus,
increased cost sharing, contrary to Britain and the US, is not automatical-
ly converted into reductions of governmental spending and therefore was
of limited worth for the coalition's budget consolidation strategy.
The next important move of Christian-Liberal health policy was an
overhaul of the existing system of hospital financing. Out of the whole
outlay of the GKV the percentage that was devoted to hospital care had
increased ftom 25.2Vo (= DM 6 billion) in 1970 to 32.l%o (= DM 33.2
billion) in 1984. This increased share of hospital costs might lead to the
expectation that any reform effort would focus on cost containment mea-
sures. However, hospital financing reform was in fact more strongly
influenced by the logic of intergovernmental relations than by political
pressure for cost containment.
Up to 1972, the majority of German hospitals were in a state of
chronic underfunding. The user charges which were negotiated between
individual hospitals and health insurance funds did not provide the capital
needed for hospital construction, modernization and extension. Thus the
sponsoring organizations, such as churches, local government, voluntary
associations or private owners, had to balance hospital deficits. Because
of their limited capacity for raising such funds and the unstable financial
situation of the hospital sector, the Social-Liberal coalition, with the
agreement of CDU/CSU, enacted the "Krankenhausfinanzierungs-Gesetz"
(KHG) in 1972 which for the first time introduced a legal claim for
public funding of hospital capital costs. The KHG created the so-called
system of "dual financing" in which daily operating costs are covered
by user charges whereas capital costs are financed jointly by the federal
government and the Länder. The instrument for allocating money was
the "hospital need plan". Adhering to federal guidelines, the Länder were
empowered to decide which hospitals should be included in the plan and
thereby entitled to public money for capital investments. Due to this
focal positioning and their final right to ratify user charge negotiations
between health insurance funds and hospitals, the Länder became the
dominant actor in hospital policy. Although the KHG, praised as a "law
of the century", significantly contributed to a consolidation of hospital
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finances, the broad consensus on which the law was based had eroded
since the late 1970s (Altenstetter 1985).
Hospitals increasingly perceived themselves as being captured within
political calculations reflecting not their priorities but rather those of the
Länder. The health insurance funds objected to being forced to bear the
financial burdens of political decisions by the Länder which culminated
in a costly oversupply of beds ("Bettenberg") and pressed for more influ-
ence on hospital planning as well as in user charge negotiations. Most
important, however, was the growing dissatisfaction of the Länder who
perceived the federal guidelines surrounding the joint financing as a
restriction on their domain of hospital policy, not least due to the täct
that the federal share never reached.30Vo, as envisaged originally, but
had declinedto ISVo in 1983 (Altenstetter 1985: 251). Interestingly, the
system of hospital financing shielded the decision making process from
becoming a pure exercise in cost containment with an enlarged opportu-
nity for introducing more market because the Länder had strong political
incentives against market and competitive solutions which would weaken
their grip on the hospital segment of the German health policy network.
When the federal government introduced a first draft of the bill in
April 1983, this particular network selectivity had already become visible.
No radical measures were included. The federal government's retreat
from the hospital sector by terminating joint financing was undisputed.
However, the federal government's plan to strengthen the position of
health insurance funds in the process of hospital planning caused consid-
erable dispute. The passage of this bill was intended to introduce some
competition in the hospital sector by enabling the health insurance funds
to exert economic pressure on the hospitals (Bruckenberger 1988). This
proposal met fierce resistance from the Länder which were not willing
to share their rights with the health insurance funds and the bill was
rejected even by the CDU/CSU-governed Länder. The decentralized
stucture of the health policy network enabled the Länder to reject the
competition plans through their veto right in the Bundesrat, so that the
final version of the "Krankenhaus-Neuordnungsgesetz", which was ap-
proved by the Bundestag in December 1984, contained only minor im-
provements of the health insurance funds' position in the hospital sector.
Most important were alterations in federal-state relations towards hospital
financing and the extension of the collective bargaining principle. The
latter change can be interpreted as one facette of an "institutional isomor-
phism" (DiMaggio/ Powell 1983) according to which the procedure for
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allocating resources in the hospital sector is becoming increasingly similar
to that in the ambulatory sector.
The health policy debate in the mid-1980s was characterized by
a political stalemate. Health policy activists, particularly academic health
economists, strongly urged a general overhaul of the German health care
system in order to allow market forces to play a greater role in the dis-
tribution of services. However, the federal government's reluctance to
pursue this strategic direction was no less strong. After three years in
office, "more market" in health care was no longer on the agenda of
the Christian-Liberal coalition. This suggests that the sectoralization of
the network was well enough developed to prevent a spill-over of alter-
native strategies. A good illustration of how the network structure
guided the health policy outcome is provided by looking at the cases
of a) drug policy and b) large-scale medical equipment. In both decision
making processes the federal committee of physicians and health insur-
ance funds played an important role.
a) As opposed to physicians' fees and hospital user charges, no in-
strument to influence drug pricing and consumption was available for
the health insurance funds, although drug prescription mounted to IsEo
of their overall budget (BMJFFG 1989: 230).In late 1984, after an efforr
by the health insurance funds to introduce the "tough" instrument of
direct price negotiations was rejected by the pharmaceutical industry, the
Concerted Action recommended the compilation of a "comparative drug
price list" as a "soft" and rather indirect measure for getting a grip on
drug expenditures. This additional information instrument should enable
physicians to consider the price as one parameter of their drug prescrip-
tions - which, it was hoped, would activate price competition in the
pharmaceutical industry. [n accordance with the strategic selectivity of
the German health policy network, the federal government did not issue
the price list as a law or governmental decree but instead charged the
federal committee with this delicate job. After a controversial discussion,
the price list was approved by the BMA in September 1986 (Döhler
1990: 447ff.). Although the pharmaceurical industry managed ro dilute
the original concept, the interesting question is not so much how the
industry did this but rather why exactly this instrument and not, for
example, a limited list which would have excluded a number of drugs
from GKV reimbursement was chosen. First, it has to be considered that
the network configuration virtually pushed the federal government into
a distinct strategic direction. Delegating certain responsibilities into the
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area of self-administration not only relieved the federal government from
a troublesome political decision but additionally allowed it to build an
important alliance. Since any regulation of prescribing behavior is likely
to be perceived as a threat to physicians' clinical autonomy, this hurdle
was effectively bypassed by relying on a committee in which half of
the members came from the ranks of physicians. Second, if the federal
government refers the regulation of a problem back to self-administration,
it has to approve the particular bargaining rules of this intermediate
sphere. In a way, the federal committee is among the most important
policy tools of the federal government but it is one which can only be
employed at the price of diluting the state's law-making authority with
the bargaining logic of self-government. It is justifiable, therefore, to
expect that the construction principles of the federal committee thorough-
ly exclude market-oriented decisions or indeed any radical policy out-
comes.
b) Another verification of the increasing relevance of the federal
committee and its compromise-oriented policy output are the "guidelines
for the efficient use of large-scale medical equipment" from December
1985. As was the case with the price list, the federal government pre-
ferred to replace a governmental law with a guideline negotiated between
the actors of the federal committee. The original aim of these guidelines
was to regulate the growth of the use of medical technology equipment
by private practitioners which was phenomenal in the early 1980s (Kirch-
berger 1986). As is to be expected from the previous analysis, the guide-
lines did not include stringent regulations but left a number of loopholes
for office-based physicians. Most important in this respect was that physi-
cians unwilling to comply with a new set of guidelines concerning the
distribution of such equipment were not automatically sanctioned. The
design of an efficient enforcement tool was left to negotiated contracts
at the regional level. This suggests that the choice for German health
policy makers, even neo-conservatives, is not between state and market,
but between state and self-government. The increasing reliance on the
federal committee strongly supports the hypothesis that the opportunity
structure of the German health policy network creates a nearby irresistible
attraction to build on existing institutional arrangements and to stay away
from alternatives not in accordance with the system ("systemfremd").
So far, the German case closely resembles the variant d in Figure 1,
i.e. even the modest strategic aspirations of the Christian-Liberal gov-
emment to bring some competition into the health care sector have
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been bent into a direction compliant with the network. There was a
change neither in the structure of the network, nor in governance or
the operating ideology. If there was any chance for the government to
enforce a radical policy change then this opportunity may have emerged
from the discussion about the so-called "structural reform" in 1987 and
1988.
This reform effort was not a result of long-term strategic planning,
but was triggered by a renewed rise in health insurance expenditures in
late 1984 (Döhler 1990: 466ff.). Immediate legislative action, however,
was deliberately postponed so as to prevent this issue from arising in
the 1987 federal election campaign. In April 1985, the Labour Ministry
issued a vague health policy concept which made it clear that a potential
reform bill would not entail a "comprehensive" overhaul of the statutory
health insurance as announced by chancellor Helmut Kohl later but
would be restricted to some moderate adjustments primarily aimed at
stabilizing health insurance premiums. However', the "10 principles" stipu-
lated the appointment of a "council of expert advisors" for the KAG.
This body of experts was commissioned to publish an annual report
containing proposals for increasing the quality and efficiency of health
care. Although the council functioned as a new actor, the range of strate-
gic opportunities was circumscribed by appointing the members according
to the principle of proportional representation, i.e. political and sectoral
interests were included in a fairly balanced way through advisers close
to these actors. Thus once again, the durability of a corporatist policy
style was evident.
The discussion about the structural reform itself, however, was among
the most controversial policy issues of the whole Christian-Liberal gov-
ernment before ultimately, in December 1988, after a painfully drawn-
out political battle, the "Gesundheits-Reformgesetz" was adopted. The
Minister of Labor, Norbert Blüm, has fuelled the perception of the law
in which the dominant role of pressure groups is stressed (Webber 1989)
by characterizing the reform effort as a "trail of courage in a field mined
by interest groups" (quoted in Döhler 1990: 497). From the policy net-
work perspective, a more elaborate interpretation is inferred. Conflict
and group pressure occurred largely over the details of the reform but
the main direction was furnished by the opportunity structure of the
network.
First, the political decision making process made it clear that the
autonomy of the federal government is decisively restricted by its re-
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source dependence upon the system of self-governing associations. As
opposed to the British case, the German federal government is not able
to disregard or even to exclude the interests of the network actors from
the decision making process. The broad delegation of implementation
functions forces the federal government into concessions which are al-
ready granted during the stage in which alternative policy solutions are
being considered.
A second important influence results from the actors' institutional
integration and representation. Due to the fact that health insurance funds
do not effectively advocate the insured population since the decision
making bodies are staffed with employee and employer representatives
in equal numbers, the new interpretation of the meaning of "solidarity"
was primarily achieved by shifting the burden to the insurers' Patients'
cost sharing was perceptively raised and several benefits such as dental
services or funeral grants were curtailed. This became possible because
at the same time, the social committee's resistance to cost sharing was
bought off by making the health insurance funds responsible for financ-
ing ambulatory long-term care even though this new benefit remained
on a very low level. Physicians and hospitals were not completely left
out but their contribution to the "new conception of solidarity", as cost-
shifting was hailed by the federal government, remained more than mod-
erate. The most interesting facet of the whole law became the introduc-
tion of a new reimbursement procedure for prescription drugs.
Amidst a heated debate about the adequacy of the proposals to cut
back the expenditures of health insurance funds, a working group of the
coalition parties which was charged with preparing the essentials of the
bill adopted the idea of fixed prices for pharmaceuticals ("Festbeträge").
According to this concept, health insurance funds would no longer have
to reimburse the market price of each prescribed drug but rather a fixed
sum based on the price of cheaper drugs with comparable therapeutical
effects. Ifthe patient asks for the product from the original producer then
he has to bear the price difference out of his own pocket. It was ex-
pected that this new scheme, hailed as the "central plank" of the law
by the federal government, would save health insurance funds DM 2
billion a year at the expense of the pharmaceutical industry. Despite
several objections about the efficiency of this new scheme, recent empiri-
cal findings suggest that the fixed prices in fact have resulted in a signif-
icant decrease in turnover for the pharmaceutical industry (Manow-Borg-
wardt 1990: 48ff.). Thus the question occurs as to how this clear viola-
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tion of the fundamental interests of an ostensibly influential actor became
possible.
As was pointed out earlier, such political solutions can be explained
by referring to a health policy network which is based on corporatist
concertation and collective bargaining. In the same way as the weak
representation of consumers made them politically vulnerable, the weak
integration of the pharmaceutical industry into the bargaining structure
of the network contributed to its defeat. since direct price negotiations
were rejected by the pharmaceutical industry and their membership in
the Concerted Action did not prove to be an effective way of slowing
down increasing drug costs, it was logical to switch from a loosely-cou-
pled encompassing corporatism to a tighter mode of selective corporatism
(Manow-Borgwardt 1990: 65). This interpretation becomes clearer when
the method by which the fixed prices are determined is considered.
The highly complex procedure of dividing pharmaceuticals into com-
parable groups was delegated to the Bundesausschuß and in a second
step the peak associations of health insurance funds are empowered to
decide the fixed price for those drugs included in the scheme. Thus, the
federal government has not only seized the opportunity for shifting the
implementation of a conflict-ridden policy solution into the sphere of
self-government but furthermore, it has excluded the pharmaceutical
industry from determining drug prices. Two changes in the structure of
the policy network have facilitated this political decision. First, since the
early 1980s, the structure of the pharmaceutical market has changed. The
generic producers ability to capture an increasing market share has cre-
ated the strategic opportunity to exert pressure on traditional producers.
second, the established coalition between the medical profession and the
brand name producing pharmaceutical industry was decisively weakened
as physicians tried to move out of the cost containment battle by pre-
scribing more generic drugs.
A third explaining variable, also linked to the network, refers to the
already introduced hypothesis of institutional isomorphism. According
to this general trend, the forms of governance of the hospital and the
pharmaceutical segments of the network are slowly being adjusted to
correspond to the model of the ambulatory sector, i.e. price fixing by
collective bargaining between associations. The fixed pricing scheme is
a clear indicator of this development because it has not only introduced
an element of negotiation into the pharmaceutical sector but also has
enhanced the willingness within the pharmaceutical industry to become
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involved in direct price negotiations with the health insurance funds
(Arzte Zeitung 1990) because this procedure has become more attractive
in the face of complete exclusion from price determination. seen from
this perspective, the new pricing scheme not only became possible be-
cause of the rearrangement of coalitions but also because the selectivity
of the German health policy network favors a collective bargaining strate-
gy and tends to preclude competition and market strategies.
6 Conclusions: Policy Networks as Facilitators and
Impediments to Change
In the previous country-related analysis, several indicators for assessing
success or failure of neo-conservative reform strategies have been pre-
sented which will be considered now in a comparative perspective. Obvi-
ously, the US represents the case in which the market solution has flour-
ished most. The initial success in deregulating health care and the sweep-
ing transformation of health services into a large-scale commercial
market clearly points in this direction. However, the thesis that it was
the Reagan administration that was most successful in enforcing this
strategy deserves significant qualification. This judgement is only correct
in a limited sense because the current shift in governance structures was
largely an endogenous process and was only to a certain extent influ-
enced by political decisions of the Reagan administration. The fact that
the Reagan administration returned to a regulatory strategy while, at the
same time, the commercial transformation of health care providers contin-
ued, demonstrates why it is not easy to fit the US case into a scale of
"more or less market". In clear opposition to the US, it is justified with-
out any qualification to argue that no strategic "turn-around" has taken
place in the FRG. The realm of market and competition in the statutory
health insurance has remained as restricted as it was at the point of
change in government. Great Britain falls between both other cases. The
Thatcher govemment's record has been mixed. Although the basic struc-
tures and principles have been preserved, there has also been a percepti-
ble increase in market or quasi-market transactions within the NHS.
At the beginning of this chapter, it was assumed that neo-conserva-
tive governments intending to expand the role of markets in health care
had io face a particular functional matching between the established
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health policy network and an alternative political strategy. If the strategic
adaptability of the network proves to be inhospitable to market mecha-
nisms and competition, then change or instability of the network becomes
a crucial prerequisite for implementing a new policy strategy. Thus a
comparison of the network structure at different points in time (cf' Figure
l) with a focus on those network characteristics that have changed will
provide an explanation for success or failure of neo-conservative reform
efforts.
Ihble 2: Changes in the Policy Networks in the Late 1980s
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Before taking a closer look at Table 2, it is necessary to consider the
multiplicity of network change. The modification of the network structure











latter case, it has to be taken into account that not every change is iden-
tical with more market but may also go into a different strategic direc-
tion. Aside from network instability and changes, also opportunities ema-
nating from existing network structures have to be taken into account.
The variable network structure contains some of the most basic deter-
minants of neo-conservative policy making. As has already been stressed
by Krieger (1986: 34), institutional centralization in Britain and fragmen-
tation in the US both had the effect of enabling the govemment to en-
force strategic intentions. In Britain it was the centralist and hierarchical
organization of the NHS that opened the window of opportunity for
introducing a whole battery of control techniques all aiming at improving
efficiency and thus contributing to a perceptible change of the organiza-
tional culture of the NHS. The fragmentation of the policy network in
the US, which spans across both governmental institutions and organized
interests, proved to be particularly helpful in the case of deregulation
since it allowed the Reagan administration to exploit the heterogeneity
of organizational interests including those of regulatory bureaucracies.
In Germany, the comparatively close interconnections between federal
ministries, self-government, organized interests and political parties have
resulted in a mutual resource dependence "in which preferences and
organizational structures are conditioned by long-standing relationships
and shared political values" (Krasner 1988: 81).
Similarly, the structural characteristics of sectoralization and system
integration protected the German health policy network from being in-
vaded with a market-oriented strategy. In Britain, however, a spill-over
of the managerialist ideology became possible because the NHS was not
completely isolated from the Civil Service which has been strongly chal-
lenged by the Thatcher government. In the US, the sectoralization of the
policy network was so weak that even the Federal Trade Commission
was able to expose health care to an "ordinary" antitrust scrutiny. In
Germany and to a lesser extent in Britain, the equation of health care
with any other service would be almost unthinkable.
Some of the most interesting changes have occurred in the configura-
tion of actors. As was the case with other network characteristics in
Germany, with the exception of drug pricing, there have been no signifi-
cant changes which have remodelled the opportunity structure. This con-
trasted with the American development where not only the number of
relevant actors has strongly increased but also coalitions have been rebuilt
to a considerable degree. Most important in this respect has been the
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loss of influence of formerly important interest groups, particularly the
AMA and the AHA. Due to a growing heterogeneity of membership
interests, these associations no longer occupy a representative monopoly.
In a political system with almost no restrictions to access of the decision
making process, there are strong incentives for segments of members to
deviate from the umbrella organization. The trend of increasing fragmen-
tation of interest representation was amplified by the emergence of new
actors such as employer groups specializing in health policy. Since the
growing number of actors has also eroded the stability of coalitions, this
network characteristic has provided the Reagan administration with new
room to maneuver. In Britain, the government-led introduction of general
management in the NHS had an even more positive impact on the oppor-
tunity structure. The implementation of the internal market concept would
have been unthinkable without this new actor whose creation has led to
the opportunity of a new coalition formed between center and periphery.
The most sweeping changes in the area of governance are again
occurring in the US. The already existing dominance of markets as a
mode of economic coordination was augmented even further by the trans-
formation of single medical entrepreneurs into large multi-unit enterprises
in which profit-orientation governs most service parameters. The opportu-
nity which accrued in the Reagan administration lay in the chance to
treat health care similarly to other sectors of the economy. This relieved
the Reagan administration from the onerous exercise of having to justify
its unabashed preference for markets as an instrument for providing and
distributing health services. [n this respect, the German and British gov-
ernments have been in a much more defensive position. But the Thatcher
government was able to influence the governance of the NHS to such
an extent that efficiency and internal markets became a new operating
ideology whereas in the German case, not markets but rather an exten-
sion of collective associational bargaining has to be considered as a
change of governance. Changes in the network structure in Germany,
therefore, have not increased the opportunity for a competition strategy
but have reinforced the locked-in strategy of collective associational
bargaining.
This is also reflected in the patterns of interactioz which in Germany
basically have remained the same. Even in situations in which the Chris-
tian-Liberal coalition tried very hard, it was not able to deviate from
the established patterns of corporatist decision making. A quite dift'erent
picture can be observed in Britain, where the inherited consultation prin-
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ciple was increasingly feplaced by the hierarchical technique of "non-
negotiability". This has enabled the Conservatives to make policy deci-
sions without taking into account the "veto" of organized intefests such
as the BMA, which has lost its privileged clientelist relationship with
the ministry of health. This change in the policy style became possible
because the consultation principle has always been a "convention" (Page
1985: 105) without protecting institutional support as is the case in the
German health policy network. The major change in the US policy style
consists in the "new activism" (Brown 1990) of Congress and the execu-
tive. On the one hand, this has contributed to a slightly enlarged govern-
mental enforcement capacity, on the other hand, however, this change
was ambiguous in terms of contributing to the implementation of pro-
competitive health policy strategy because it also strengthened the capaci-
ty of state intervention-oriented policy makers who are gaining ground.
The simple diagnosis that there is no goodness of fit between a net-
work structure and a market-oriented strategy is not sufficient in order
to explain the success or failure of neo-conservative governments. Of
crucial importance is an assessment of the opportunities to reorganize
the network. This twofold opportunity structure is included in the variable
selectivity.In the German case, there is a well developed preselection
against market and competition policies. However, German policy makers
are not completely restricted in their choice. Although the health policy
network appears to be trapped by "reform blockades" (Rosewitz/ webber
1990), this observation only describes one side of strategic adaptability.
The other side consists of a continuous, although incremental, path-de-
pendent development ("Weiterentwicklung") and path dependency is not
an equivalent to structural and strategic deadlock but denotes a selective
exclusion of policy alternatives (Krasner 1988: 83). There is certainly
some change in German health policy but it is in the direction of neSoti-
ated pices and not in the direction of competition. This suggests that
one of the fundamental obstacles to a neo-conservative turn-around in
Germany can be found in the institutional lock-in of a particular strategy.
Exactly the lack of this characteristic has been responsible for the
greater strategic discontinuities in the US case. Even before the Reagan
administration came into office, there have been two rival health policy
strategies: one relying on the forces of the market and a second one
oriented towards an interventionist regulation of the health care market.
At first this enabled the new administration to catch up to the already
practiced market strategy. However, because neither the state intervention-
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ist nor the private market alternative tested during the Reagan presidency
achieved a firm establishment in the structures of the network, even
under Ronald Reagan, health policy fanned out in two different direc-
tions. The Thatcher govemment has been fairly successful because it
adopted a strategy according to network selectivity and remained within
the institutional framework.
These results can be summarized into two general conclusions. The
predisposition of policy networks towards strategic changes strongly
depends on a) network stability defined "as a situation in which relations
between organizations within a bounded population remain the same over
time" (Aldrich/ Whetten 1981: 391), and b) the structure of ties between
actors within a network. Both the "loose coupling" of the US health
policy network and the vertical and hierarchical networt structure in
Britain have enabled the governments to implement their strategies to
a certain extent. In Germany, on the other hand, the vertical and horizon-
tal interconnecting structures formed a barrier which was extlemely diffi-
cult to overcome.
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Chapter 9
The Preconditions for Policy Networks:




Theories on the production and reproduction of social, political and eco-
nomic orders have been dominated for a long time by the juxtaposition
of two polar forms of social organization: market and organization - or
hierarihy, bureaucracy, state, etc. (for a good illustration of this argu-
ment see Vanberg 1975, 1982). In the last decade, however, a literature
has developed which distinguishes many alternative governance arrange-
ments. In this discussion, networks as a mode of governance acquired
an important status (e.g. Williamson 1975; Hollingsworth et al. n.d.;
Hollingsworth 1990; Powell 1990; Marin 1990a: Traxler/ Unger 1990).
In chapter 2 of this book, it was shown that such network forms of
social organization emerge as well and exist in processes of public policy
making - an observation which also was made by a number of American
and British scholars (Rainey/ Milward 1983; Wilks/ Wright 1987; Wright
1988; Jordan 1990; Marsh/ Rhodes 1991; Marin 1990b; Laumann/ Knoke
1987). It is also important to notice that next to these public policy
networks, additional forms of policy networks developed which consist
either of private or of a mixture of public and private actors. These
private networks, too, often play an increasing role in the production and
reproduction of social orders. The concept of "private policy network"
finds its parallel in the by now well-established private government con-
cept. Private-interest governments are "... affangements under which an
attempt is made to make associative, self-interested collective action
I would like to thank Bernd Marin, Renate Mayntz, Volker Schneider and Franz Traxler
for helpful corrunents on earlier drafts of this chapter. For linguistic assistance I am grateful
to Suzanne Stephens.
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contribute to the achievement of public policy objectives" (Streeck/
Schmitter 1985: 17). There is one basic difference between private inter-
est governance and private policy networks, however: the first directs
its attention to single organizations, whereas the second directs its atten-
tion to loosely-organized organizational networks'
By now, a whole series of studies exist which illustrate the impor-
tance and relevance of private policy networks - without, however, direct-
ly referring to the concept.l What is still missing, however, is systematic
knowledge about the factors which account for the development of policy
networks. The answer to this question is equally significant from a policy
making point of view, since it appears that those policy fields which are
primarily governed by policy networks, produce different - and often
more successful - policy outcomes. Traxler and Unger (1990), for exam-
ple, clearly demonstrated that the metal, automobile and machine tool
industry coped much more successfully with challenges of world-wide
compeiition in those countries where these sectors were characterized
by network or neo-corporatist governance structures.
This chapter attempts to find some general answers to the question
of why and under which circumstances policy networks develop, by
offering some empirical insights into policies towards industrial restruc-
turing within a specific sectof. The study is based on an empirical analy-
sis oi industrial restructuring in West Germany, Britain, and Italy be-
tween 1968 and 1985 (as described in detail in Kenis 1991)'
The construction industry (Eccles 1981; Marin 1986), the publishing industry (coser/
Kadushin/ Powell 1982), the film and recording industry Girsch 1972)' the diamond
trade (Ben-Porath 1980), the aircraft industry (Mowery 1987), the high-tech industry
(Mariti/ smiley 1983), the industrial region of Emilia-Romagna (sabel 1989), the
iupun"." textilö industry (Dore 1983), the Japanese economy (Wrig-ht l.?!9)' the Srvedish
".änory (pestoff l9i0), the food-processing industry (Pestoff 1987), etc. For anoverview of some of these studies, see Powell (1990)'
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2 Policy Networks as a Mode of Governance in Industrial
Restructuring
Industrial policy towards industrial restructuring can be accomplished by
different governance structufes. In addition to the traditionalmarket/state
dichotomy, policy networks were more recently identified as another
distinct, significant, and frequent governance mechanism in industrialized
countries. In the case of industrial restructuring, governance through
policy networks means that an environment exists in which the parties
concerned negotiate among themselves either over the need for or, the
distribution of, mutual burdens and benefits of industrial restructuring
plans. Policy networks constitute observable and relatively stable groups
of organizations formed in an alliance or coalition to promote the collec-
tive interest of all or part of the industry's members. They do this by
negotiating common interests as well as by ranking their collective priori-
ties.
Industrial governance by policy networks differs from state-led indus-
trial policy, in the sense that the principal mode of coordinating is not
based on command or direction but rather on negotiation and bargaining.
It also differs from market-led industrial restructuring in that every indi-
vidual firm is not merely pursuing its own private interests. In contrast,
policy networks are horizontal systems of coordinating among firms,
public administration, and associations. They tend to be more stable than
market types of governance, even though this stability is not hierarchical-
ly imposed. Instead, shared norrns, attitudes of trust, considerable knowl-
edge about and respect for one another, stabilize the relationship among
the actors. Normative mechanisms, negotiations, and socialization within
the group coordinates relationships and discourages opportunism over
relatively long time periods. As such, a governance mode is given in
which medium- and long-term policies are formulated and implemented
to cope with the structural problems of a specific industry.
Take, for example, the problem of overcapacity in an industry pro-
ducing basic goods and which is exposed to all the pressures of the
world market - as, for example, the chemical fibre or steel industry.
These industries are characterized by low technological complexity and
mass production. High economies of scale and significant fixed costs also
tend to be basic characteristics. In these industries, full-capacity utiliza-
tion is the major condition for competitiveness. Therefore, when the firms
are confronted with high fluctuations in demand - as was most usually
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the case in the 70s and 80s - they are almost immediately hit with high
risks. Much is at stake: many workers stand to lose their job, and inves-
tors stand to bear huge losses. As a consequence during a period of
recession, market-led industrial policies in such sectors led to closing
down plants - eventually leading to the complete disappearance of an
industry at the national level. This, in turn, means large-scale capital
depletion and massive unemployment - the latter having even broader
social implications.
In order to prevent or overcome these negative results of market-led
industrial restructuring, an industrial policy led directly by the state might
be preferred. In most cases, such a state policy amounts to subsidizing
industries in order to save jobs. However, at the same time, such actions
often increase the danger of slowing down the long-term structural adapt-
abilities of that industry.
Alternatively, in order to compensate for the shortcomings and self-
destructive elements within the market - and, at the same time, to pre-
empt state intervention - firms within an industry can organize them-
selves and band together to cope with an impending crisis. In such a
situation, they agree upon mutual rules of conduct, linking their own
individual autonomy to their medium and long-term collective interests.
Policy networks put actors in a situation where they are less time-depen-
dent, more flexible, and less constrained by disruptive developments.
Therefore, a governance mode is offered through which they can better
adapt to changing circumstances. Industrial restructuring through policy
networks is based on intensive integration and cooperation between the
parties concerned. The actors explicitly negotiate and define rules of
conduct, even though they do not necessarily specify them in contracts
or other formal agreements. These iurangements enable the design and
implementation of medium- or long-term policies for greater competitive-
ness, as well as facilitating collective decisions on high-risk investment
projects of the firms involved. They help to discuss the need for, and
distribution of, mutual burdens and benefits of restructuring plans; and
they can diffuse know-how among the firms in non-competitive areas.2
In these terms, policy networks may seem similar to cartel-like arrangements. This
would indeed apply to industries with limited foreign trade relationships. With such
industries, policy networks do not necessarily result in establishing long-term adaptive
capacities; they rather maintain and obtain exclusive positions. Cartel-like arrangements
on a national level can never be successful in industries with extensive foreign trade
relationships - for instance, the chemical fibre industry. However, policy networks can
2
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3 The Case of the Chemical Fibre Industry in West Germany,
Britain and Italy
The late 1960s and early 1970s were periods of rapid growth in the
chemical fibre industry in general, and in Westem Europe in particular.
Output of both acrylic and polyester fibres in Western Europe more than
tripled between 1967 and 1973, while output of nylon virtually doubled.
The same period also witnessed the development of an integrated Wesr
ern European market following the expiration of the major nylon (or
polyamide) and polyester patents in the early and mid,1960s. As a conse-
quence, the major European producers penetrated each other's national
markets, both through exports and through the setting up of manufactur-
ing subsidiaries.
Whereas other parts of the world continued to display an impressive
increase in fibre output during the 1970s, in Western Europe the rapid
growth phase came to a halt after 1973. Output of all three fibres de-
clined in 1974 and 1975: and - in spite of recoveries in 1976, 1978
and 1979 - the overall level of output was only three per cent higher
in 1979 than it had been in 1973. In 1980, output declined once again
to below the 1973level. Stagnation, even absolute decline (particularly
for nylon), replaced rapid growth in output. However, capacity continued
to expand until at least the mid-1970s. Expectations of continuing
growth, together with competitive aspirations for increasing market shares
(which had led to this increase in capacity in the first place), thus exac-
erbated the deteriorating competitive environment.
A number of f'actors contributed to these changing conditions. They
included factors such as the world recession, sharply increased costs for
raw materials, a change in fashion from some synthetic fibres back to-
wards natural fibres, and increasing competition from outside Western
Europe. In this changed situation, severe excess capacity emerged; and
the Western European chemical fibre industry became highly unprofitable.
In the seven years between 1974 and 1980, the average capacity utiliza-
tion of all chemical fibre plants in Western Europe was only 68 per cent.
Losses were huge for all major European producers between 1975 and
1983 - in 1980, for example, this amounted to a sum of DM 1.9 billion.
As a result in some European countries, many - and in some cases, all -
lead to policies for long-term adaptive strategies within such industries.
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firms left the industry. In other countries, the firms became dependent
on state subsidies. In other countries, the major form of industrial restruc-
turing was through private policy networks.
On the basis of interviews with representatives from firms, associa-
tions, and administrations - as well as through a study of their internal
reports and through an extensive study of over 3,000 newspaper and
magazine clippings - collective industrial restructuring strategies were
identified which developed in the chemical fibre sector in West Germany,
Britain, and Italy between 1968 and 1985.
In Table 1, the presence of different collective strategies observed
among chemical fibre producers is summanzed.It is important to notice
that the table does not include all possible forms of industrial restructur-
ing. Rather, it refers exclusively to those strategies which are organized
collectively, which are located on a sectoral leveI, and which were ob-
served empirically in at least one of the countries studied.
Space does not permit a detailed description of the 27 different cells
of Table 1. However, a short description of the nature of the different
restructuring strategies is helpful before discussing them in a framework
of private policy networks.
Vertical integration refers to strategies where chemical fibre produc-
ers extend their activities to later production phases (i.e., towards the
textile industry) in order to absorb environmental interdependencies.
By having stable relationships of sales, as well as price-setting with the
textile industry costs can be reduced without constantly having to deal
with the market. Although this strategy is also very often pursued by
firms individually, sevenl instances could be observed where firms col'
Iectively regulated their relationship with the textile industry. A good
example of this collective action is the way in which chemical fibre
firms, through associations or consultant agencies, stimulate the textile
industry to develop efficient production units. These consultant services
both convince and help their colleagues in textiles to consolidate into
larger economic units; they organize export stimulation policies for the
textile producers (textile firms exporting to markets with low fibre prices
are given discounts relative to the share of chemical fibres contained in
the products purchased).
Publicity and trade mark policy can be seen, from the point of view
of the producers, as the creation of a more or less stable link between
one's product and the clients. Instead of competing only through quality
or price, firms can compete on the basis of services linked to brand
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Table 1: Collective Restructuring Strategies among Chemical Fibre
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fibres, thus distinguishing themselves from other producers producing
similar products. In the chemical fibre industry especially, this strategy
is often pursued by firms individually (examples of brand names of large
firms promoted extensively, are Dralon, Courtelle, Terylene, Trevira, etc.).
Collective actions among fibre firms on the basis of brand names are,
of course, logically impossible. But in the same manner as when a firm
promotes its own fibre individually, a sector can promote its products
tsing generic names. Here the idea is not so much to be competitive
vis-ä-vis other firms producing the same product, as to compete with
other industries producing substitute goods - in the present case, the
natural or the cellulose fibre industry. Collective organized actions pro-
moting the total group of chemical fibres are a very common strategy.
Cheap imports of substitution products - or in the 70s, the producers'
shock at the unexpected but significant consumer trend back to natural
fibres - were situations that triggered such collective actions.
Lobbying or pressure politics has been extensively studied'and de-
scribed in political science as a strategy for industry to deal collectively
with changing circumstances. In all three countries, instances of collective
lobbying could indeed be observed; but they were much less common
than many other forms of collective actions. The reason for this may
be that the chemical fibre industry being part of the chemical industry,
profits from more favorable state policies than other sectors - and without
having to organize for them. There seems to exist something like a gen-
eralized loyalty of the state towards the chemical sector.
Participation in concerted actions is similar to the previously-men-
tioned lobbying, in that the relationship between the industry and the
state is involved. It is different, however, in that the strategy is not so
much based on pressure but on cooperation through comprehensive indus-
trial restructuring schemes.3 Two important cases of concerted action
in which collective sets of chemical fibre producers participated took
place at the international level: the Multi-Fibre Agreements and the Euro-
pean restructuring network. But at the national level in Italy, such indus-
try participation in concerted action has been crucial throughout.
Reduction of competition within the national sector through division
of labor is made possible since the chemical fibre industry produces three
products: nylon, polyester and acrylic. In the beginning of the 70s,
This point is especially well covered in the literature on neocorporatism (Schmitter/
Lehmbruch 1979; Lehmbruch/ Schmitter 1982).
J
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there was a clear tendency among all the large producers to add all three
fibres to their product range. From 1976 onwards, as a result of the
crisis in the sector, the firms suddenly favored specialization and pro-
ceeded to concentrate on one fibre. It became clear that this decision
was not primarily an individual firm policy (i.e., specialization on the
tirm level) but rather the result of collective negotiations about who is
going to produce which fibre in the future (i.e., differentiation at the
sectoral level).
As lobbying is for political science the form of collective action pur
excellence, so are cartels the form of collective action par excellence
for economists. And as with lobbying, cartels are less frequent than
other forms of collective action in the case studied. They were comnlon
at the end of the 60s and the beginning of the 70s. Since then, however,
the foreign trade relationships of the chemical fibre industry have grown
extensively, making national cartels a difficult strategy for collectively
coping with prices and competition.
The concept of the concerted sector refers to those forms of coopera-
tion which go in the direction of binding all chemical fibre sector facili-
ties of one country together in a coordinated production unit. The idea
is to put the entire chemical fibre industry under one roof for either
arriving at a more efficient use of resources - and thus avoiding some
disastrous effects of competition - or to better face international competi-
tion.
Reduction of foreign competition through price policy is a rather
complex undertaking for a collective action, since two conditions must
be fulfilled in order for it to be effective. Apart from the fact that prices
must be kept high, it should at the same time not lead to imports of
cheaper fibres. As far as a collective closing of the sector is concerned,
this has occasionally been achieved by a combination of vertical integra-
tion, trade mark policies, the giving of discounts fbr fibres manufactured
in those textiles produced for export, international agreements, price
cartels, and price leadership. Among these forms of collective action,
the latter two - price cartels and price leadership - are both the most
vulnerable and the most difficult to implement. Consequently, they are
also the least frequent. There is the problem of free-riding, the difficulty
of imposing higher prices on buyers (e.g. in ltaly), and the fact that
sometimes price increases have to be approved (e.g. the Price Commis-
sion in Britain).
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Policies for the reduction of labor force in the industry refer to a
situation where industry decides to lay off labor in order to cope with
changing circumstances. Such a decision is very often taken by the firm
individually. The study of the chemical fibre case has shown, however,
that firms in a sector can also act collectively with respect to laying off
the labor force. There may be good reasons for the producers to act
collectively rather than individually in this. In some countries (e.g. Italy),
it is very difficult to discharge labor. In order to do so, the entire sector
must be formally declared as being in a situation of economic crisis.
Once applicable, wages are totally or partially paid by state funds (Cassa
Integrazione in Italy, Kurzarbeitergeldin Germany). With this, firms can
externalize restructuring costs to the state without simultaneously having
to partially or totally leave the sector. Moreover, the firms have less to
fear from labor conflicts; and once the recession is over, the firms can
regain the same labor force.
When turning to a vertical reading of Table l, it becomes clear that
the West German industry is strongly characterized by the presence of
collective restructuring strategies. The study also indicated that all differ-
ent collective strategies result from a stable private policy network
which existed over the entire period studied. All collective strategies
resulted from an unchanging set of actors who mutually recognize one
another, without at the same time being involved in major conflicts
among themselves. Here we have a private policy network which can
mobilize collective restructuring strategies for the overall sector in periods
of difficulties, while keeping the network latent in periods when collec-
tive strategies are not needed.
ln ltaly, collective restructuring strategies are also quite common;
but in contrast to West Germany, they did not result from one compre-
hensive policy network. Rather, they resulted from two different and
often competing policy networks: a private policy network integrating
the private producers and their associations, and a public policy network
integrating public firms and other quasi-public institutions. Taken sepa-
rately, both networks - as in the case of West Germany - were also
characterized by the remarkable stability of the participating actors. More-
over, when it became clear in 1983 to all the actors in the two different
networks that competing for the same resources had to lead to mutual
destruction, both networks melted together for a short period of time in
a mixed private/public policy network.
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Britain lies at the other end of the scale. As one can see from Ta-
ble l, many attempts did exist in the British industry to come to collec-
tive restructuring strategies. Most of the time, however, they were noth-
ing more than attempts reflecting coalitions of the day rather than result-
ing from a stable policy network. Such a policy network never existed
in Britain during the period studied.
How such differences in the occurrence of policy networks - and
consequently, in collective restructuring strategies - can be explained is
the topic of the following sections.
4 Preconditions for Policy Networks
There exists a widespread argument in social science nowadays which
states that the actors in a policy network come together because they
have interests or goals in common - or in other words, because it is the
most rational strategy for them. This approach is certainly not wrong;
but it neglects the fact that the existence of collective action is also
dependent on other factors. To understand collective action, it is not
enough to understand the motives for doing things together; one has also
to understand the conditions which facilitate cooperation. As Crozier
and Friedberg put it,
In asserting ... a system's existence, our underlying assumption is that there must be a
game which allows the different strategies of the pafiners in a relationship to be coord!
nated. In other words, there must be a containing system within which this game takes
place, and which makes it possible for the necessary conflicts, negotiations, alliances,
and interactions to occur (Crozier/ Friedberg 1980: 125).
As became clear in the study of the chemical fibre sector, this containing
system is not an abstract, but rather a reality composed of concrete con-
texts in which the relevant actors are embedded.
Three different kinds of contexts turned out to be significant for the
absence or presence of policy networks:
- The cluster of general country variables, such as the traditional polit-
ical orientation towards the economy, the level of consistency in how
industrial adaptation is managed, the degree to which industrial adap-
tation has become politicized, and the role played by public agencies.
- The existence of general sector variables, such as personal or/and
organizational interlocks and integration within an industry.
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Structural end situational conditio,?s of tlle sector or industry in
question: intra-industry competition and crisis, existence and activities
of trade associations, frequency and extent of state regulation and
influence, degree of international regulation, and degree of influence
of international organizations.
4.1 General Country Variables Enabling (or Disabling) Policy
Networks
As was stated earlier, industrial adaptation in West Germany relies heavi-
ly on private policy networks. Italy relies on private networks to a much
lesser extent; and Britain does so only in a minimal way. In this section,
possible reasons will be formulated in an attempt to explain why these
differences occur among the three countries. It will be illustrated that
the use of private policy networks in crisis management is conditioned
by ideologies and institutions - or, in other words, by national character-
istics. rnuch in the same way that public policies towards industrial adap-
tation are,
Political and social sciences have produced a number of studies that
analyze industrial adaptation in a more comprehensive way (Blank 1978;
Duchöne/ Shepherd 1987; Dyson/ Wilks 1983; Esser/ Fach/ Dyson 1983;
Grant/ Paterson/ Whitston 1988; Hayward 1974; Horn 1987; Katzenstein
1978; Kreile 1978, 1983; Posner 1978; Ranci 1987; Shepherd 1987;
Strange/ Tooze l98l;Wilks 1983). All of them have identified a list of
national characteristics which influence the particular fotm which industri-
al adaptation will take: the general political tradition regarding the econo-
my, the level of consistency in how industrial adaptation is managed,
the degree to which industrial adaptation has become politicized, and the
role played by public agencies.
The same categories will be used in the following analysis to demon-
strate why some countries can constitute a better ground than others fbr
industrial adaptation via policy networks.
Regarding the economy, West Gerntdto,'s political tradition is general-
ly characterized by two seemingly contradictory tendencies. On the one
hand, there is a strong tradition of non-interventionism in industry; and
on the other, there exists a long tradition of organized capitalism (or
social parmership).
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In Gennany, the state is usually absent (or at least in the back-
ground) as far as concrete action is concerned. This tendency is coupled
with long-standing cooperative relations between the various pafties in
public policy and industry - both in depth and in width. Such an envi-
ronment is indeed an ideal ground fbr the development of policy net-
works, since the private policy network here is part of a conrprehensive
public policy.
There are however, also three other fäctors - namely. the level of
consistency in how industrial adaptation is managed. the de-eree to which
industrial adaptation has becorne politicized. and the role played by pub-
lic agencies. These constitute additional stimnlants to the development
of policy nefworks within Gennan industry.
The consistency of West German industrial policy lies in a widely
and deeply held principle: Strukturpolirifr. This nleAns that govemment
support is given to make adjustments led bv tlrc privrte sector. Public
agencies do not conlpete with policy networks. but rather stimulate
tlrern. Srrakrurpolitik allows structural intervention only (l) when the
difliculties concern a v'hole sector, and (2) when they are based on
lasting economic changes. In crisis situations, the govenrrnent's role is
to support measures of self-help. A significant example here is the possi-
bility given to Gennan industry to receive Kurzarlteiter.gelri (shorr-time
allowance). Howeveq such special governmental help or other 
_qovern-
mental interventions can be considered only if the sectors are undergoing
major changes at a rapid pace - and if the changes would generate unde-
sirable economic and social consequences (see also Esser/ Fach/ Dyson
1983: 125). Defining a problem as stnrctural. depends primarily on a
collective strategy by the industry itself. Throughout the entire period
of study, temporary labor has been a cornmon practice in West
Gennany's chemical fibre sector. It is not known precisely how much
such a scheme has cost the West Gennan governnlent. but a figurc of
some hundred million DM has been mentioned for the one-year period
of 1975-76 alone.4
West Germany is also characterized by a "depoliticized" process of
industrial adaptation: this means that it cornes closest to a model of
technocratic managernent of industrial adaptation (Dysoni Wilks 1983:
257). This model is at the same tirne both the outcorne and the fbunda-
The compctitive advantages resulting tiom this scheme. when conrparcd k) other countlies.
have been described in nrore detail in Kcnis (1990).
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tion of policy networks. Historical experiences have shown that cooperate
networks were successful and advantageous for all parties concerned, thus
contributing to the stability of such affangements and to their diffusion
into other domains. In West Germany, such networks are not only facili-
tated by but also constitute a genuinely stateless industrial policy. As
is illustrated in Figure 1, this phenomenon has also been called "closed
private-sector management" (Dyson/ Wilks 1983: 257; Ronge 1980).
Figure 1: Forms of Sectoral Management in the Chemical Fibre Sector








ln Britain, the situation is quite different from the one in West Germany.
In Britain, closed sector management has never been an option. Here
openness prevailed, characteized by an "incremental pattern of decision
making" (Lindblom 1977; Richardson and Jordan 1979 for the specific
case of Britain). This was portrayed by Hayward (1974) as the "hum-
drum, unplanned and pluralistic" style.
This style of management most probably finds its roots in Britain's
political tradition, where principles of autonomy and individual self-gov-
ernment form the basis of institutional life. They materialize in the econ-
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not only lacks a basis for the development of policy networks; it also
lacks the environmenl in which such networks would make any sense.
Utterly absent in Britain is the West German consistency in the man-
agement of industrial adaptation. Britain is characterizedby great ideolog-
ical instabilities (Grant 1982). These fluctuating polarities have undoubt-
edly led to failure on the part of industry along certain lines. British
industry has been unable to develop the organizational capacity so neces-
sary for the anticipatory management of industrial adaptation. The politi-
cizing of industrial adaptation, however, has reached high peaks in Brit-
ain. Relevant here are both the openness mentioned earlier and the firms'
desire to organize their own affairs. Individual firms engage in consulta-
tion with their employees in a haphazard, and irregular manner. This
amounts to oscillation between a hesitant and suspicious approach to
industrial change, or else resorting to a dramatic fait accompli.
What makes the situation even worse for the entire sector is, that
this did not lead to the purification crusls so praised (and expected) by
conservative economists (i.e., the elimination of less efficient market
participants). The deeper the crisis in the British chemical fibre industry
became, the worse the chances for crisis management grew; and the more
fragmented, unpredictable and uncoordinated the institutional responses
were.
Regarding the role of public agencies, Britain is a very interesting
case. It is interesting to note that the British "disease" cannot simply be
imputed to weak public institutions. such administrative structures as the
Civil Service, the City, the distribution circuits, and - at times - even
the National Economic Development councils, can all certainly be called
strong public institutions. Moreover, in the field of economic policy, the
British government has been neither weak nor vacillating (Blank 1978:
9l). However, two aspects are missing: first, close interorganizational
collaboration between firms, enabling both the development of collective
learning processes and the effective management of successive crises;
and second, a politically secure and equally interlocked environment in
which such institutions could have an influence on the outcome of do-
mestic or international economic objectives.
Although the political and social environment in ltaly is fundamen-
tally more favorable for building up private policy networks, both the
growth and existence of such networks were limited. Industrial policy
was carried out from the top down and was led almost completely by
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the state. Additional obstructive f'actors also emerged. especially during
the 70s.
In a country where the price tbr thousands of goods is strictly regu-
lated but where no anti-trust legislation exists, one shottld expect a stable
basis tbr networks. Industrial culture in Italy accepts principles both of
order and of integration, as well as the importance of common or corpo-
rate interests. This type of industrial culture has supported the emergence
of highly fbrmalized institutional structures which can be subsumed under
the heading of organized copitalisnr.
In the West German case, collective goals have often been pursued
under the concept of social partnership; but for the Italians, this mission
has mainly been pursued by the public enterprise. Ironically enough,
the existence of public enterprises - along with the ltalian pattern of
direct and detailed intervention in industrial affairs - has more often than
not had the reverse effect of dividing firms against one another. Many
attempts by the state to arrive at a coordinated and integrated chemical
fibre sector failed, leading both to redundancies in investments and to
spectacular crashes. The Italian government would have liked to see a
national network of firms building a holding company through which
all Italian production units of chemical fibres would be coordinated.
However, the Italian state has never been able to overcome the mixture
of intimacy, cooperation, and rivalry between the producers. For example,
the massive chemical fibre complex in Sardinia's Val de Tirso area was
planned and carried out through a joint venture of Montedison Fibre and
ANIC, a joint venture initiated and strongly favored by the state. This
cooperation between a private and a public firm was built more on the
good intentions of the Italian state than on good understanding between
the firms. An overall rivalry always existed between their parent firms
(Montedison and ENI) in the chemical fields, and both groups generally
do not agree on each other's future plans. From the first day of opera-
tion, the joint massive plant in Val de Tirso produced enonnous losses
and was referred to as "the cathedral in the desert"' It can be said that
Italy has generally experienced difficulties in arriving at a coherent indus-
trial strategy. Obstacles here are the factionalism and immobility of the
ruling Christian Democratic Party, the patronage system, and the directly
ensuing administrative inefficiency.
In principle, the management of industrial adaptation in Italy is rela-
tively depoliticized and uncontroversial. Catholic - as well as communist
- social ideas, together with a national consensus in favor of regional
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policies, are all legitimate grounds for intervention - as well as for a
general admission of the inadequacy of the market. The Italian version
of organized capitalism is not organized from the bottom up (as in West
Germany) but from the top down. This political reality renders it difficult
for firms to find a general basis for cooperation.
The overall Italian chemical fibre industry can be characterized as
an open public sector: it does not constitute an integrated set of firms
(see Figure 1). Instead, the firms are embedded (all along different lines)
not only in a public web of trade unions and economic institutions (i.e.,
Cassa integrizione, GEPI, CIPI, IMI, CIPE)5 but also in the political
parties, the bureaucracy, central and regional governments, etc. Private
firms and public institutions form a large, undifferentiated public sphere.
Most of the time, this sphere produces nothing but "ad hoc unsystematic
and sometimes inconsistent measures" (Diebold 1980: 6) - and these
make for short-term "fix-its" rather than long-term adjustments.
4.2 General Sector Variables Enabling (or Disabling) Policy
Networks
Whether a policy network exists or not, however, is not exclusively
dependent on country variables. Especially at the sectoral level, comple-
mentary factors are decisive if a policy network is to develop. For exam-
ple, in countries with an overall positive climate for policy networks,
it is possible for policy communities or networks not to develop within
certain sectors. For example, it seems obvious that a sector with thou-
sands of geographically dispersed actors will only develop as a policy
network under very specific conditions - even in a country with a posi-
tive climate.
In the case of an industrial sector, the chances for developing a
policy network will increase in relation to existing forms of integration
and interpenetration among firms. There are different indicators which
express this: the degree of concentration according to market shares as
well as mutual capital shares; the firm's degree of vertical integration
and its degree of differentiation and integration regarding public/private
CIPE = Comitato interministeriale per la programmazione economica; CIPI = Centro
interministeriale di guida delle politica industriale; GEPI = Gestione pubblica industriale;
IMI = Istituto mobiliare italiano.
5
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ownership, domestic or foreign origin of producers, production of a sin-
gle sort of fibre versus different ones, and regional concentration; and
lastly, the history of the industry. Along these lines, let me give a short
account of the three national sectors under study.
Britain: Firms producing in the chemical fibre industry could rely
in no way on interlocks and forms of integration within the industry.
The sector showed the highest concentration regarding market shares.
This was true to such an extent that it proved counterproductive, since
it led to continuous quarrels between ICI and Courtaulds.
As regards mutual capital shares, the firms were penetrated only to
a limited extent by banks as intermediaries and were coordinated only
to a limited extent through joint shareholdings. What did exist in the
British case, however, was a rather high level of vertical integration
towards textile firms. Such a form of integration, however, counteracted
integration among the fibre producers themselves.
In the British case, many additional factors were present to divide
firms into different groups. Small firms and large firms acted in totally
different spheres; foreign producers were not integrated into the home
industry; and finally, the regional concentration of plants in Northem
Ireland did not enhance integration of firms producing chemical fibres
in Britain.
The one form of company integration which was successful in
Britain was the division of labor between different firms with regard
to the production of specific fibres. Each major producer concentrated
on the production of one specific fibre. In the short run, this can be seen
as a mode to avoid future intra-industry competition, as well as a way
to solve collective action problerns. In the long run, however, it renders
even more unlikely any future development of a policy community - and
consequently, comprehensive political restructuring of the overall sector
through a policy network.
West Germany: Although politicians and producers paid continuous
lip service to the idea of a free market, their position compared to Brit-
ain was exactly the opposite. The degree of firm integration was very
high. Concentration measured by market share was also high, but not
so high that it produced conflicts. Even more important for this integra-
tion were indirect mutual capital shares - and above all, interlocking
directorates (through German banks). These were crucial factors for the
formation of an accommodating network in the West German chemical
fibre sector.
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Vertical integration was almost absent. This certainly helped to re-
duce pafticularistic interests, since it facilitated agreement on universalis-
tic strategies for handling demand. All West German producers continu-
ously insisted on not following the trend of vertical integration: a trend
which was, at times, very fashionable in Western Europe's chemical fibre
industry.
Another factor in West Germany was the way in which different
groups of firms worked side by side: small and large firms, foreign and
domestic firms, public and private firms. Similar to the other countries,
in West Germany small firms were not part of the national policy com-
munity. Apart from this division, however, none of the other differentia-
tions among groups had any negative effect on the integration of firms
in the West German chemical fibre sector. Historical factors probably
played a much greater role in the integration of West German firms.
After all, the three major producers of chemical fibres had not so long
ago constituted one single firm. Moreover, the tradition of cartels in the
chemical industry was a strong promoting factor as well.
Italy: Regarding the degree of company integration, Italy is a less
clear-cut case. Company integration may appear high in ltaly, but a
closer look provides a more complex picture. Concentration according
to market share was lowest for the three countries; but there was a great
number of direct mutual capital shares. However, these direct mutual
capital shares - often politically initiated - produced much more conflict
than integration among firms. A high degree of vertical integration also
led to particularistic supply politics by the firms. The main difference
from the British case, however, is that at times vertical integration be-
came an important part of industrial policies. These policies which tried
to bring together private and public firms, were mostly imposed by the
state rather than voluntary; and consequently, most of them lasted only
a very short time.
The domestic firm/foreign firm division did not play a role, simply
because foreign firms were absent. Almost every other imaginable catego-
ry played a role in dividing the firms among themselves. Policy network
development was undermined by the factional politics of clientelism,
as different party iactions cultivated their relations with industry. Firms
could be public or firivate, large or small, northern or southern, and party
or not to any govbrnmental program of sectoral intervention or restruc-
turing.
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However, in 1981 under the Presidency of Prime Minister Cossiga
an Italian government commission was able to immunize the factionalism
all-too-typical in Italy. The large, overall, and - for once - successful
sectoral restructuring scheme which resulted from this, can therefore be
read as a plan which organizationally immunized many of these conflicts.
Two years afterwards - and for the first time in a decade - the Italian
chemical fibre producers could break even.
In general terms, one can conclude that the trend is the same as with
the country variables. The West German sector is structured in such a
way that it stimulates the existence of policy networks. In Britain, the
policy domain factors are counterproductive to the development of policy
networks. Italy lies somewhere in between; here additional situational
factors seem to be of particular importance for the existence of policy
networks.
4.3 Structural and Situational Factors Shaping Policy Networks
The above factors are necessary but not sufficient conditions leading to
the emergence of policy networks. Empirically stated, the following four
structural and situational factors have been found to play an important
role in understanding why policy networks come about at certain points
in time and not at others:
- the degree of intra-industry competition and crisis,
- the existence of sectoral trade associations,
- the frequency and extent of state regulation and influence, and
- the degree of international regulation and the influence of interna-
tional organizations.
The Degree of Intra-Industry Competition and Crisis
In almost all instances, forming, elaborating, relying on, or mobilizing
policy networks went hand in hand with increasing intra-industry compe-
tition and crisis. Competition is not simply equated with the working
of the free market but rather is defined as a situation where different
actors compete for the same resources (market shares, for example). This
amounts to a zero-sum situation. It can then be said that the individual
firms are in a situation of crisis. This situation was already observed by
Marx:
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So long as everything goes well, competition effects a practical brotherhood of the
capitalist class ... so that each shares in the common loot in proportion to the magnitude
of his investment ... But as soon as it is no longer a question of sharing profits, but of
sharing losses, everyone tries to reduce his own share to the minimum and to shove
it upon another ... How much the individual capitalist must bear of the loss, i.e., to what
extent he must share in it at all, is decided by power and craftiness, and competition
then transforms itself into a fight of hostile brothers (1954-56, Vol. 3: 253).
The pattern found in the case studied, however, shows that the destruc-
tive effects of such a competitive situation or "fight of hostile brothers",
can be solved by the firms as a collectivity. A typical policy network's
history will thus look like a succession of periods of sharing benefits
from the market - with an absence of policy networks - coupled with
periods of sharing losses. In other words, competition is followed by
periods of attempts to collectively deal with crisis situations and reinstall
the non-competitive order through policy networks.6 In cases where one
cannot rely on a policy network (e.g., the British), the burden of the
crisis is borne by the individual firm: it will succumb to the game called
survival of the fittest where, again according to Marx, "All is decided
by power and craftiness."
This succession of phases - from non-competition to competition
to trying to act collectively and re-affange non-competition and so on -
could be observed to be the general logic of affairs throughout the
period studied. This ranged from trying to collectively avoid imports on
a national level, to the European restructuring cartel (see Kenis 1985).
In the latter case, the challenges to the national sectors were so massive
that no national collective action could have handled them. As a result
of overly optimistic investment plans, the European chemical fibre indus-
try in 1976 found itself in a situation where the capacity utilization
was only 68 per cent and huge losses were borne by all European chemi-
cal fibre producers. Only thanks to CIFRS (Comitd International de la
Rayonne et des Fibres Synthdtiques) and the then-indispensable help of
the EC (European Community), could a European policy network be
installed. After a second try, this network was able to collectively rein-
stall a crisis-resistant European order.
Note that this is different for the labor market. Here real competition nearly always
existed. Only a limited numberof jobs are given, which put labor in the zero-sum situa-
tion that characterizes real competition. And as we know, labor unions can do almost
nothing about it except to try to smooth over the effects.
6
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The process view taken here, restrains us from viewing the economy
in either of two ways: as totally controlled by networks of capitalists,
or as a system where no competition exists any more - as some theories
seem to assume. This latter view may hold true for certain points in time
(as, for example, immediately after the European restructuring cartel).
But when considering the productive system as a process, it becomes
clear that firms are continuously confronted with new factors challenging
their new-found, collectively-organized system of non-competition: im-
ports, changing exchange rates, emerging capacities in newly-developing
countries, etc.
This also means that theories are wrong which see the economy as
a system in which only the most efficient firms can survive. Just as the
state can interfere in the productive process with public policies, capital
can implement policies through policy networks - for similar goals. How-
ever, this does not imply that capital has the capacity to form stable
networks over time. Mancur Olson (1965) has rightly shown the prob-
lems inherent in collective action. If stable collective action existed,
that would be monopoly capitalism in the sense of Hilferding's General
kartell of an all-for-one, one-for-all creation of a collective order. Policy
networks are certainly challenged, must constantly reproduce orders of
non-competition and, in turn, are called upon to reorganize these orders
whenever they are destabilized
Reacting to intra-industry competition and crisis, the study on the
restructuring of the chemical fibre sector found that policy networks tend
to go in two directions. On the one hand, they will try to achieve non-
competitive orders within their policy community: diversification, divi-
sion of labor, price leadership, etc. On the other hand, they will try to
detach their non-competitive order from potential competitive challenges:
blocking imports, preventing newcomers, etc.
Existence and Activities of Sectoral Trade Associations
Broadly speaking, trade associations arc formal organizations through
which firms in an industry collectively attempt to promote and protect
common interests. This can be done by means of ordering, managing,
and stabilizing both the relations within the industry - as well as the
relationships between industry members and those whose strategies and
activities can decisively affect the industry's future success. (Pfeffer/
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Salancik 1978; Schmitter/ Streeck 1981; Staber/ Aldrich 1983; Grant/
Coleman 1987).
In this respect, associations fulfil the same function as private policy
networks. This could theoretically mean that a negative relationship exists
between the efforts of trade associations and the existence of policy
networks. Both would constitute/?nctional equivalents within the collec-
tive management of the chemical fibre industry.
The empirical data, however, lead to two different conclusions. First,
there seems to be a positive relationship between the existence of policy
networks and the efforts of sectoral trade associations. Second, while
studying policy networks, it often occurred that trade associations in the
chemical fibre sector do not fulfil the functions defined above.
As to the unimportance of trade associations regarding these tradi-
tional functions and their no-less-significant importance regarding the
existence of policy networks, both point to a specific kind of relationship.
This interaction appears to be different from functional equivalency.
Sectoral trade associations were, in some instances, an important
means for successfully arriving at policy networks. The most striking
case here was certainly the European restructuring cartel. Here, CIFRS
has been an important actor in many ways: centralizing information,
serving as a meeting place for firms, or legitimating forms of action by
firms which would otherwise have been defined as a simple cartel.
Another indication for the mutual functionality of sectoral trade asso-
ciations and policy networks is the fact that the firms making up the
respective policy networks are exactly the same as those who are mem-
bers of the sectoral trade associations (in West Germany, Industrievereini-
gung Chemiefaser; and in Italy, the federation within Aschimica (for
private firms) and Associazione sindicale delle aziende del gruppo ENI
(ASAP, for public firms). This holds true despite the fact that in all
countries, the sector contains many more firms; and these associations
do not specify rules of exclusion.
All this points to the fact that business associations can play an
important role in the existence of policy networks. Whereas business
associations of small firms directly promote and protect interests on
behalf of their members, business associations of large firms seem to
provide crucial organizational and cultural resources for the realization
of collective actions - such as policy networks.
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Frequency and Extent of State Regulation and State Influence
From the existing literature on collective actions by industry, two factors
can be deduced which specify in which way their existence is dependent
on the state. First, it is stated that collective actions by industry exist
in order to enhance the industry's power within the political arena and
thus act as a force counter to the state. Second, the state may favor
collective actions by industry by granting them the right to autonomously
produce policies (see Hollingsworth et al. n.d.). Interestingly enough,
neither factor helps to explain the existence of policy networks as a case
of collective action. First, since policy networks are not organilational
forms of collective action, it is difficult for the state to delegate power
to such an ad hoc system of action. Second, although the probability of
policy networks stands in positive correlation to the state's regulating
influence, the underlying logic of this relationship is different. It does
not seem to be the case that business, through policy networks, aims at
constituting a force counter to the state.
The opposite rather holds: i.e., the more power the state exerts in
the economy, the more policy networks can use the state's influence to
arrive at their own goals. This is all the more true in proportion to the
diminution of state policies directed specifically towards a given industry.
In cases where the government strongly regulates a specific industry, this
industry will probably constitute a counter-force through trade associa-
tions. This does not, however, contradict a basic rule: i.e', in order to
arrive at certain goals, business needs the state as a partner. A good
example is the case of increasing imports, where pressure comes from
foreign countries, not state regulation. One way of coping with these
imports is precisely to ask the state for help.
The state theory implicit in this observation is that business, far from
always acting against the state, actually needs it in many instances to
arrive at certain policies. The primary rationale is not to exert influence
on government, but to secure common benefits for the participating actors
- be they government or business (for a similar conclusion, see Cawson/
HolmesT St"uen, 1987:15; and recently, Traxler/ Unger l99O7). To illus-
7 In a study of the industrial restructuring of the automobile, machine tool, and steel
industry in different countries, it is concluded that: "Da der Staat die allgemeinen Rah-
menbedingungen wirtschaftlicher Beziehungen setzt, fällt ihm auch die entscheidende Rolle
für den Aüfbau und den Fortbestand korporatistischer und netzwerkförmiger Steuerungsin-
stitutionen zu. Für alle drei der hier betrachteten Sektoren gilt, daß in jenen Ländern'
Industrial Restructuring in Britain, Italy and West Germany 32t
trate this point, let me briefly present the West German case, in which
policy networks were a common mode of governance for industrial re-
structuring of the chemical fibre sector. Accepting that there is a relation-
ship between the existence of policy networks and the presence of the
nation-state, how does this relationship function?
What makes West Germany so different from the other cases studied,
is that the industrial policies developed by industry itself are congruent
with the stance the state takes towards industrial policies. All takes place
within the same sectoral circle: early warnings (often by the banks),
policy formulation, bargaining, and policy implementation. The private
policy network is thus part of an overall public policy: one which allows
for minimal transaction costs, avoids politicizing, enables time manage-
ment of policies, and prompts organizational learning. It manages to
avoid a central problem, seen as fundamental to industrial policy: "To
analyze industrial policies and performance is one thing: to establish
connections between them is quite another. Government, planners and
banks cannot run firms themselves. Whatever their formal powers, in
the end they have to rely on managers. Their influence is inherently
indirect" (Duch6ne 1987: 233).
Seen from such a perspective, it is difficult to place the West Ger-
man state along a traditional weak-state/strong-state axis. The primary
role of policy networks is neither to exert influence on government nor
vice-versa. The strong/weak perspective implies that relationships operate
as formal channels of state influence - or of resistance to it. Instead of
putting West Germany into the middle ground, as it has been suggested
(e.g. Wilksi Wright 1987: 282),I prefer to put it on the weak end as
far as direct interventions are concerned. It is, however, strong in facili-
tating a framework for policy networks. In this respect, Katzenstein
(1978: 328) is certainly right when he maintains that "... even today ...
there are traces in the West German policy network which resemble the
Japanese model more than the Anglo-Saxon one". The traditional role
of West Germany in international economic policies - which consists in
defending the free market - happens to coincide with its own economy
and industrial policy: that of relying on organizational nuclei in order
in denen solche Steuerungsinstitutionen bestehen, deren Enstehung und Funktionsftihigkeit
wesentlich auf staatliche Organisationshilfen zurückzuführen sind. ... Dies bedeutet, daß
dem Staat eine Funktion strukturpolitischer Metasteuerung zuftillt" (Traxler/ Unger 1990:
2r7-218).
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to be able to react effectively to changing circumstances. In general,
instances of lobbying and concerted practices were not as much reactions
to state interference as they were possibilities to solve problems through
the state - problems which otherwise could not have been solved. Indi-
vidual capitalists tend to be opportunist and pragmatic. While they
might have a tendency to prefer the minimal state role prescribed in
laissez-faire ideology, they certainly have a tendency to adapt to the
political realities they face.
Degree of International Regulation and Influence of International
Organiptions
The above description of the relationship with the nation-state, can be
extended to include international regulations and influence. The case of
the MFAs (or Multi-Fibre Agreements) probably best illustrates this
similarity of functions.
International trade in textiles is partially regulated by the MFAs.
These were established under the auspices of the General Agreements
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The MFAs encompass the majority of
the world's most important exporters and dates from 1973, renewable
every four years. The policy actor system for the MFAs includes the
United States, Japan, the EC, Canada, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Norway,
Switzerland, the Eastern European Countries, the newly-industrialized
countries, and the developing countries. On the basis of a common com-
mercial policy, the EC acts as a single unit on behalf of its mernber
states. In formulating its policy, the EC therefore has first to reach agree-
ment among member states on a common position in textile trade talks.
It is important to notice here that the interest of the chemical fibre pro-
ducers in the MFAs is only indirect - but nevertheless, very strong. In
principle, little possibility is given for the producers to take part as a
collectivity in concerted action in this international regime.
Interestingly enough - given the absence of direct representation of
producers in GATT, as well as the fact that representation of EC member
states is handled through the EC within GATT - national policy networks
of producers nevertheless involve themselves in the outcome of the
MFAs. I have argued elsewhere that the position taken by the EC in the
MFA talks is not a European one; it is de J'acto a mix of particular
national policies of different member states (Kenis and Schneider 1987).
Consequently, this power of the nation-state in final decision making,
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almost always leads to the fact that producers primarily promote their
interests through national policy networks. It could indeed be observed
that organized interests of chemical fibre producers, in concert with orga-
nized interests of textile producers, participated in formulating the nation-
al stance regarding the MFA talks.
Inte rnationalization certainly means an increase of interdependencies
at the international economic level - along with a loss of power for
national actors. Nevertheless, the above illustrates that one should not
be tempted to conclude that resulting contingencies can only be dealt
with on the international level. The contrary is true: in situations of
international interdependence, the strength of well-organized sectoral
policy networks at the national level becomes especially relevant. To be
sure, it is usually much more fficient to deal with contingencies at the
level where they arise. [t is, however, often still more effictive to deal
with them at the level of national policy networks. Survival for a sector
within the international economy, then, depends more than anything else
on the rule of the best organized - as the West German case clearly
illustrates.
5 Conclusion
The most plausible conclusion from the presented study, is that the de-
velopment of policy networks depends on several factors. Formulating
a theory on the development of policy networks should therefore be
handled with caution. If we take a closer look at the relationships be-
tween the different factors explaining the emergence of policy networks,
it is seen that not all factors have the same weight, that some factors
are conditional upon others, and that some of the factors are highly
interrelated.
What if we were to select a single factor as being the central explan-
atory one, the crucial condition for many other factors? Due to its inter-
relation with many other factors, it would undoubtedly be the institution-
al structure of the nation-state. Nevertheless, when considering the na-
tion-state and its diverse institutions, we are obviously dealing with
quite a complex situation. Rather than one or more clearly deducible
independent variables to explain the emergence of policy networks, there
is an interrelated set of historical structures. The relationship between
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governance structures and state structures is so complicated that it is
difficult to confine it to a simple causal and/or linear model.
Instead, allow me to draw attention to two more general tendencies
which refer to the development of policy networks and in particular, to
the relationship between policy networks and the state - at least in the
cases studied here:
- First, the development of policy networks seems to be dependent on
the state, since it sets the general framework for coordinating the
economy. More specifically, though, one can say that it is not so
much the structure or activities of the state, nor the structure or
activities of policy networks, which are of crucial importance: it is
their mutual meeting ground. The strength of the West German case
seems to arise from an overall sectoral governance characterized by
a functional mix of private policy networks and public institutions.
From a process perspective, one could expect the role of the state
to encourage the existence of policy networks - while existing policy
networks encourage the state to rely on them, and so on.
- Second, it is remarkable that in the identified cases of private poli-
cy networks, the state is characterized by a limited claim - not by
the traditionally self-exalted claim of total rationality, total sovereign-
ty, and total steering. Nonetheless, private policy networks prove to
be a mode of providing public goods. From an institutional point
of view, the state develops here in a decentralized and cooperative
way.
The decentralization of the state is a theme which has recently been
discussed with growing frequency. It is argued that the state is not a
monolithic whole, but a set of relatively discrete institutional apparata
that vary across industries, sectors, and societies - as well as over time.
Within governance institutions in which private policy networks play
a role, the structure of the state is not only characteized by decentnliza-
tion but also by cooperation. This cooperation results from a social fact:
in many policy fields, public goals are increasingly more difficult to
obtain without the cooperation of private collectivities (see Schuppert
1989). This might be taken as an indication of a state which is less
involved in substantive regulation; but the state we see here nevertheless
tries to influence the premises of the policies. Importantly too, this state
also tries to provide "rules of the game" for societal problem-solving
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processes (see, for example, the distinction between "procedural" and
"substantive" regulation introduced by Mayntz 1983).
Consequently, a "strong" decentralized and cooperative state seems
to be fruitful ground for the development of private policy networks.
Direct state intervention is absent from the governance structures in
which private policy networks exist. Nevertheless, the state does seem
to fulfil important functions (called Meta-Strttkturpolitik in Unger/ Trax-
ler, 1990). This is also important from a policy making point of view.
On the one hand, avoiding or being incapable of implementing direct
state intervention does not necessarily mean that industrial restructuring
has to be left to either individual firm strategies or to the market. After
all, the destructive effect of this became clear in the British case. On
the other hand, choosing to rely on private policy networks means that
the state must consider how those networks can be governed - hopefully,
in such a way that clear lines of accountability and consistency in control
systems can be ensured. This, however, opens a new research agenda -
and one which will need even further research on policy networks.
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